acceptance doctrine in Maryland

2013The principle that the General Assembly may occupy a particular field so extensively as to preclude local legislation, was first recognized in City of Baltimore v. Sitnick & Firey, 254 Md. 303, 323 , 255 A.2d 376, 385 (1969), where Judge Finan for the Court observed that “there may be times when the legislature may so forcibly express its intent to occupy a specific field of regulation that the acceptance of the doctrine of pre-emption by occupation is compelled.... ” The first case in this Court to hold that local legislation was invalid under the principle of implied preemption was County Co

2013The principle that the General Assembly may occupy a particular field so extensively as to preclude local legislation, was first recognized in City of Baltimore v. Sitnick & Firey, 254 Md. 303, 323 , 255 A.2d 376, 385 (1969), where Judge Finan for the Court observed that “there may be times when the legislature may so forcibly express its intent to occupy a specific field of regulation that the acceptance of the doctrine of pre-emption by occupation is compelled.... ” The first case in this Court to hold that local legislation was invalid under the principle of implied preemption was County Co

2013Judge Smith for the Court concluded in the McCarthy case as follows ( 280 Md. at 650-651 , 374 A.2d at 1144 ): “This case represents an excellent example of what the Court had in mind in City of Baltimore v. Sitnick & Firey, supra, 254 Md. 303, 323 , [ 255 A.2d 376 ], when it referred to the fact that the General Assembly might ‘so forcibly express its intent to occupy a specific field of regulation that the acceptance of the doctrine of preemption by occupation is compelled.... ’ Our recital of legislation by the State in the field of education demonstrates the occupation of that field by the

2013Judge Smith for the Court concluded in the McCarthy case as follows ( 280 Md. at 650-651 , 374 A.2d at 1144 ): “This case represents an excellent example of what the Court had in mind in City of Baltimore v. Sitnick & Firey, supra, 254 Md. 303, 323 , [ 255 A.2d 376 ], when it referred to the fact that the General Assembly might ‘so forcibly express its intent to occupy a specific field of regulation that the acceptance of the doctrine of preemption by occupation is compelled.... ’ Our recital of legislation by the State in the field of education demonstrates the occupation of that field by the

2011The Md, Public Utilities Code does not contain any language expressly preempting the field of providing electric service to retail customer, Gen. 110] 119 The general rule is that a field, such as the regulation of electric service, has been preempted by implication when the General Assembly has legislated in the field with such comprehensiveness that "the acceptance of the doctrine of preemption by occupation is compelled." Allied Vending v. City of Bowie, 332 Md. 279 (1993).12 In Allied Vending, the Court of Appeals identified certain secondary factors that are to be considered in determinin

1995The Appellees argue that this is a case of implied preemption, which presents itself in situations “when the legislature ... so forcibly express[es] its intent to occupy a specific field of regulation that the acceptance of the doctrine of pre-emption by implication is compelled.” Id. at 298, 631 A.2d 77 (quoting Mayor of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 323 , 255 A.2d 376 (1969)).

2022App. at 755 (first quoting Waterman, 357 Md. at 506 ; and then quoting Maryland-Nat’l Cap.

2006Although the Court of Special Appeals remarked that the record may have been more decisive had the trial court made an explicit statement regarding its finding of the knowing and voluntary nature of the defendant's waiver, the court stated that "while the court's acceptance of the waiver was implicit, it [wa]s nonetheless apparent." Zylanz, 164 Md.App. at 352 , 883 A.2d at 263 .

2006Although the Court of Special Appeals remarked that the record may have been more decisive had the trial court made an explicit statement regarding its finding of the knowing and voluntary nature of the defendant's waiver, the court stated that "while the court's acceptance of the waiver was implicit, it [wa]s nonetheless apparent." Zylanz, 164 Md.App. at 352 , 883 A.2d at 263 .

2005In reaching that conclusion, we are comforted by the words of the Court of Appeals in State v. Hall, supra, 321 Md. at 178 , 582 A.2d 507 .

2005In reaching that conclusion, we are comforted by the words of the Court of Appeals in State v. Hall, supra, 321 Md. at 178 , 582 A.2d 507 .

1993Although there is no particular formula for determining whether the General Assembly intended to pre-empt by implication an entire area, Skipper, 329 Md. at 488 , 620 A.2d at 883 ; Potomac Elec.

1993Although there is no particular formula for determining whether the General Assembly intended to pre-empt by implication an entire area, Skipper, 329 Md. at 488 , 620 A.2d at 883 ; Potomac Elec.

1990As we indicated earlier, aside from our consideration of the defense in Eagle-Pitcher, supra, 84 Md.App. 10, 59-66 , 578 A.2d 228 , it has not been explicitly adopted by a Maryland Court.

1990As we indicated earlier, aside from our consideration of the defense in Eagle-Pitcher, supra, 84 Md.App. 10, 59-66 , 578 A.2d 228 , it has not been explicitly adopted by a Maryland Court.

1977We had occasion in County Council v. Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. 52 , 325 A. 2d 112 , 333 A. 2d 596 (1974), to apply this latter theory of preemption.

1967Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 652-54 , 217 A. 2d 531 (1966) and authorities therein cited.

1967Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 652-54 , 217 A. 2d 531 (1966) and authorities therein cited.