Pennsylvania rule in Pennsylvania

2009Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 203-04 (3d Cir.2000).

2009Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 203-04 (3d Cir.2000).

1991“The Pennsylvania standard of qualification for an expert witness is a liberal one. ‘If a witness has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation he may testify, and the weight to be given to his evidence is for the jury.’ Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 338 , 319 A.2d 914, 924 (1974).” Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District, 496 Pa. 590, 597-8 , 437 A.2d 1198, 1201 (1981) (plurality opinion).

1991“The Pennsylvania standard of qualification for an expert witness is a liberal one. ‘If a witness has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation he may testify, and the weight to be given to his evidence is for the jury.’ Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 338 , 319 A.2d 914, 924 (1974).” Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District, 496 Pa. 590, 597-8 , 437 A.2d 1198, 1201 (1981) (plurality opinion).

1992However, “[t]he Pennsylvania standard of qualification for an expert witness is a liberal one.” Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 597-598 , 437 A.2d 1198, 1201 (1981).

1992However, “[t]he Pennsylvania standard of qualification for an expert witness is a liberal one.” Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 597-598 , 437 A.2d 1198, 1201 (1981).

2025If he does, he may testify and the weight to be given to such testimony is for the trier of fact to determine.” Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., 664 A.2d 525, 528 (Pa. 1995).

2019In Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, - 10 - J-S43037-19 Inc., 541 Pa. 474, 480-81 , 664 A.2d 525, 528 (1995), the Supreme Court stated: The test to be applied when qualifying a witness to testify as an expert witness is whether the witness has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation.

2024"The Pennsylvania test for ineffectiveness is, in substance, the same as the two-part performance-and-prejudice standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court, see Strickland v. Washinqton, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), although this Court has divided the performance element into two sub-parts 4 dealing with arguable merit and reasonable strategy." Kinq, 57 A.3d at 613 .

2024"The Pennsylvania test for ineffectiveness is, in substance, the same as the two-part performance-and-prejudice standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court, see Strickland v. Washinqton, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), although this Court has divided the performance element into two sub-parts 4 dealing with arguable merit and reasonable strategy." Kinq, 57 A.3d at 613 .

2024In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa.Super. 2004) (cleaned up).

2024In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

2020Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1031-1032 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 922 (2013). [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [] 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 [] (1983).

2016See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1031-1032 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1795 (2013). [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [ 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985)], and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983).

2017See Commonwealth v. Watts, 611 Pa. 80 , 23 A.3d 980 (2011) (stating judicial determinations are not “facts” within meaning of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)). -3- J-S27015-17 Moreover, the “new constitutional right” exception provides no benefit to Appellant because Alleyne does not serve as an exception to the PCRA time-bar.

2017See Commonwealth v. Watts, 611 Pa. 80 , 23 A.3d 980 (2011) (stating judicial determinations are not “facts” within meaning of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)). -3- J-S27015-17 Moreover, the “new constitutional right” exception provides no benefit to Appellant because Alleyne does not serve as an exception to the PCRA time-bar.

2024Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 307 A.3d 742, 746 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ____, ___ A.3d ____ (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 622 Pa. 91, 110 , 79 A.3d 1053, 1063-1064 (2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1048 , 134 S.Ct. 1792 , 188 L.Ed.2d 761 (2014)). [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [ 509 Pa. 476 , 503 A.2d 921 (1985)], and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illi

2024Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 307 A.3d 742, 746 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ____, ___ A.3d ____ (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 622 Pa. 91, 110 , 79 A.3d 1053, 1063-1064 (2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1048 , 134 S.Ct. 1792 , 188 L.Ed.2d 761 (2014)). [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [ 509 Pa. 476 , 503 A.2d 921 (1985)], and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illi

2024Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 307 A.3d 742, 746 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ____, ___ A.3d ____ (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 622 Pa. 91, 110 , 79 A.3d 1053, 1063-1064 (2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1048 , 134 S.Ct. 1792 , 188 L.Ed.2d 761 (2014)). [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [ 509 Pa. 476 , 503 A.2d 921 (1985)], and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illi

2024Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 307 A.3d 742, 746 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ____, ___ A.3d ____ (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 622 Pa. 91, 110 , 79 A.3d 1053, 1063-1064 (2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1048 , 134 S.Ct. 1792 , 188 L.Ed.2d 761 (2014)). [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [ 509 Pa. 476 , 503 A.2d 921 (1985)], and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illi

2020First, he claims the trial court imposed mandatory sentences due to his prior convictions, pursuant 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714, an unconstitutional statute under Alleyne v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and its Pennsylvania progeny.

2020In his petition, Appellant raised multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted his sentence included an illegal mandatory minimum term per Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) and its Pennsylvania progeny.

