contours inquiry (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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contours inquiry in Illinois

10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Mendenhallgreen
scotus · 1980 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“no intrusion upon [a] person’s liberty or privacy” occurs for fourth - 19 - No. 1-24-0629 amendment purposes when a person voluntarily answers questions posed by police). ¶ 34 Instead, we believe that the legislature intended the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” in this statute to account for the fact that a victim or witness could engage in an encounter with a law enforcement officer while recognizing that the body camera recording of that encounter would likely be used for law enforcement purposes; by doing so, however, th

2025See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“no intrusion upon [a] person’s liberty or privacy” occurs for fourth amendment purposes when a person voluntarily answers questions posed by police). - 19 - No. 1-24-0629 ¶ 33 Instead, we believe that the legislature intended the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” in this statute to account for the fact that a victim or witness could engage in an encounter with a law enforcement officer while recognizing that the body camera recording of that encounter would likely be used for law enforcement purposes; by doing so, however, th

22
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.green
scotus · 2002 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005Although the contours of the inquiry into purpose are not clear under Justice Kennedy's analysis (see Alameda Books, Inc. , 535 U.S. at 447 , 152 L.

2005Although the contours of the inquiry into purpose are not clear under Justice Kennedy's analysis (see Alameda Books, Inc. , 535 U.S. at 447 , 152 L.

22
Siegel v. City of Chicagogreen
illappct · 1970 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997As a result, the contours of the requirement have been shaped by our appellate court, which, in 1970, announced that the favorable termination requirement could be satisfied only by "a judgment which deals with the factual issue of the case, whether the judgment be rendered after a trial or upon motion for summary judgment.” (Emphasis added.) Siegel v. City of Chicago, 127 Ill.

1997As a result, the contours of the requirement have been shaped by our appellate court, which in 1970, announced that the favorable termination requirement could be satisfied only by “a judgment which deals with the factual issue of the case, whether the judgment be rendered after a trial or upon motion for summary judgment.” (Emphasis added.) Siegel v. City of Chicago , 127 Ill.

22
Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co.green
ill · 1965 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014See Larson, 33 Ill. 2d at 325 (adopting section 414). ¶ 73 Section 414 states: “One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Austin green
ill · 2019
2 sentences

2025See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“no intrusion upon [a] person’s liberty or privacy” occurs for fourth - 19 - No. 1-24-0629 amendment purposes when a person voluntarily answers questions posed by police). ¶ 34 Instead, we believe that the legislature intended the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” in this statute to account for the fact that a victim or witness could engage in an encounter with a law enforcement officer while recognizing that the body camera recording of that encounter would likely be used for law enforcement purposes; by doing so, however, th

2025See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“no intrusion upon [a] person’s liberty or privacy” occurs for fourth amendment purposes when a person voluntarily answers questions posed by police). - 19 - No. 1-24-0629 ¶ 33 Instead, we believe that the legislature intended the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” in this statute to account for the fact that a victim or witness could engage in an encounter with a law enforcement officer while recognizing that the body camera recording of that encounter would likely be used for law enforcement purposes; by doing so, however, th

22025–2025
In Re Commitment of Simons green
ill · 2004
2 sentences

2006Simons, 213 Ill. 2d at 530 .

2006Simons, 213 Ill. 2d at 530 .

22006–2006
Edwards v. Arizona green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1991The Court held that once an accused has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” (Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 485 , 68 L.

1991The Court held that once an accused has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” (Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 485 , 68 L.

11991–1991

Where else courts name it

KS 55 (2005–2024) CT 42 (1991–2026) CA 18 (1973–2026) NJ 16 (1975–2025) PA 15 (1986–2024) TX 11 (1999–2020) IL 10 (1991–2025) OR 9 (1987–2022) UT 9 (1999–2026) MD 9 (1985–2015) MI 8 (2014–2024) IA 7 (2014–2021) AZ 5 (2002–2014) CO 5 (1988–2024) AK 5 (1970–2024) VA 5 (1989–2024) MO 4 (1980–2019) WV 4 (1988–2016) WI 4 (2011–2023) NM 4 (1997–2021) LA 4 (2016–2024) FL 3 (2010–2025) WY 3 (1982–2007) TN 3 (2001–2010) ME 3 (2016–2024) MA 3 (2000–2015) NH 3 (2010–2023) MS 2 (1976–1991) KY 2 (2014–2024) MN 2 (2014–2024) SC 2 (2023–2024) NY 2 (2018–2025) DC 2 (2017–2017) AR 2 (2004–2006) GA 2 (1988–2002) NC 2 (2015–2026) OH 2 (2007–2026) VT 2 (2000–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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