contours privilege in Maryland

1989See, e.g., Miner v. Novotny, supra, 304 Md. 164 , 498 A.2d 269 ; Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 537-40 , 445 A.2d 1038 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 , 103 S.Ct. 344 , 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 314-22 , 413 A.2d 170 (1980); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 584-94 , 350 A.2d 688 (1976); A.S.

1989See, e.g., Miner v. Novotny, supra, 304 Md. 164 , 498 A.2d 269 ; Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 537-40 , 445 A.2d 1038 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 , 103 S.Ct. 344 , 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 314-22 , 413 A.2d 170 (1980); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 584-94 , 350 A.2d 688 (1976); A.S.

1989See, e.g., Miner v. Novotny, supra, 304 Md. 164 , 498 A.2d 269 ; Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 537-40 , 445 A.2d 1038 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 , 103 S.Ct. 344 , 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 314-22 , 413 A.2d 170 (1980); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 584-94 , 350 A.2d 688 (1976); A.S.

1989See, e.g., Miner v. Novotny, supra, 304 Md. 164 , 498 A.2d 269 ; Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 537-40 , 445 A.2d 1038 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 , 103 S.Ct. 344 , 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 314-22 , 413 A.2d 170 (1980); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 584-94 , 350 A.2d 688 (1976); A.S.

1989See, e.g., Miner v. Novotny, supra, 304 Md. 164 , 498 A.2d 269 ; Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 537-40 , 445 A.2d 1038 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 , 103 S.Ct. 344 , 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 314-22 , 413 A.2d 170 (1980); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 584-94 , 350 A.2d 688 (1976); A.S.

1989See, e.g., Miner v. Novotny, supra, 304 Md. 164 , 498 A.2d 269 ; Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 537-40 , 445 A.2d 1038 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 , 103 S.Ct. 344 , 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 314-22 , 413 A.2d 170 (1980); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 584-94 , 350 A.2d 688 (1976); A.S.

2015This Court has adopted Professor Wigmore’s definition, which describes the contours of the privilege: “(1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection [may] be waived.” Greenberg v. State, 421 Md. 396, 409 , 26 A.3d 955 (2011) (citing Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 135 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975)) (alterations in Greenbe

2015This Court has adopted Professor Wigmore’s definition, which describes the contours of the privilege: “(1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection [may] be waived.” Greenberg v. State, 421 Md. 396, 409 , 26 A.3d 955 (2011) (citing Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 135 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975)) (alterations in Greenbe

2015This Court has adopted Professor Wigmore’s definition, which describes the contours of the privilege: “(1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection [may] be waived.” Greenberg v. State, 421 Md. 396, 409 , 26 A.3d 955 (2011) (citing Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 135 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975)) (alterations in Greenbe

2015This Court has adopted Professor Wigmore’s definition, which describes the contours of the privilege: “(1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection [may] be waived.” Greenberg v. State, 421 Md. 396, 409 , 26 A.3d 955 (2011) (citing Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 135 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975)) (alterations in Greenbe

2014“Abuse of discretion,” although used and applied with great frequency by appellate courts, has been described aptly as a “very general, amorphous term[ ]....” North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1 , 648 A.2d 1025 (1994).

2014“Abuse of discretion,” although used and applied with great frequency by appellate courts, has been described aptly as a “very general, amorphous term[ ]....” North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1 , 648 A.2d 1025 (1994).

2011Dant, 829 F.2d at 74 ; accord Smith, 290 F.3d at 207.

