Pennsylvania rule in New York

2021Fire, 243 US at 94 ).

2010Donovan v Rothman, 302 AD2d 238, 239 [1st Dept 2003] [affirming dismissal of contract claim on ground of in pari delicto]). [4] The doctrine's full name is in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis, meaning "[i]n a case of equal or mutual fault, the position of the [defending party] is the better one" ( Baena, 453 F3d at 6 n 5 [internal quotation marks omitted]). [5] Although the Pennsylvania rule (unlike the New Jersey rule) permits in pari delicto to be asserted as a basis for a pretrial motion to dismiss in negligent-auditor cases, any benefit to defendants may prove more speculative

2010Donovan v Rothman, 302 AD2d 238, 239 [1st Dept 2003] [affirming dismissal of contract claim on ground of in pari delicto]). [4] The doctrine's full name is in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis, meaning "[i]n a case of equal or mutual fault, the position of the [defending party] is the better one" ( Baena, 453 F3d at 6 n 5 [internal quotation marks omitted]). [5] Although the Pennsylvania rule (unlike the New Jersey rule) permits in pari delicto to be asserted as a basis for a pretrial motion to dismiss in negligent-auditor cases, any benefit to defendants may prove more speculative

1988Also present in the Kovalchick case and other cases involving claims against a decedent’s estate is the Pennsylvania rule requiring even closer scrutiny of a claimed common-law marriage "where one of the parties [to the purported marriage] is dead and the claim, so grounded, is to share in the distribution of the estate” (In re Estate of Gavula, 490 Pa 535, 417 A2d 168, 171 , supra).

1988Also present in the Kovalchick case and other cases involving claims against a decedent’s estate is the Pennsylvania rule requiring even closer scrutiny of a claimed common-law marriage "where one of the parties [to the purported marriage] is dead and the claim, so grounded, is to share in the distribution of the estate” (In re Estate of Gavula, 490 Pa 535, 417 A2d 168, 171 , supra).

1988And defendant’s remaining contentions, including the assertion that the negotiated sentence was harsh and excessive, are either unpersuasive or have been waived by his guilty plea (see, e.g., People v Clavijo, 126 AD2d 907, 908 ; People v Normandin, 122 AD2d 348, 349-350 ).

1988And defendant’s remaining contentions, including the assertion that the negotiated sentence was harsh and excessive, are either unpersuasive or have been waived by his guilty plea (see, e.g., People v Clavijo, 126 AD2d 907, 908 ; People v Normandin, 122 AD2d 348, 349-350 ).

1987Nor are we disposed to accept petitioners’ invitation to adopt the Pennsylvania rule, said to be designed to promote alienability of land, that silence as to prepayment in the loan documents raises a presumption of the right to prepay (see, Mahoney v Furches, 503 Pa 60, 468 A2d 458 ).

1987Nor are we disposed to accept petitioners’ invitation to adopt the Pennsylvania rule, said to be designed to promote alienability of land, that silence as to prepayment in the loan documents raises a presumption of the right to prepay (see, Mahoney v Furches, 503 Pa 60, 468 A2d 458 ).

1966In Hurwitz v. Hurwitz ( 10 Misc. 353, 358 , supra) the court suggests that the reason for the Pennsylvania rule was ‘ ‘ the defect in equity jurisdiction peculiar to that state, [wherein] a remedy by common-law action may be thought indispensable.

1966Still we cannot assent to the doctrine of that case.” In Ward v. Petrie ( 157 N. Y. 301, 310 ) the court discussed the question before us, citing among other eases Braem v. Merchants’ Nat.

1959Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 1043 ): “ The three doctrines may be summed up by saying the Massachusetts rule considers the character of the dividend, the Pennsylvania rule the source of the dividend, and the Kentucky rule the time of the dividend.” (Emphasis in original.) Oddly enough, New York, during different periods, has followed all three rules.

1959Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 1043 ): “ The three doctrines may be summed up by saying the Massachusetts rule considers the character of the dividend, the Pennsylvania rule the source of the dividend, and the Kentucky rule the time of the dividend.” (Emphasis in original.) Oddly enough, New York, during different periods, has followed all three rules.

