accused is given warning in Texas

2015United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) and Stansberry v. California, 511 U.S. 318 , (1994), Douthitt v. State, 931 S.W. 2d 244 (Tex. Crim.

2015United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) and Stansberry v. California, 511 U.S. 318 , (1994), Douthitt v. State, 931 S.W. 2d 244 (Tex. Crim.

2015United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) and Stansberry v. California, 511 U.S. 318 , (1994), Douthitt v. State, 931 S.W. 2d 244 (Tex. Crim.

2015United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) and Stansberry v. California, 511 U.S. 318 , (1994), Douthitt v. State, 931 S.W. 2d 244 (Tex. Crim.

2025Section 7 provides that “[w]hen the issue is raised by the evidence, the trial judge shall appropriately instruct the jury, generally, on the law pertaining to such statement,” id. art. 38.22, § 7, and the Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted the phrase “the issue” from section 7 as “refer[ring] to compliance with the statutory warnings set out in . . . [arts.] 38.22, §§ 2 & 3, and the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver of the rights,” Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 176 .

2024Id. art. 38.22, § 3(a). –5– (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

2024Id. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308 , 312 1 Among other things, article 38.22 provides that an oral custodial statement is inadmissible unless: (1) an electronic recording, which may include motion picture, video tape, or other visual recording, is made of the statement; (2) prior to the statement but during the recording the accused is given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2 above and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any rights set out in the warning; (3) the recording device was capable of making an accurate recording, the operator was co

2021Id. 1 Detective Burk, like Sergeant Meek, had been at the crime scene. –3– Article 38.22, section 3(a)(2) provides that “[n]o oral statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation is admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless . . . prior to the statement but during the recording the accused is given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2 [of article 38.22] and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any rights set out in the warning.” TEX.

2015It plainly states: No oral . . . statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless: (1) an electronic recording, which may include motion picture, video tape, or other visual recording, is made of the statement; (2) prior to the statement but during the recording the accused is given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2 above and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any rights set out in the warning; . . . .” (emphasis added) In subsection (e) of Article 38.23, it provides as

2014That subsection provides that the accused, prior to making the statement, [must] either receive[] from a magistrate the warning provided in Article 15.17 of [the code of criminal procedure] or receive[] from the person to whom the statement is made a warning that: (1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial; (2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in court; (3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and during any questioning; 3 Amador, 221 S.W.3d at

2011Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 specifically provides that an oral statement given while an accused was in custody may not be used unless “prior to the statement but during the recording the accused is given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2 above and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any rights set out in the warning.” Id. art. 38.22, § 3(a )( 2) (Vernon 2005).

2011As the court of criminal appeals stated in Barfield, ―[w]e do not . . . interpret the oral confession statute to require an express verbal statement from an accused that he waives his rights prior to giving the statement.‖ Barfield, 784 S.W.2d at 40–41. ―In reaching the voluntariness of a confession,‖ we look 8 Article 38.22, section 3(a)(2) states, ―prior to the statement but during the recording the accused is given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2 above and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any rights set out in the warning[.]‖ TEX.

2008Id. art. 38.22, § 3(a). 9 requirements of Section 2(b), to contain the following language, near or adjacent to the signature of the individual giving the statement: ‘I knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived the rights described above before and during the making of this statement.’” 919 S.W.2d 370, 387 (Tex. Crim.

1987In McGinty v. State, 723 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), the court held that a police officer's inquiry of whether the suspect would take a blood-alcohol test was not an interrogation.

1987In McGinty v. State, 723 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), the court held that a police officer’s inquiry of whether the suspect would take a blood-alcohol test was not an interrogation.