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11 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1879–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2010It may then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it on him." United States v. Wilson , 32 U.S. 150,161 (1833). 2010It may then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it on him." United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150,161 (1833). | 2 | 2 |
Hunnicutt v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Texas courts thereafter adopted the acceptance doctrine, recognizing that the power of the Governor, "under the State Constitution, to pardon offenses, is of the same general nature as that conferred upon the President of the United States." See Hunnicutt , 18 Tex. Ct. App. at 517,520 . 2010Texas courts thereafter adopted the acceptance doctrine, recognizing that the power of the Governor, "under the State Constitution, to pardon offenses, is of the same general nature as that conferred upon the President of the United States." See Hunnicutt, 18 Tex. Ct. App. at 517,520 . | 2 | 2 |
Cherry v. State of Texasgreen2 sentences2010See Schick , 419 U.S. at 261 ("requirement of consent was a legal fiction at best"); cf. Cherry v. State , 361 F. Supp. 1284 , 1288 (N.D. 2010See Schick, 419 U.S. at 261 ("requirement of consent was a legal fiction at best"); cf Cherry v. State, 361 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (N.D. | 2 | 2 |
Schick v. Reedgreen2 sentences2010Schick v. Reed , 419 U.S. 256 , 261 (1974). 2010See Schick , 419 U.S. at 261 ("requirement of consent was a legal fiction at best"); cf. Cherry v. State , 361 F. Supp. 1284 , 1288 (N.D. | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Davenportgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Exparte Davenport , 7 S.W.2d 589 , 591 (Tex. Crim. 2010See, e.g., Ex parte Davenport, 7 S.W.2d 589,591 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napiergreen2 sentences2001NOTES [1] See Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970). [2] Effective February 1, 1991 (republished May 1, 1995, as amended). [3] Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1999). [4] By his original petition, Alashmawi (a) alleged negligence against IBP, (b) alleged negligence, per se, (c) sought a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the signed acceptance and waiver, (d) alleged rescission of the acceptance and waiver on the basis of duress, undue influence, fraud, and lack of capacity, and (e) sought punitive damages. [5] Exce 2001FOOTNOTES 1: See Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970). 2: Effective February 1, 1991 (republished May 1, 1995, as amended). 3: Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1999). 4: By his original petition, Alashmawi (a) alleged negligence against IBP, (b) alleged negligence, per se, (c) sought a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the signed acceptance and waiver, (d) alleged rescission of the acceptance and waiver on the basis of duress, undue influence, fraud, and lack of capacity, and (e) sought punitive damages. 5: Exce | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lambert v. Affiliated Foods, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006After Alashmawi received some medical care and benefits under WISP, and notwithstanding his execution of the acceptance and waiver, approximately six months later, he filed suit against IBP seeking to recover for his personal injuries at common law, and among other things, seeking to set aside his execution of the waiver on common law grounds of fraud, duress, and undue influence. (4) See Lambert v. Affiliated Foods, Inc., 20 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1999), aff'd , 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 555 , 2001 WL 299542 (March 29, 2001). 2001After Alashmawi received some medical care and benefits under WISP, and notwithstanding his execution of the acceptance and waiver, approximately six months later, he filed suit against IBP seeking to recover for his personal injuries at common law, and among other things, seeking to set aside his execution of the waiver on common law grounds of fraud, duress, and undue influence. [4] See Lambert *167 v. Affiliated Foods, Inc., 20 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999), aff'd, 44 S.W.3d 544 , 44 Tex. Sup.Ct. | 5 | 2001–2006 |
Lawrence v. CDB Services, Inc.
red
2 sentences2006After Alashmawi received some medical care and benefits under WISP, and notwithstanding his execution of the acceptance and waiver, approximately six months later, he filed suit against IBP seeking to recover for his personal injuries at common law, and among other things, seeking to set aside his execution of the waiver on common law grounds of fraud, duress, and undue influence. (4) See Lambert v. Affiliated Foods, Inc., 20 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1999), aff'd , 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 555 , 2001 WL 299542 (March 29, 2001). 2001After Alashmawi received some medical care and benefits under WISP, and notwithstanding his execution of the acceptance and waiver, approximately six months later, he filed suit against IBP seeking to recover for his personal injuries at common law, and among other things, seeking to set aside his execution of the waiver on common law grounds of fraud, duress, and undue influence. [4] See Lambert *167 v. Affiliated Foods, Inc., 20 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999), aff'd, 44 S.W.3d 544 , 44 Tex. Sup.Ct. | 5 | 2001–2006 |
Grant v. Southwestern Electric Power Co.
green
2 sentences2001Power Co., 20 S.W.3d 764 , 768 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.), the court noted that although the rules do not prohibit a combination traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the better practice is to file separate motions. [8] See Act of May 27, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 931, art. 11, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. 2001Power Co., 20 S.W.3d 764 , 768 n.1 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2000, no pet.), the court noted that although the rules do not prohibit a combination traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the better practice is to file separate motions. 8: See Act of May 27, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 931, art. 11, § 1 1985 Tex. Gen. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Colony Ins. Co. v. G & E TIRES & SERVICE, INCORPORATED
green
2 sentences2008In Colony Insurance, the Florida appeals court held that a liability insurer’s reservation of rights letter, coupled with the insured’s acceptance of a defense, entitled the insurer to reimbursement for defense costs it had paid. 777 So.2d at 1039 . 2008In Colony Insurance, the Florida appeals court held that a liability insurer's reservation of rights letter, coupled with the insured's acceptance of a defense, entitled the insurer to reimbursement for defense costs it had paid. 777 So.2d at 1039 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Texas Ass'n of Counties County Government Risk Management Pool v. Matagorda County
green
2 sentences2008As we reaffirmed in Matagorda County , “a meeting of the minds is an essential element of an implied-in-fact contract.” Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d at 133 (citing Haws & Garrett Gen. 2008As we reaffirmed in *49 Matagorda County , "a meeting of the minds is an essential element of an implied-in-fact contract." Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d at 133 (citing Haws & Garrett Gen. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Sanford & Brooks Co. v. Columbia Dredging Co.
green
2 sentences1969Sanford & Brooks Co. v. Columbia Dredging Co [4 Cir.], 177 F. 878 , 101 C.C.A. 92 ; Portsmouth Fisheries Co. v. John L. 1969Sanford & Brooks Co. v. Columbia Dredging Co [4 Cir.], 177 F. 878 , 101 C.C.A. 92 ; Portsmouth Fisheries Co. v. John L. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Stanford v. Butler
green
1 sentence1961An excellent discussion of this doctrine by the Supreme Court of Texas is found in Stanford v* Butler, 142 Tex. 692, 700 , lE?l S.W.2d 269,, 273, 274 11944.1, wherein the court sets forth the rule as stated immediately above and cites numerous authorities for the acceptance of such rule., Mr. Richard L. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Heffner v. Brander
neutral
1 sentence1879(Paschal’s Dig., arts. 5660, 5783, 5791; Heffner v. Brander, 23 Tex., 631 .) On the trial below there was evidence of subsequent promises on the part of the deceased, James Weir, which would have taken the claims without any apparent bar of the statute of limitations. | 1 | 1879–1879 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.