Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
James v. Janegreen1 sentence2025Although government employees are not immune from claims of gross negligence, James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53 (1980), the School Board itself benefits from immunity from suit, whether the claims involve simple negligence, gross negligence, or even intentional torts. | 1 | 1 |
McCary v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024However, the Court in McCary also acknowledged in a footnote that “[a]n argument is sometimes made that the United States Supreme Court no longer requires exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless automobile search but instead requires only a showing of probable cause.” 228 Va. at 227 n.*. 2024In articulating the contours of the exception, many of these cases relied (at least in part) on the “ready mobility” of the vehicle—or, in other words, the “exigency” of the situation4 that would preclude obtaining a warrant—as a justification for the search. 4 The Court in Carroll stated that the automobile exception rested, at least in part, on the fact that “it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” 267 U.S. at 153 . -7- The Supreme Court of Virginia stated, in 1984, “[u]nder | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiayellow2 sentences2006We succinctly addressed in Williams v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 395 , 528 S.E.2d 166 (2000), the contours of the analysis required when a Confrontation Clause error occurs. *83 Constitutional error is harmless . . . only if "the beneficiary of the constitutional error. . . proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (1967). 2006We succinctly addressed in Williams v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 395 , 528 S.E.2d 166 (2000), the contours of the analysis required when a Confrontation Clause error occurs. *83 Constitutional error is harmless . . . only if "the beneficiary of the constitutional error. . . proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Albert Thompson v. William D. Leeke Attorney General of South Carolinagreen1 sentence2006"The test, therefore, is not whether laying aside the erroneously admitted evidence there was other evidence sufficient to convict beyond a reasonable doubt . . ., but, more stringently, `whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" Thompson v. Leeke, 756 F.2d 314, 316 (4th Cir.1985) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Warrengreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Moore, 250 Va. at 424 , 463 S.E.2d at 460-61 (volunteer of charity is immune from liability to charity's beneficiaries while engaged in performance of charity's work); Straley, 243 Va. at 37 , 413 S.E.2d at 50-51 (community member only generally served by charity is not beneficiary); Weston, 131 Va. at 610 , 107 S.E. at 792 (one who pays for charity's services can be beneficiary of charity). 2004See, e.g., Moore, 250 Va. at 424 , 463 S.E.2d at 460-61 (volunteer of charity is immune from liability to charity's beneficiaries while engaged in performance of charity's work); Straley, 243 Va. at 37 , 413 S.E.2d at 50-51 (community member only generally served by charity is not beneficiary); Weston, 131 Va. at 610 , 107 S.E. at 792 (one who pays for charity's services can be beneficiary of charity). | 1 | 1 |
Weston's Administratrix v. Hospital of St. Vincentgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Moore, 250 Va. at 424 , 463 S.E.2d at 460-61 (volunteer of charity is immune from liability to charity's beneficiaries while engaged in performance of charity's work); Straley, 243 Va. at 37 , 413 S.E.2d at 50-51 (community member only generally served by charity is not beneficiary); Weston, 131 Va. at 610 , 107 S.E. at 792 (one who pays for charity's services can be beneficiary of charity). 2004See, e.g., Moore, 250 Va. at 424 , 463 S.E.2d at 460-61 (volunteer of charity is immune from liability to charity's beneficiaries while engaged in performance of charity's work); Straley, 243 Va. at 37 , 413 S.E.2d at 50-51 (community member only generally served by charity is not beneficiary); Weston, 131 Va. at 610 , 107 S.E. at 792 (one who pays for charity's services can be beneficiary of charity). | 1 | 1 |
Straley v. Urbanna Chamber of Commercegreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Moore, 250 Va. at 424 , 463 S.E.2d at 460-61 (volunteer of charity is immune from liability to charity's beneficiaries while engaged in performance of charity's work); Straley, 243 Va. at 37 , 413 S.E.2d at 50-51 (community member only generally served by charity is not beneficiary); Weston, 131 Va. at 610 , 107 S.E. at 792 (one who pays for charity's services can be beneficiary of charity). 2004See, e.g., Moore, 250 Va. at 424 , 463 S.E.2d at 460-61 (volunteer of charity is immune from liability to charity's beneficiaries while engaged in performance of charity's work); Straley, 243 Va. at 37 , 413 S.E.2d at 50-51 (community member only generally served by charity is not beneficiary); Weston, 131 Va. at 610 , 107 S.E. at 792 (one who pays for charity's services can be beneficiary of charity). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carroll v. United States
green
1 sentence2024In articulating the contours of the exception, many of these cases relied (at least in part) on the “ready mobility” of the vehicle—or, in other words, the “exigency” of the situation4 that would preclude obtaining a warrant—as a justification for the search. 4 The Court in Carroll stated that the automobile exception rested, at least in part, on the fact that “it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” 267 U.S. at 153 . -7- The Supreme Court of Virginia stated, in 1984, “[u]nder | 1 | 2024–2024 |
New York v. Burger
green
1 sentence2006Rather, the proper focus is on whether the “regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.” Id. at 705 n. 16, 107 S.Ct. at 2645 (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600 , 101 S.Ct. at 2539 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Williams v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006We succinctly addressed in Williams v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 395 , 528 S.E.2d 166 (2000), the contours of the analysis required when a Confrontation Clause error occurs. 2006We succinctly addressed in Williams v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 395 , 528 S.E.2d 166 (2000), the contours of the analysis required when a Confrontation Clause error occurs. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Donovan v. Dewey
green
2 sentences2006Rather, the proper focus is on whether the “regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.” Id. at 705 n. 16, 107 S.Ct. at 2645 (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600 , 101 S.Ct. at 2539 ). 2006Rather, the proper focus is on whether the “regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.” Id. at 705 n. 16, 107 S.Ct. at 2645 (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600 , 101 S.Ct. at 2539 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ferrero Construction Co. v. Dennis Rourke Corp.
green
2 sentences1989Consequently, the policies favoring certainty and stability strongly support our follow- *7 Id. at 567 , 536 A.2d at 1140 . 1989Consequently, the policies favoring certainty and stability strongly support our follow- *7 Id. at 567 , 536 A.2d at 1140 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.