acceptance doctrine in Georgia

2021Safety v. Ragsdale, 308 Ga. 210 ( 839 SE2d 541 ) (2020); Smith v. Dabbs-Williams General Contractors, LLC, 287 Ga. App. 646, 648 (1) ( 653 SE2d 87 ) (2007) (holding that the acceptance doctrine barred a claim against a contractor for a defective stairway when the property owner had accepted the construction work and the contractor “no longer exercised any control over” the facility it had built).

2021Safety v. Ragsdale, 308 Ga. 210 ( 839 SE2d 541 ) (2020); Smith v. Dabbs-Williams General Contractors, LLC, 287 Ga. App. 646, 648 (1) ( 653 SE2d 87 ) (2007) (holding that the acceptance doctrine barred a claim against a contractor for a defective stairway when the property owner had accepted the construction work and the contractor “no longer exercised any control over” the facility it had built).

2009See David Allen Co., supra, 260 Ga. at 558 , 398 S.E.2d 191 . [2] Application of the acceptance doctrine makes sense in this case.

2009David Allen Co. v. Benton, 260 Ga. 557, 558 , 398 S.E.2d 191 (1990). [2] Where, as here, Oxford did not hold itself out as an expert on the design of the road, it could not be held liable under any other exceptions to the acceptance doctrine unless it performed the requested work in a negligent manner.

2009A. Mann & Co., 277 Ga. App. 22, 25 (1) ( 625 SE2d 425 ) (2005) (ruling that the acceptance doctrine applied since there was no evidence that the work was nonconforming or imminently dangerous at the time it was completed and accepted by the employer); Carney v. JDN Constr.

2009A. Mann & Co., 277 Ga. App. 22, 25 (1) ( 625 SE2d 425 ) (2005) (ruling that the acceptance doctrine applied since there was no evidence that the work was nonconforming or imminently dangerous at the time it was completed and accepted by the employer); Carney v. JDN Constr.

2019Bragg, 285 Ga. at 101 (Hunstein, P. J., dissenting) (citation and punctuation omitted). the General Assembly has not enacted or amended any statute purporting to modify or abrogate the acceptance doctrine, so the privity requirement remains intact as the foundation for the doctrine in the construction context.

2009See also Bragg, 285 Ga. at 100 (if the contractor had been negligent in the performance of the requested work to the extent that an exception to the acceptance doctrine applied, the contractor could still face liability regardless of whether or not the property owner accepted its work).

2021To the contrary, the cases consistently describe and contemplate acceptance as a process in which a contractor “turns over” discrete work to the owner with which it has contracted, who has an opportunity to inspect and accept the work on completion and thereby “adopt[] the work as his own.” Thomaston Acquisition, 306 Ga. at 104 ; see Johnson, 273 Ga. App. at 719 (2) (acceptance did not occur until work 3 This Court has suggested that the acceptance doctrine might not apply at all when the contractor retains a “continuous duty of inspection . . . after turning work over” to the owner.

2021To the contrary, the cases consistently describe and contemplate acceptance as a process in which a contractor “turns over” discrete work to the owner with which it has contracted, who has an opportunity to inspect and accept the work on completion and thereby “adopt[] the work as his own.” Thomaston Acquisition, 306 Ga. at 104 ; see Johnson, 273 Ga. App. at 719 (2) (acceptance did not occur until work 3 This Court has suggested that the acceptance doctrine might not apply at all when the contractor retains a “continuous duty of inspection . . . after turning work over” to the owner.

2021See Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. at 491 .

2021See Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. at 491 .

2021To the contrary, the cases consistently describe and contemplate acceptance as a process in which a contractor “turns over” discrete work to the owner with which it has contracted, who has an opportunity to inspect and accept the work on completion and thereby “adopt[] the work as his own.” Thomaston Acquisition, 306 Ga. at 104 ; see Johnson, 273 Ga. App. at 719 (2) (acceptance did not occur until work 3 This Court has suggested that the acceptance doctrine might not apply at all when the contractor retains a “continuous duty of inspection . . . after turning work over” to the owner.

2021To the contrary, the cases consistently describe and contemplate acceptance as a process in which a contractor “turns over” discrete work to the owner with which it has contracted, who has an opportunity to inspect and accept the work on completion and thereby “adopt[] the work as his own.” Thomaston Acquisition, 306 Ga. at 104 ; see Johnson, 273 Ga. App. at 719 (2) (acceptance did not occur until work 3 This Court has suggested that the acceptance doctrine might not apply at all when the contractor retains a “continuous duty of inspection . . . after turning work over” to the owner.

2018See Peachtree N. Apartments Co. v. Huffman-Wolfe Co. , 126 Ga. App. 594 , 595, 191 S.E.2d 485 (1972).

2018See Peachtree N. Apartments Co. v. Huffman-Wolfe Co. , 126 Ga. App. 594 , 595, 191 S.E.2d 485 (1972).

2013Consequently, “[b]ecause the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings, the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] was converted to one for summary judgment.” Robertson v. Ridge Environmental, LLC, 319 Ga. App. 570, 571 ( 737 SE2d 578 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted).