2006See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 ; State v. Welsh, [ 84 N.J. 346, 355 , 419 A.2d 1123 ] (stating, “[t]he relevant facts, then, appear to be those which disclose what places the person under arrest presently could reach at the time the arrest is undertaken and how likely it is that he would attempt resistance or escape or destruction of evidence”); State v. Pierce, [ 136 N.J. 184, 211 , 642 A.2d 947 ] (stating, “[w]e reject not the rationale of Chimel , but Belton’s, automatic application of Chimel to authorize vehicular searches following all ar

2006See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 ; State v. Welsh, [ 84 N.J. 346, 355 , 419 A.2d 1123 ] (stating, “[t]he relevant facts, then, appear to be those which disclose what places the person under arrest presently could reach at the time the arrest is undertaken and how likely it is that he would attempt resistance or escape or destruction of evidence”); State v. Pierce, [ 136 N.J. 184, 211 , 642 A.2d 947 ] (stating, “[w]e reject not the rationale of Chimel , but Belton’s, automatic application of Chimel to authorize vehicular searches following all ar

2006See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 ; State v. Welsh, [ 84 N.J. 346, 355 , 419 A.2d 1123 ] (stating, “[t]he relevant facts, then, appear to be those which disclose what places the person under arrest presently could reach at the time the arrest is undertaken and how likely it is that he would attempt resistance or escape or destruction of evidence”); State v. Pierce, [ 136 N.J. 184, 211 , 642 A.2d 947 ] (stating, “[w]e reject not the rationale of Chimel , but Belton’s, automatic application of Chimel to authorize vehicular searches following all ar

2006See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 ; State v. Welsh, [ 84 N.J. 346, 355 , 419 A.2d 1123 ] (stating, “[t]he relevant facts, then, appear to be those which disclose what places the person under arrest presently could reach at the time the arrest is undertaken and how likely it is that he would attempt resistance or escape or destruction of evidence”); State v. Pierce, [ 136 N.J. 184, 211 , 642 A.2d 947 ] (stating, “[w]e reject not the rationale of Chimel , but Belton’s, automatic application of Chimel to authorize vehicular searches following all ar

1996Ten years after we handed down Offutt , Judge Bishop, writing for us in Passamichali v. State, 81 Md.App. 731 , 569 A.2d 733 , cert. denied, 319 Md. 484 , 573 A.2d 808 (1990), delineated the contours of an exception to the general rule. 14 In that case, the defendant challenged the mandate found in § 10-905 of the Courts Article that evidence of conviction of an infamous crime is per se admissible.

1996Ten years after we handed down Offutt , Judge Bishop, writing for us in Passamichali v. State, 81 Md.App. 731 , 569 A.2d 733 , cert. denied, 319 Md. 484 , 573 A.2d 808 (1990), delineated the contours of an exception to the general rule. 14 In that case, the defendant challenged the mandate found in § 10-905 of the Courts Article that evidence of conviction of an infamous crime is per se admissible.

1994In re Estate of Olson, 244 Minn. 449 , 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697 , 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 , 70 S.Ct. 488 , 94 L.Ed. 585 (1950); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Ct.App.1981).

1994In re Estate of Olson, 244 Minn. 449 , 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697 , 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 , 70 S.Ct. 488 , 94 L.Ed. 585 (1950); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Ct.App.1981).

1994In re Estate of Olson, 244 Minn. 449 , 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697 , 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 , 70 S.Ct. 488 , 94 L.Ed. 585 (1950); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Ct.App.1981).

1994In re Estate of Olson, 244 Minn. 449 , 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697 , 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 , 70 S.Ct. 488 , 94 L.Ed. 585 (1950); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Ct.App.1981).

1994In re Estate of Olson, 244 Minn. 449 , 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697 , 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 , 70 S.Ct. 488 , 94 L.Ed. 585 (1950); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Ct.App.1981).

1994In re Estate of Olson, 244 Minn. 449 , 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697 , 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 , 70 S.Ct. 488 , 94 L.Ed. 585 (1950); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).

1994In re Estate of Olson, 244 Minn. 449 , 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697 , 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 , 70 S.Ct. 488 , 94 L.Ed. 585 (1950); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Ct.App.1981).

1994In re Estate of Olson, 244 Minn. 449 , 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697 , 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 , 70 S.Ct. 488 , 94 L.Ed. 585 (1950); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Ct.App.1981).

1993Acknowledging that its earlier cases had left some doubt as to the contours of the exception, the Supreme Court felt that it was behooved “to delineate the bounds of that exception more fully than we have in previous cases.” Id.