1959Prior to 1913 the Kentucky rule was in force in this State (Matter of Kernochan, 104 N. Y. 618 ).

1959Prior to 1913 the Kentucky rule was in force in this State (Matter of Kernochan, 104 N. Y. 618 ).

1958After the Benanti case (supra) was decided, the same court refused to change the Pennsylvania rule, even after considering that case (Commonwealth v. Voci, 393 Pa. 404 ).

1958After the Benanti case (supra) was decided, the same court refused to change the Pennsylvania rule, even after considering that case (Commonwealth v. Voci, 393 Pa. 404 ).

1958In Matter of Jones ( 377 Pa. 473 ) the court refused to extend the Pennsylvania rule of apportionment to a situation where there had been a merger and held that the stock of the merged corporation must be retained as trust principal, even though such merger had resulted in the capitalization of surplus and undivided profits.

1958In Matter of Jones ( 377 Pa. 473 ) the court refused to extend the Pennsylvania rule of apportionment to a situation where there had been a merger and held that the stock of the merged corporation must be retained as trust principal, even though such merger had resulted in the capitalization of surplus and undivided profits.

1958In Matter of Bonbright ( 186 Misc. 172 ) the court held that where a corporation in which the trust held stock was merged with another corporation which took over all of its assets and issued new stock in the merged corporation, the new stock must be treated as trust principal, even though the original corporation at the time of the merger had earnings from which dividends might have been declared.

1958In Matter of Bonbright ( 186 Misc. 172 ) the court held that where a corporation in which the trust held stock was merged with another corporation which took over all of its assets and issued new stock in the merged corporation, the new stock must be treated as trust principal, even though the original corporation at the time of the merger had earnings from which dividends might have been declared.

1952Under the other major rule — the Pennsylvania rule — it was provided that ordinary dividends were payable to income and extraordinary dividends were apportionable between income and principal on a formula which need not here concern us (Matter of Nirdlinger, 290 Pa. 457 ).

1952Under the other major rule — the Pennsylvania rule — it was provided that ordinary dividends were payable to income and extraordinary dividends were apportionable between income and principal on a formula which need not here concern us (Matter of Nirdlinger, 290 Pa. 457 ).

1950(See Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, supra, p. 9 .) In the Osborne case (supra) the court noted the difference between the Massachusetts rule and the Pennsylvania rule with reference to stock dividends, and substantially adopted the Pennsylvania rule.

1950(See Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, supra, p. 9 .) In the Osborne case (supra) the court noted the difference between the Massachusetts rule and the Pennsylvania rule with reference to stock dividends, and substantially adopted the Pennsylvania rule.

1939In Matter of Mancinelli ( 158 Misc. 605 ), decided by Surrogate Henderson, in Bronx county, the testator left his residuary estate in trust for the benefit of his wife for life, remainder to his two brothers by name.

1939In Matter of Mancinelli ( 158 Misc. 605 ), decided by Surrogate Henderson, in Bronx county, the testator left his residuary estate in trust for the benefit of his wife for life, remainder to his two brothers by name.

1927(Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 .) It is also argued that the adoption of the so-called Pennsylvania rule, as announced in the Osborne case, has led to a great deal of confusion, so much so that the Legislature, by recent amendment to the Personal Property Law (§ 17-a [added by Laws of 1922, chap. 452, as amd. by Laws of 1926, chap. 843]), has provided that all stock dividends shall constitute principal of a trust, unless otherwise provided in the instrument creating the trust.

1927(Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 .) It is also argued that the adoption of the so-called Pennsylvania rule, as announced in the Osborne case, has led to a great deal of confusion, so much so that the Legislature, by recent amendment to the Personal Property Law (§ 17-a [added by Laws of 1922, chap. 452, as amd. by Laws of 1926, chap. 843]), has provided that all stock dividends shall constitute principal of a trust, unless otherwise provided in the instrument creating the trust.