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9 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mikey R. Lawrence v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 678 (Fla. 2014) (“Accepting a stipulation improperly absolves the trial court from making an independent determination regarding a defendant’s competency to stand trial.”); Belizaire v. State, 188 So. 3d 933, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (finding the trial court’s acceptance of defense counsel’s “stipulation that because both experts found [defendant] competent, they could proceed with the trial” to be insufficient). 2018Ross v. State, 155 So. 3d 1259, 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (emphasis added); see also Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 678 (Fla. 2014) (“Accepting a stipulation improperly absolves the trial court from making an independent determination regarding a defendant’s competency to stand trial.”); Belizaire v. State, 188 So. 3d 933, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (finding the trial court’s acceptance of defense counsel’s “stipulation that because both experts found [defendant] competent, they could proceed with the trial” to be insufficient). | 2 | 2 |
Bernard J. Dougherty v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2018Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 678 (Fla. 2014) (“Accepting a stipulation improperly absolves the trial court from making an independent determination regarding a defendant’s competency to stand trial.”); Belizaire v. State, 188 So. 3d 933, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (finding the trial court’s acceptance of defense counsel’s “stipulation that because both experts found [defendant] competent, they could proceed with the trial” to be insufficient). 2018Ross v. State, 155 So. 3d 1259, 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (emphasis added); see also Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 678 (Fla. 2014) (“Accepting a stipulation improperly absolves the trial court from making an independent determination regarding a defendant’s competency to stand trial.”); Belizaire v. State, 188 So. 3d 933, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (finding the trial court’s acceptance of defense counsel’s “stipulation that because both experts found [defendant] competent, they could proceed with the trial” to be insufficient). | 2 | 2 |
Bennie John Ross v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2018Ross v. State, 155 So. 3d 1259, 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (emphasis added); see also Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 678 (Fla. 2014) (“Accepting a stipulation improperly absolves the trial court from making an independent determination regarding a defendant’s competency to stand trial.”); Belizaire v. State, 188 So. 3d 933, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (finding the trial court’s acceptance of defense counsel’s “stipulation that because both experts found [defendant] competent, they could proceed with the trial” to be insufficient). | 1 | 1 |
Meekins-Bamman Prestress, Inc. v. BETTER CONST., INC.green1 sentence2008See Meekins-Bamman Prestress, Inc. v. Better Constr., Inc., 408 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ("It is universally held that a document. . . which specifically conditions the contractual effectiveness of a proposal by a projected seller upon its own subsequent approval, constitutes no more than a solicitation to the prospective purchaser to make an offer itself."); Rudolph v. Lewis, 418 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) ("An acceptance clause specifically limits the authority of an agent and reduces an agreement to the status of an unaccepted offer. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Rudolph v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2008See Meekins-Bamman Prestress, Inc. v. Better Constr., Inc., 408 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ("It is universally held that a document. . . which specifically conditions the contractual effectiveness of a proposal by a projected seller upon its own subsequent approval, constitutes no more than a solicitation to the prospective purchaser to make an offer itself."); Rudolph v. Lewis, 418 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) ("An acceptance clause specifically limits the authority of an agent and reduces an agreement to the status of an unaccepted offer. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Copeland v. Stategreen1 sentence1995In Copeland v. State, 566 So.2d 856, 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the First District Court of Appeal found that the admission of expert testimony based on the "spermatozoa age test," where there was not a proper predicate to establish the scientific reliability, was error, and noted that "the only evidence presented was of noncontrolled experimentation by the crime analyst." In *1168 Page v. Zordan, 564 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), the Second District Court of Appeal held that it was error to permit an expert clinical psychologist to rely upon a "sexual abuse legitimacy scale" because no pre | 1 | 1 |
