prescribed standard in Pennsylvania

2018Whether evidence meets a prescribed standard of proof is “always a question of law and therefore reviewable by the appellate court.” Stafford v. Reed, 70 A.2d 345, 346 (Pa. 1950).

2016Nevertheless, whether evidence meets a prescribed standard of proof is “always a question of law and therefore reviewable by the appellate court.” Stafford v. Reed, 70 A.2d 345, 346 (Pa. 1950).

1979Our Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 190 , 266 A.2d 753, 755 (1970): Even though the Court [in Miranda] failed to set forth a single permissible formulation of this warning, however, they did clearly indicate that deviation from the prescribed formulation of the various warnings would be permissible only when the offered version is more likely to give a suspect a better understanding of his constitutional rights and a heightened awareness of the seriousness of his situation.

1979Our Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 190 , 266 A.2d 753, 755 (1970): Even though the Court [in Miranda] failed to set forth a single permissible formulation of this warning, however, they did clearly indicate that deviation from the prescribed formulation of the various warnings would be permissible only when the offered version is more likely to give a suspect a better understanding of his constitutional rights and a heightened awareness of the seriousness of his situation.

2022Craley, 895 A.2d at 539-540; see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738. - 15 - J-A22002-22 1738(d) waiver form, knowingly waives intra-policy stacking, but it is unclear whether the prescribed waiver form establishes that the policyholder understood that he or she knowingly waived inter-policy stacking.

2022Craley, 895 A.2d at 539-540 ; see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738. - 15 - J-A22002-22 1738(d) waiver form, knowingly waives intra-policy stacking, but it is unclear whether the prescribed waiver form establishes that the policyholder understood that he or she knowingly waived inter-policy stacking.

2021Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. 2008). -8- J-S21020-21 (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime. (vii) The mental capacity of the victim. (2) Prior offense history, including: (i) The individual's prior criminal record. (ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences. (iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs for sexual offenders. (3) Characteristics of the individual, including: (i) Age. (ii) Use of illegal drugs. (iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or menta

2018To meet the statutory standard, the child’s “testimony must be of such a quality to allow the factfinder to conclude that it outweighs ‘inconsistent evidence.’” In re: S.H., 96 A.3d 448, 462 (Pa. Cmwlth. 12 For purposes of this appeal, we treat Uncle’s second and third issues together as one issue. 10 2014) (holding that where there is no physical evidence of abuse all of the child’s testimony must be considered, not just selective parts).

2013As reflected in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. O’Berg, 584 Pa. 11, 26-29 , 880 A.2d 597, 606-08 (2005) (Saylor, J., dissenting), the courts cannot reasonably “defer” constitutional claims to PCRA proceedings which they know will not be available.

2013As reflected in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. O’Berg, 584 Pa. 11, 26-29 , 880 A.2d 597, 606-08 (2005) (Saylor, J., dissenting), the courts cannot reasonably “defer” constitutional claims to PCRA proceedings which they know will not be available.

2012See Thompson Coal, 412 A.2d at 471 , and discussion concerning same, supra. If the handshake and oral agreement (“mazal”) — attested to be signs of binding agreement binding among diamond-traders — as to the material terms of a significant transaction discussed by Appellant Goldstein and Mr. Hakami over a matter of years did not present a jury question regarding the presence of a “prospective contractual relation,” we are hard-pressed to imagine what “prospective” contractual relation would occupy the narrow band between the agreement in principle at issue in this case and a fully executed, wr

1989The court has also opined that “Congress did not intend that a person by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his tax liability . . . should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct.” United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).

1953As Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice, Stern said in Stafford v. Reed, 363 Pa. 405, 407, 410-411 , 70 A. 2d 345 : “An appellate court will ordinarily accept as conclusive the findings of fact of a chancellor approved by the court en banc, but this rule is not applicable where the evidence, in order to prevail, must be clear, precise and indubitable or where it must meet some other prescribed standard of proof.