defendant claiming violation in California

2024(See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 367 [“A defendant claiming a violation of this right must establish both that he was deprived of the opportunity to present material and favorable evidence and that the deprivation was arbitrary and disproportionate to any legitimate purpose.”].) 5.

2021“A defendant claiming a denial of compulsory process must plausibly show that the missing testimony ‘would have been both material and favorable to his defense.’ [Citations.] Moreover, the constitutional right to compulsory process is not ‘an unfettered right to offer testimony’ that ‘automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.’ [Citation.] A defendant claiming a violation of this right must establish both that he was deprived of the opportunity to present material and favorable evidence and that the deprivation was arbitrary or disproportionate to any legitimate

2024(See People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 371 ; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 462, 463 .) “There are two exceptions to this forfeiture: (1) the objection and/or the request for an admonition would have been futile, or (2) the admonition would have been insufficient to cure the harm occasioned by the misconduct .… A defendant claiming that one of these exceptions applies must find support for his or her claim in the record. [Citation.] The ritual incantation that an exception applies is not enough.” (Panah, at p. 462.) A defendant claiming that an exception applies must demonstrate

2013(E.g., People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 872 ; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 371 ; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 462, 463 ; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 432 .) A defendant claiming an exception applies must demonstrate support therefore in the record.

2020This right is a fundamental element of due process of law." (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 19 .) However, "more than the mere absence of testimony is necessary to establish a violation of the right." (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 (Valenzuela-Bernal).) "[T]he constitutional right to compulsory process is not 'an unfettered right to offer testimony' that 'automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.' [Citation.] A defendant claiming a violation of this right must establish both that he was deprived of the opportunity to presen

2014(See Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319, 324-325 [ 164 L.Ed.2d 503 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 ].) At bottom, “ ‘[i]n order to declare a denial of [due process based on the denial of compulsory process] we must find that the absence of . . . fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’ ” (Valenzuela-Bernal, p. 872.) As Bryant acknowledges in his brief, Williams was not the only witness who could have testified on this subject.

2020This right is a fundamental element of due process of law." (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 19 .) However, "more than the mere absence of testimony is necessary to establish a violation of the right." (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 (Valenzuela-Bernal).) "[T]he constitutional right to compulsory process is not 'an unfettered right to offer testimony' that 'automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.' [Citation.] A defendant claiming a violation of this right must establish both that he was deprived of the opportunity to presen

2014A defendant claiming a denial of compulsory process must plausibly show that the missing testimony “would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 , 102 S.Ct. 3440 ]; see In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 263 , 744 P.2d 374 ].) Moreover, the constitutional right to compulsory process is not “an unfettered right to offer testimony” that “automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410, 414 [ 98 L.Ed.2d 798 , 108 S.

2024(Gamache, at p. 371; Panah, at p. 462.) “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In conducting this inquiry, we ‘do not lightly infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) “When argument runs counter

2024(Gamache, at p. 371; Panah, at p. 462.) “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In conducting this inquiry, we ‘do not lightly infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) “When argument runs counter

2024(Gamache, at p. 371; Panah, at p. 462.) “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In conducting this inquiry, we ‘do not lightly infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) “When argument runs counter

2020DISCUSSION A. The Trial Court Violated Reyes’s Due Process Rights by Refusing To Allow Him To Call Witnesses The right “to call witnesses in one’s own behalf [has] long been recognized as essential to due process.” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 294 [ 93 S.Ct. 1038 ]; accord, People v. Aguilera (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 894 , 910; see People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 367 [Sixth Amendment right “‘to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses’” in a criminal trial “is applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause”]; People

2020(People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378, 382 (Parham).) In that case, the defendant was placed in a lineup, where he was 20 identified by several witnesses to various robberies.

2020DISCUSSION A. The Trial Court Violated Reyes’s Due Process Rights by Refusing To Allow Him To Call Witnesses The right “to call witnesses in one’s own behalf [has] long been recognized as essential to due process.” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 294 [ 93 S.Ct. 1038 ]; accord, People v. Aguilera (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 894 , 910; see People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 367 [Sixth Amendment right “‘to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses’” in a criminal trial “is applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause”]; People

2020DISCUSSION A. The Trial Court Violated Reyes’s Due Process Rights by Refusing To Allow Him To Call Witnesses The right “to call witnesses in one’s own behalf [has] long been recognized as essential to due process.” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 294 [ 93 S.Ct. 1038 ]; accord, People v. Aguilera (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 894 , 910; see People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 367 [Sixth Amendment right “‘to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses’” in a criminal trial “is applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause”]; People

2020This right is a fundamental element of due process of law." (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 19 .) However, "more than the mere absence of testimony is necessary to establish a violation of the right." (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 (Valenzuela-Bernal).) "[T]he constitutional right to compulsory process is not 'an unfettered right to offer testimony' that 'automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.' [Citation.] A defendant claiming a violation of this right must establish both that he was deprived of the opportunity to presen

2014A defendant claiming a denial of compulsory process must plausibly show that the missing testimony “would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 , 102 S.Ct. 3440 ]; see In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 263 , 744 P.2d 374 ].) Moreover, the constitutional right to compulsory process is not “an unfettered right to offer testimony” that “automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410, 414 [ 98 L.Ed.2d 798 , 108 S.