2013Consequently, “[b]ecause the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings, the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] was converted to one for summary judgment.” Robertson v. Ridge Environmental, LLC, 319 Ga. App. 570, 571 ( 737 SE2d 578 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted).

2019As discussed previously, this Court explained more than a century ago that the acceptance doctrine applies to completed work that has been "turned [ ] over to the owner or employer and ... has been accepted by him." Young , 124 Ga. at 476 , 52 S.E. 765 .

2019As discussed previously, this Court explained more than a century ago that the acceptance doctrine applies to completed work that has been "turned [ ] over to the owner or employer and ... has been accepted by him." Young , 124 Ga. at 476 , 52 S.E. 765 .

2023Case No. A23A0143 30 Id. at 104 (3) (citing Woody, 250 Ga. App. at 455 ). 31 Jones v. Federated Mut.

2019Corp. v. Akin & Flanders, Inc., 240 Ga. App. 766, 769 ( 525 SE2d 123 ) (1999) (holding that the economic loss rule did not apply to a negligent construction claim seeking recovery for a collapsed parking lot). 2 The acceptance doctrine is also referred to as the completed work doctrine, the completed and accepted rule, and similar formulations. that a manufacturer’s liability for injuries caused by a defective product was limited to the original purchaser or his privies in the purchase contract.

2019Corp. v. Akin & Flanders, Inc., 240 Ga. App. 766, 769 ( 525 SE2d 123 ) (1999) (holding that the economic loss rule did not apply to a negligent construction claim seeking recovery for a collapsed parking lot). 2 The acceptance doctrine is also referred to as the completed work doctrine, the completed and accepted rule, and similar formulations. that a manufacturer’s liability for injuries caused by a defective product was limited to the original purchaser or his privies in the purchase contract.

2019See, e.g., Powell v. Ledbetter Bros., Inc., 251 Ga. 649 ( 307 SE2d 663 ) (1983) (damage to other property); Stopanio v. Leon’s Fence & Guardrail, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 18 ( 815 SE2d 232 ) (2018) (personal injury); Clive v. Gregory, 280 Ga. App. 836 ( 635 SE2d 188 ) (2006) (personal injury and damage to other property).

2019See, e.g., Powell v. Ledbetter Bros., Inc., 251 Ga. 649 ( 307 SE2d 663 ) (1983) (damage to other property); Stopanio v. Leon’s Fence & Guardrail, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 18 ( 815 SE2d 232 ) (2018) (personal injury); Clive v. Gregory, 280 Ga. App. 836 ( 635 SE2d 188 ) (2006) (personal injury and damage to other property).

2014Even if we were to assume that the acceptance doctrine applies both to owners and to third parties, the acceptance doctrine protects a negligent contractor only “if the defect is not hidden but readily observable on reasonable inspection.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lumsden v. Williams, 307 Ga. App. 163, 171 (2) (f) ( 704 SE2d 458 ) (2010).

2014Even if we were to assume that the acceptance doctrine applies both to owners and to third parties, the acceptance doctrine protects a negligent contractor only “if the defect is not hidden but readily observable on reasonable inspection.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lumsden v. Williams, 307 Ga. App. 163, 171 (2) (f) ( 704 SE2d 458 ) (2010).

2014(Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) McCray v. FedEx Ground Package System, 291 Ga. App. 317, 322 (1) ( 661 SE2d 691 ) (2008). *724 (c) We also find merit in appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in applying the acceptance doctrine to bar their negligent construction claims.

2014(Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) McCray v. FedEx Ground Package System, 291 Ga. App. 317, 322 (1) ( 661 SE2d 691 ) (2008). *724 (c) We also find merit in appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in applying the acceptance doctrine to bar their negligent construction claims.

2009Co., 206 Ga. App. 785, 786-787 (1) ( 426 SE2d 611 ) (1992) (same); Peachtree North Apts. v. Huffman-Wolfe Co., 126 Ga. App. 594, 595 ( 191 SE2d 485 ) (1972) (same).

2009Co., 206 Ga. App. 785, 786-787 (1) ( 426 SE2d 611 ) (1992) (same); Peachtree North Apts. v. Huffman-Wolfe Co., 126 Ga. App. 594, 595 ( 191 SE2d 485 ) (1972) (same).

2009Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 323 (2) ( 277 SE2d 312 ) (1981).

2009Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 323 (2) ( 277 SE2d 312 ) (1981).

2007See Pennington v. Cecil N. Brown Co., 187 Ga. App. 621, 622 (1) ( 371 SE2d 106 ) (1988).

2007See Pennington v. Cecil N. Brown Co., 187 Ga. App. 621, 622 (1) ( 371 SE2d 106 ) (1988).

1989Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 152 Ga. App. 509, 514-515 ( 263 SE2d 190 ), citing with approval International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., supra at p. 319. 3.

1989Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 152 Ga. App. 509, 514-515 ( 263 SE2d 190 ), citing with approval International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., supra at p. 319. 3.

1989Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 152 Ga. App. 509, 514-515 ( 263 SE2d 190 ), citing with approval International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., supra at p. 319. 3.