Pennsylvania rule in Hawaii

1940(Estate of Allen, ante, p. 501; Robinson v. McWayne, *751 ante, p. 689.) Cogent reasons are given in the recent decisions of this court for refusing to sanction the decision of the circuit judge holding that we should abandon the rule of apportionment of stock dividends between life tenants and remaindermen, generally referred to as the Pennsylvania rule, first adopted in this jurisdiction more than forty years ago in the case of Carter v. Crehore, supra, and adopt the rule which treats all stock dividends as corpus, generally referred to as the Massachusetts rule, exemplified in the two cases

1940(Estate of Allen, ante, p. 501; Robinson v. McWayne, *751 ante, p. 689.) Cogent reasons are given in the recent decisions of this court for refusing to sanction the decision of the circuit judge holding that we should abandon the rule of apportionment of stock dividends between life tenants and remaindermen, generally referred to as the Pennsylvania rule, first adopted in this jurisdiction more than forty years ago in the case of Carter v. Crehore, supra, and adopt the rule which treats all stock dividends as corpus, generally referred to as the Massachusetts rule, exemplified in the two cases

1965But this should not be done when the exhibits have not even been admitted in evidence. 21 Cf., Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., *474 146 Conn. 327, 334-35 , 150 A.2d 602, 605-06 .

1965But this should not be done when the exhibits have not even been admitted in evidence. 21 Cf., Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., *474 146 Conn. 327, 334-35 , 150 A.2d 602, 605-06 .

1961See Hankins v. Mack, 364 Pa. 417 , 72 A.2d 268 (1950); Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470 , 112 A.2d 189 (1955); Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109 , 161 A.2d 330 ; Menneti v. Evans Construction Co., 160 F. Supp. 372, 381 , aff’d on this point 259 F.2d 367, 371 .

1961See Hankins v. Mack, 364 Pa. 417 , 72 A.2d 268 (1950); Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470 , 112 A.2d 189 (1955); Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109 , 161 A.2d 330 ; Menneti v. Evans Construction Co., 160 F. Supp. 372, 381 , aff’d on this point 259 F.2d 367, 371 .

1961See Hankins v. Mack, 364 Pa. 417 , 72 A.2d 268 (1950); Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470 , 112 A.2d 189 (1955); Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109 , 161 A.2d 330 ; Menneti v. Evans Construction Co., 160 F. Supp. 372, 381 , aff’d on this point 259 F.2d 367, 371 .

1961See Hankins v. Mack, 364 Pa. 417 , 72 A.2d 268 (1950); Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470 , 112 A.2d 189 (1955); Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109 , 161 A.2d 330 ; Menneti v. Evans Construction Co., 160 F. Supp. 372, 381 , aff’d on this point 259 F.2d 367, 371 .

1961See Hankins v. Mack, 364 Pa. 417 , 72 A.2d 268 (1950); Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470 , 112 A.2d 189 (1955); Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109 , 161 A.2d 330 ; Menneti v. Evans Construction Co., 160 F. Supp. 372, 381 , aff’d on this point 259 F.2d 367, 371 .

1961See Hankins v. Mack, 364 Pa. 417 , 72 A.2d 268 (1950); Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470 , 112 A.2d 189 (1955); Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109 , 161 A.2d 330 ; Menneti v. Evans Construction Co., 160 F. Supp. 372, 381 , aff’d on this point 259 F.2d 367, 371 .

1961See Hankins v. Mack, 364 Pa. 417 , 72 A.2d 268 (1950); Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470 , 112 A.2d 189 (1955); Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109 , 161 A.2d 330 ; Menneti v. Evans Construction Co., 160 F. Supp. 372, 381 , aff’d on this point 259 F.2d 367, 371 .

1961See Hankins v. Mack, 364 Pa. 417 , 72 A.2d 268 (1950); Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470 , 112 A.2d 189 (1955); Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109 , 161 A.2d 330 ; Menneti v. Evans Construction Co., 160 F. Supp. 372, 381 , aff’d on this point 259 F.2d 367, 371 .

1940This argument has its basis in the contention advanced by appellees that this court, at the time of the rendition of the Carter v. Crehore, supra, decision, was as a matter of law bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 , decided May 19, 1890, and upon the further ground that if it be held that Gibbons v. Mahon, supra, was not controlling, then the Pennsyl *517 vania rule should be repudiated because the Massachusetts rule is the superior and better of the two.

1940This argument has its basis in the contention advanced by appellees that this court, at the time of the rendition of the Carter v. Crehore, supra, decision, was as a matter of law bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 , decided May 19, 1890, and upon the further ground that if it be held that Gibbons v. Mahon, supra, was not controlling, then the Pennsyl *517 vania rule should be repudiated because the Massachusetts rule is the superior and better of the two.