2015Whereas Strickland explained the ineffective assistance of counsel test using two prongs, our Commonwealth uses three prongs to apply the “identical rule of law.” Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 332 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586 , 594 n.8 (Pa. 2007) (“The Third Circuit has likewise recognized that Pennsylvania’s standard for assessing claims of counsel ineffectiveness is materially identical to Strickland.

2012As we previously have noted: "Although the Pennsylvania test for ineffectiveness [articulated in Pierce] is the same as Strickland's two-part performance and prejudice standard, in application this Court has characterized the test as tripartite, by dividing the performance element into two distinct parts, i.e., arguable merit and lack of reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698 , 713 n. 8, 927 A.2d 586 , 594 n. 8 (2007).

2001Bank, 384 Pa. Super. 65 , 557 A.2d 775 (1989) (applying Pennsylvania standard for summary judgment where New York substantive law governed the plaintiff’s claims).

2001Bank, 384 Pa. Super. 65 , 557 A.2d 775 (1989) (applying Pennsylvania standard for summary judgment where New York substantive law governed the plaintiff’s claims).

1988Pennsylvania’s test for custodial interrogation is whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by said interrogation____ Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 306 , 412 A.2d 517, 521 (1980) (numerous citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 577 , 459 A.2d 311, 314 (1983).” Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 503 Pa. 555, 563 , 470 A.2d 56, 59, 60 (1981) (Concurring Opinion by Larsen, J.) Although the appellant had a duty under the Motor Vehicle

1988Pennsylvania’s test for custodial interrogation is whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by said interrogation____ Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 306 , 412 A.2d 517, 521 (1980) (numerous citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 577 , 459 A.2d 311, 314 (1983).” Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 503 Pa. 555, 563 , 470 A.2d 56, 59, 60 (1981) (Concurring Opinion by Larsen, J.) Although the appellant had a duty under the Motor Vehicle

2019Notably, the parties did not dispute that the mandatory-minimum sentencing statute under which DiMatteo's sentence had been imposed - 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 - was "unconstitutional and illegal ... in light of Alleyne and its Pennsylvania progeny." Id. at 191 (citing, inter alia , *1019 Wolfe , 140 A.3d at 660-61 ). 1 Similar to every other mandatory-sentencing statute struck down in this Commonwealth following Alleyne , "[s]ection 7508 specifies that its provisions 'shall not be an element of the crime[,]' the application of the sentence 'shall be determined at sentencing[,]' and the factual determ

2019Notably, the parties did not dispute that the mandatory-minimum sentencing statute under which DiMatteo's sentence had been imposed - 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 - was "unconstitutional and illegal ... in light of Alleyne and its Pennsylvania progeny." Id. at 191 (citing, inter alia , *1019 Wolfe , 140 A.3d at 660-61 ). 1 Similar to every other mandatory-sentencing statute struck down in this Commonwealth following Alleyne , "[s]ection 7508 specifies that its provisions 'shall not be an element of the crime[,]' the application of the sentence 'shall be determined at sentencing[,]' and the factual determ

2020Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1031-1032 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 922 (2013). [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [] 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 [] (1983).

2016See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1031-1032 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1795 (2013). [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [ 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985)], and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983).

2012As we previously have noted: "Although the Pennsylvania test for ineffectiveness [articulated in Pierce] is the same as Strickland's two-part performance and prejudice standard, in application this Court has characterized the test as tripartite, by dividing the performance element into two distinct parts, i.e., arguable merit and lack of reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698 , 713 n. 8, 927 A.2d 586 , 594 n. 8 (2007).

2012As we previously have noted: "Although the Pennsylvania test for ineffectiveness [articulated in Pierce] is the same as Strickland's two-part performance and prejudice standard, in application this Court has characterized the test as tripartite, by dividing the performance element into two distinct parts, i.e., arguable merit and lack of reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698 , 713 n. 8, 927 A.2d 586 , 594 n. 8 (2007).

2009Indeed, implicit in the long-standing Pennsylvania requirement that the principal manifest an intention that the agent act on the principal’s behalf is the notion that the agent has authority to alter the principal’s relationships with third parties, such as binding the principal to a contract.” Id. at 370 , 761 A.2d at 1121 . (emphasis in original) “The Supreme Court has determined that a confidential relationship and the resulting fiduciary duty may attach ‘whenever one occupies toward another such a position of advisor or counsellor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in go

2009Indeed, implicit in the long-standing Pennsylvania requirement that the principal manifest an intention that the agent act on the principal’s behalf is the notion that the agent has authority to alter the principal’s relationships with third parties, such as binding the principal to a contract.” Id. at 370 , 761 A.2d at 1121 . (emphasis in original) “The Supreme Court has determined that a confidential relationship and the resulting fiduciary duty may attach ‘whenever one occupies toward another such a position of advisor or counsellor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in go

1999Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599 , 235 A.2d 349 (1967), included the prejudice standard described by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1999Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599 , 235 A.2d 349 (1967), included the prejudice standard described by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).