2014Even if the trial court erred in removing defendant from the courtroom, defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced. “‘Erroneous exclusion of the defendant is not structural error that is reversible per se, but trial error that is reversible only if the defendant proves prejudice. [Citations.]’ (People v. Perry [(2006)] 38 Cal.4th [302,] 312.) ‘“A defendant claiming a violation of the right to personal presence at trial bears the burden of demonstrating that [the defendant’s] personal presence could have substantially benefited the defense. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Pric

2014Even if the trial court erred in removing defendant from the courtroom, defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced. “‘Erroneous exclusion of the defendant is not structural error that is reversible per se, but trial error that is reversible only if the defendant proves prejudice. [Citations.]’ (People v. Perry [(2006)] 38 Cal.4th [302,] 312.) ‘“A defendant claiming a violation of the right to personal presence at trial bears the burden of demonstrating that [the defendant’s] personal presence could have substantially benefited the defense. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Pric

2014Even if the trial court erred in removing defendant from the courtroom, defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced. “‘Erroneous exclusion of the defendant is not structural error that is reversible per se, but trial error that is reversible only if the defendant proves prejudice. [Citations.]’ (People v. Perry [(2006)] 38 Cal.4th [302,] 312.) ‘“A defendant claiming a violation of the right to personal presence at trial bears the burden of demonstrating that [the defendant’s] personal presence could have substantially benefited the defense. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Pric

2014Even if the trial court erred in removing defendant from the courtroom, defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced. “‘Erroneous exclusion of the defendant is not structural error that is reversible per se, but trial error that is reversible only if the defendant proves prejudice. [Citations.]’ (People v. Perry [(2006)] 38 Cal.4th [302,] 312.) ‘“A defendant claiming a violation of the right to personal presence at trial bears the burden of demonstrating that [the defendant’s] personal presence could have substantially benefited the defense. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Pric

2014A defendant claiming a denial of compulsory process must plausibly show that the missing testimony “would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 , 102 S.Ct. 3440 ]; see In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 263 , 744 P.2d 374 ].) Moreover, the constitutional right to compulsory process is not “an unfettered right to offer testimony” that “automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410, 414 [ 98 L.Ed.2d 798 , 108 S.

2014A defendant claiming a denial of compulsory process must plausibly show that the missing testimony “would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 , 102 S.Ct. 3440 ]; see In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 263 , 744 P.2d 374 ].) Moreover, the constitutional right to compulsory process is not “an unfettered right to offer testimony” that “automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410, 414 [ 98 L.Ed.2d 798 , 108 S.

2014(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 22, 24 .) “The California Supreme Court . . . has explained, ‘Erroneous exclusion of the defendant is not structural error that is reversible per se, but trial error that is reversible only if the defendant proves prejudice. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘“A defendant claiming a violation of the right to personal presence at trial bears the burden of demonstrating that [the defendant’s] personal presence could have substantially benefited the defense. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] . . . [A]n error pertaining to defendant’s presence involving a f

2014A defendant claiming a denial of compulsory process must plausibly show that the missing testimony “would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 , 102 S.Ct. 3440 ]; see In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 263 , 744 P.2d 374 ].) Moreover, the constitutional right to compulsory process is not “an unfettered right to offer testimony” that “automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410, 414 [ 98 L.Ed.2d 798 , 108 S.

2014A defendant claiming a denial of compulsory process must plausibly show that the missing testimony “would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 , 102 S.Ct. 3440 ]; see In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 263 , 744 P.2d 374 ].) Moreover, the constitutional right to compulsory process is not “an unfettered right to offer testimony” that “automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410, 414 [ 98 L.Ed.2d 798 , 108 S.

2010(United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 657 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 ] (Cronic); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ]; McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 763 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 ].) As the high court noted in Strickland , typically, a defendant claiming a violation of the federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel must satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is a reasonable probability the outcome woul

2010(United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 657 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 ] (Cronic); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ]; McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 763 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 ].) As the high court noted in Strickland , typically, a defendant claiming a violation of the federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel must satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is a reasonable probability the outcome woul

2010(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) In contrast, a defendant is spared “the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome . . . where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding ... the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary. [Citations.] But only in ‘circumstances of that magnitude’ do we forgo individual inquiry into whether counsel’s inadequate performance undermined the reliability of the verdict.” (Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 166 [ 152 L.Ed.2d 291 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 ];

2010(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) In contrast, a defendant is spared “the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome . . . where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding ... the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary. [Citations.] But only in ‘circumstances of that magnitude’ do we forgo individual inquiry into whether counsel’s inadequate performance undermined the reliability of the verdict.” (Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 166 [ 152 L.Ed.2d 291 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 ];

2010(United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 657 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 ] (Cronic); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ]; McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 763 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 ].) As the high court noted in Strickland , typically, a defendant claiming a violation of the federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel must satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is a reasonable probability the outcome woul

2010(United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 657 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 ] (Cronic); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ]; McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 763 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 ].) As the high court noted in Strickland , typically, a defendant claiming a violation of the federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel must satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is a reasonable probability the outcome woul