1940J. 774.)” In Estate Thomas Cummins, 16 Haw. 185, 192 , decided in 1904, this court said: “The decision in Carter v. Crehore, in reference to stock dividends, is conclusive in the present case.” The appellees urged that this court now renounce the rule adopted by it first in the Carter v. Crehore, supra, decision, rendered February 27, 1900, and the subsequent decisions reaffirming adherence to the Pennsylvania rule and to now declare the Massachusetts rule to be the law in the Territory.

1940J. 774.)” In Estate Thomas Cummins, 16 Haw. 185, 192 , decided in 1904, this court said: “The decision in Carter v. Crehore, in reference to stock dividends, is conclusive in the present case.” The appellees urged that this court now renounce the rule adopted by it first in the Carter v. Crehore, supra, decision, rendered February 27, 1900, and the subsequent decisions reaffirming adherence to the Pennsylvania rule and to now declare the Massachusetts rule to be the law in the Territory.

1940Parker, 14 Haw. 317 ; Kapiolani Estate v. Atcherly, 21 Haw. 441 ; Valli v. United States, 91 F. [2d] 687; 11 Cyc. 717.) As indicated in the three leading local decisions, namely, Carter v. Crehore, supra; Evans v. Garvie, sufra; and Estate of Weber, 31 Haw. 137, 116 , dealing with extraordinary dividends, this court referred to the fact that there are two divergent American rules, one commonly designated as the “Pennsylvania rule” and the other the “Massachusetts rule.” The State of Kentucky appears to have followed neither but has taken what might be called a middle course which is sanctioned

1937(Lyman v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 58 .) Under the Kentucky rule, which has been followed in some States, all dividends received during the life of the estate paid from the earnings of a corporation, regardless of whether the same accumulated prior to or after the inception of the trust, are treated as income without regard to whether they are in the form of ordinary, extraordinary or stock dividends.' The Pennsylvania rule, which was approved by this court in Carter v. Crehore, 12 Haw. 309 , and again in Evans v. Garvie, 23 Haw. 651 , and is approved also in many other jurisdictions and which is some

1937(Lyman v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 58 .) Under the Kentucky rule, which has been followed in some States, all dividends received during the life of the estate paid from the earnings of a corporation, regardless of whether the same accumulated prior to or after the inception of the trust, are treated as income without regard to whether they are in the form of ordinary, extraordinary or stock dividends.' The Pennsylvania rule, which was approved by this court in Carter v. Crehore, 12 Haw. 309 , and again in Evans v. Garvie, 23 Haw. 651 , and is approved also in many other jurisdictions and which is some

1937(Lyman v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 58 .) Under the Kentucky rule, which has been followed in some States, all dividends received during the life of the estate paid from the earnings of a corporation, regardless of whether the same accumulated prior to or after the inception of the trust, are treated as income without regard to whether they are in the form of ordinary, extraordinary or stock dividends.' The Pennsylvania rule, which was approved by this court in Carter v. Crehore, 12 Haw. 309 , and again in Evans v. Garvie, 23 Haw. 651 , and is approved also in many other jurisdictions and which is some

1937(Lyman v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 58 .) Under the Kentucky rule, which has been followed in some States, all dividends received during the life of the estate paid from the earnings of a corporation, regardless of whether the same accumulated prior to or after the inception of the trust, are treated as income without regard to whether they are in the form of ordinary, extraordinary or stock dividends.' The Pennsylvania rule, which was approved by this court in Carter v. Crehore, 12 Haw. 309 , and again in Evans v. Garvie, 23 Haw. 651 , and is approved also in many other jurisdictions and which is some

1920The discretion given to the register is limited to a selection from those asking, if competent, in each class in their order. * * * When the widow renounces her right to administer it is the duty of the register to select from the children or next of kin a person or persons competent to perform the duties of administration.” McClellan’s Appeal, 16 Pa. 110 .

1920The discretion given to the register is limited to a selection from those asking, if competent, in each class in their order. * * * When the widow renounces her right to administer it is the duty of the register to select from the children or next of kin a person or persons competent to perform the duties of administration.” McClellan’s Appeal, 16 Pa. 110 .

1900This rule has the support not only of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, which as shown above also follow the rule of apportionment, but also of Kentucky (Hite v. Hite, supra) which does not follow the rule of apportionment, and Tennessee (Prichett v. Nashville Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472 , 33 L.

1900This rule has the support not only of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, which as shown above also follow the rule of apportionment, but also of Kentucky (Hite v. Hite, supra) which does not follow the rule of apportionment, and Tennessee (Prichett v. Nashville Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472 , 33 L.

1900This rule has the support not only of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, which as shown above also follow the rule of apportionment, but also of Kentucky (Hite v. Hite, supra) which does not follow the rule of apportionment, and Tennessee (Prichett v. Nashville Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472 , 33 L.

1900This rule has the support not only of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, which as shown above also follow the rule of apportionment, but also of Kentucky (Hite v. Hite, supra) which does not follow the rule of apportionment, and Tennessee (Prichett v. Nashville Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472 , 33 L.