Page v. Zordan Ex Rel. Zordangreen1 sentence1995In Copeland v. State, 566 So.2d 856, 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the First District Court of Appeal found that the admission of expert testimony based on the "spermatozoa age test," where there was not a proper predicate to establish the scientific reliability, was error, and noted that "the only evidence presented was of noncontrolled experimentation by the crime analyst." In *1168 Page v. Zordan, 564 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), the Second District Court of Appeal held that it was error to permit an expert clinical psychologist to rely upon a "sexual abuse legitimacy scale" because no pre | 1 | 1 |
SALEM REALTY COMPANY v. Batsongreen1 sentence1984See Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298 , 123 S.E.3d 744 (1962); City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co., 225 Iowa 215 , 279 N.W. 590 (1938); Town of Tonawanda v. Stappell, Mumm & Beals Corp., 240 A.D. 472 , 270 N.Y.S. 377 (1934); City of Seaside v. Randles, 92 Or. 650 , 180 P. 319 (1919); and Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co., 68 N.J.L. 458 , 53 A. 294 (1902). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hanson v. Dencklagreen2 sentences1971While Mr. Justice Stone indicated a distinction between continuous and systematic activities of a foreign corporation with a single act or isolated items of activities in a state, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for seven other members of the court, indicated in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. (1957), 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 , that jurisdiction could be based on the commission of a single act within or directed towards the forum; but cf. Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 . 1971While Mr. Justice Stone indicated a distinction between continuous and systematic activities of a foreign corporation with a single act or isolated items of activities in a state, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for seven other members of the court, indicated in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. (1957), 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 , that jurisdiction could be based on the commission of a single act within or directed towards the forum; but cf. Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McGee v. International Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1971While Mr. Justice Stone indicated a distinction between continuous and systematic activities of a foreign corporation with a single act or isolated items of activities in a state, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for seven other members of the court, indicated in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. (1957), 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 , that jurisdiction could be based on the commission of a single act within or directed towards the forum; but cf. Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 . 1971While Mr. Justice Stone indicated a distinction between continuous and systematic activities of a foreign corporation with a single act or isolated items of activities in a state, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for seven other members of the court, indicated in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. (1957), 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 , that jurisdiction could be based on the commission of a single act within or directed towards the forum; but cf. Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 . | 2 | 1962–1971 |
Crawford v. Shivashankar
green
1 sentence1995In Crawford v. Shivashankar, 474 So.2d 873 , 876 n. 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), the First District Court held that the trial court was not required to accept an expert's "bald assertion" that thermography had received general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co.
neutral
2 sentences1984See Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298 , 123 S.E.3d 744 (1962); City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co., 225 Iowa 215 , 279 N.W. 590 (1938); Town of Tonawanda v. Stappell, Mumm & Beals Corp., 240 A.D. 472 , 270 N.Y.S. 377 (1934); City of Seaside v. Randles, 92 Or. 650 , 180 P. 319 (1919); and Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co., 68 N.J.L. 458 , 53 A. 294 (1902). 1984See Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298 , 123 S.E.3d 744 (1962); City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co., 225 Iowa 215 , 279 N.W. 590 (1938); Town of Tonawanda v. Stappell, Mumm & Beals Corp., 240 A.D. 472 , 270 N.Y.S. 377 (1934); City of Seaside v. Randles, 92 Or. 650 , 180 P. 319 (1919); and Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co., 68 N.J.L. 458 , 53 A. 294 (1902). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co.
neutral
2 sentences1984See Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298 , 123 S.E.3d 744 (1962); City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co., 225 Iowa 215 , 279 N.W. 590 (1938); Town of Tonawanda v. Stappell, Mumm & Beals Corp., 240 A.D. 472 , 270 N.Y.S. 377 (1934); City of Seaside v. Randles, 92 Or. 650 , 180 P. 319 (1919); and Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co., 68 N.J.L. 458 , 53 A. 294 (1902). 1984See Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298 , 123 S.E.3d 744 (1962); City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co., 225 Iowa 215 , 279 N.W. 590 (1938); Town of Tonawanda v. Stappell, Mumm & Beals Corp., 240 A.D. 472 , 270 N.Y.S. 377 (1934); City of Seaside v. Randles, 92 Or. 650 , 180 P. 319 (1919); and Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co., 68 N.J.L. 458 , 53 A. 294 (1902). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Town of Tonawanda v. Stapell, Mumm & Beals Corp.
green
2 sentences1984See Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298 , 123 S.E.3d 744 (1962); City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co., 225 Iowa 215 , 279 N.W. 590 (1938); Town of Tonawanda v. Stappell, Mumm & Beals Corp., 240 A.D. 472 , 270 N.Y.S. 377 (1934); City of Seaside v. Randles, 92 Or. 650 , 180 P. 319 (1919); and Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co., 68 N.J.L. 458 , 53 A. 294 (1902). 1984See Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298 , 123 S.E.3d 744 (1962); City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co., 225 Iowa 215 , 279 N.W. 590 (1938); Town of Tonawanda v. Stappell, Mumm & Beals Corp., 240 A.D. 472 , 270 N.Y.S. 377 (1934); City of Seaside v. Randles, 92 Or. 650 , 180 P. 319 (1919); and Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co., 68 N.J.L. 458 , 53 A. 294 (1902). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Seaside, City of v. Randles
green
2 sentences1984See Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298 , 123 S.E.3d 744 (1962); City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co., 225 Iowa 215 , 279 N.W. 590 (1938); Town of Tonawanda v. Stappell, Mumm & Beals Corp., 240 A.D. 472 , 270 N.Y.S. 377 (1934); City of Seaside v. Randles, 92 Or. 650 , 180 P. 319 (1919); and Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co., 68 N.J.L. 458 , 53 A. 294 (1902). 1984See Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298 , 123 S.E.3d 744 (1962); City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Construction Co., 225 Iowa 215 , 279 N.W. 590 (1938); Town of Tonawanda v. Stappell, Mumm & Beals Corp., 240 A.D. 472 , 270 N.Y.S. 377 (1934); City of Seaside v. Randles, 92 Or. 650 , 180 P. 319 (1919); and Mayor of Newark v. New Jersey Asphalt Co., 68 N.J.L. 458 , 53 A. 294 (1902). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Gunn
green
1 sentence1983This is the conclusion reached in State v. Gunn, 408 So.2d 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), which held that A failure to inform a driver of the consequences of refusing to submit to testing will simply afford the driver an escape from suspension of driving privileges, should he, in fact, face such suspension by virtue of having refused testing. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence1978A single sale is sufficient. ( Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 314 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1975)) However, in order to invoke subsection (3) for the acquisition of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant it is necessary that the party attempting to effect service must demonstrate either (1) that the nonresident defendant has some degree of control over the personal property referred to in said subsection (3) of the statute in the hands of the brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors selling or distributing the property in this state, or (2) that the nonresident defendant has som | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand
green
1 sentence1978A single sale is sufficient. ( Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 314 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1975)) However, in order to invoke subsection (3) for the acquisition of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant it is necessary that the party attempting to effect service must demonstrate either (1) that the nonresident defendant has some degree of control over the personal property referred to in said subsection (3) of the statute in the hands of the brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors selling or distributing the property in this state, or (2) that the nonresident defendant has som | 1 | 1978–1978 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1971The acceptance of the privilege is signification of the agreement of the persons and foreign corporations that the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if served personally on the persons or foreign corporations. *905 "(2) If a foreign corporation has a resident agent or officer in the state, process shall be served on the resident agent or officer. "(3) Any person, firm or corporation which sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person, firm or corpo 1971The acceptance of the privilege is signification of the agreement of the persons and foreign corporations that the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if served personally on the persons or foreign corporations. *905 "(2) If a foreign corporation has a resident agent or officer in the state, process shall be served on the resident agent or officer. "(3) Any person, firm or corporation which sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person, firm or corpo | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences1962Co., 1957, 355 U.S. 220, 221 , 78 S.Ct. 199, 200 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 , had this to say: "Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto 714 , 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , this Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places some limit on the power of state courts to enter binding judgments against persons not served with process within their boundaries. 1962Co., 1957, 355 U.S. 220, 221 , 78 S.Ct. 199, 200 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 , had this to say: "Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto 714 , 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , this Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places some limit on the power of state courts to enter binding judgments against persons not served with process within their boundaries. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.