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24 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1876–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Joseph v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 23-24. 2019Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Ex Parte Browngreen2 sentences2010Brown , 205 S.W.3d at 546 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 2010Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 546 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Lorig v. City of Missiongreen2 sentences2003See id. 8 544.002(b) (“To implement this subtitle or a local traffic ordinance, a local authority may place and maintain a traffic-control device on a highway under the authority’s jurisdiction.“) (emphasis added); see also Lorig v. City of MisSion, 629 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex. 1982) (“A stop sign is intended to regulate traffic for the safety of the public generally.“). 2003See id. § 544.002(b) (" To implement this subtitle or a local traffic ordinance , a local authority may place and maintain a traffic-control device on a highway under the authority's jurisdiction.") (emphasis added); see also Lorig v. City of Mission , 629 S.W.2d 699 , 700 (Tex. 1982) ("A stop sign is intended to regulate traffic for the safety of the public generally."). | 2 | 2 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2022Ann. art. 38.22; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 7 pertaining to a statement’s admissibility: the defendant's receipt of the prescribed warning and his waiver of the rights set out in the warning. 2016Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex.Crim.App.2010). | 1 | 3 |
State Ex Rel. Rodriguez v. Oniongreen1 sentence2024See Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 224-25 (explaining that “illegal acts” are not authorized by law, that “irregular acts” are acts that do not adhere to a prescribed rule or mode of proceeding, “that errors involving statutory procedure are merely voidable,” not void, and that trial court actions that are illegal are void but actions that are irregular are merely voidable); Onion, 741 S.W.2d at 434-35 (“There is no grant of jurisdiction to the county courts which precludes a District Court from exercising its plenary power over issuance of writs of habeas corpus in misdemeanor actions.”); Flores v. Sta | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Villanuevagreen1 sentence2024See Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 224-25 (explaining that “illegal acts” are not authorized by law, that “irregular acts” are acts that do not adhere to a prescribed rule or mode of proceeding, “that errors involving statutory procedure are merely voidable,” not void, and that trial court actions that are illegal are void but actions that are irregular are merely voidable); Onion, 741 S.W.2d at 434-35 (“There is no grant of jurisdiction to the county courts which precludes a District Court from exercising its plenary power over issuance of writs of habeas corpus in misdemeanor actions.”); Flores v. Sta | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Seidelgreen1 sentence2024See Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 224-25 (explaining that “illegal acts” are not authorized by law, that “irregular acts” are acts that do not adhere to a prescribed rule or mode of proceeding, “that errors involving statutory procedure are merely voidable,” not void, and that trial court actions that are illegal are void but actions that are irregular are merely voidable); Onion, 741 S.W.2d at 434-35 (“There is no grant of jurisdiction to the county courts which precludes a District Court from exercising its plenary power over issuance of writs of habeas corpus in misdemeanor actions.”); Flores v. Sta | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Johnsongreen1 sentence2024See Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 224-25 (explaining that “illegal acts” are not authorized by law, that “irregular acts” are acts that do not adhere to a prescribed rule or mode of proceeding, “that errors involving statutory procedure are merely voidable,” not void, and that trial court actions that are illegal are void but actions that are irregular are merely voidable); Onion, 741 S.W.2d at 434-35 (“There is no grant of jurisdiction to the county courts which precludes a District Court from exercising its plenary power over issuance of writs of habeas corpus in misdemeanor actions.”); Flores v. Sta | 1 | 1 |
Flores v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 224-25 (explaining that “illegal acts” are not authorized by law, that “irregular acts” are acts that do not adhere to a prescribed rule or mode of proceeding, “that errors involving statutory procedure are merely voidable,” not void, and that trial court actions that are illegal are void but actions that are irregular are merely voidable); Onion, 741 S.W.2d at 434-35 (“There is no grant of jurisdiction to the county courts which precludes a District Court from exercising its plenary power over issuance of writs of habeas corpus in misdemeanor actions.”); Flores v. Sta | 1 | 1 |
Holden v. Stategreen1 sentence2015State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 762 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)(Which Case Held, that it is not 'Always' error when a trial court decides a Motion-For-New-trial on the basis of affidavits on claims of jineffective-assistance' of counsel); However, aside from the above prescribed rule of law, as previously discussed by this Applicant, who has argured, that The Fourteenth Court Of Appealsi in this case had iOrderedj the convicting court judge to hold- conduct hearing on this Applicant's [Pro-Se] Motion-For-New- Trial due to Applicant among-other-things arguring ineffective- assistance of counsel, Double Jeopard | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See id. | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Stategreen2 sentences2009“When offered for the truth of the matters asserted, so called ‘outcry testimony’ is hearsay; as such, it is objectionable unless the testimony is permitted by a prescribed exception to the hearsay rule.” Dorado v. State, 843 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810-811 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). 2009"When offered for the truth of the matters asserted, so called `outcry testimony' is hearsay; as such, it is objectionable unless the testimony is permitted by a prescribed exception to the hearsay rule." Dorado v. State, 843 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810-811 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). | 1 | 1 |
Dorado v. Stategreen2 sentences2009“When offered for the truth of the matters asserted, so called ‘outcry testimony’ is hearsay; as such, it is objectionable unless the testimony is permitted by a prescribed exception to the hearsay rule.” Dorado v. State, 843 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810-811 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). 2009"When offered for the truth of the matters asserted, so called `outcry testimony' is hearsay; as such, it is objectionable unless the testimony is permitted by a prescribed exception to the hearsay rule." Dorado v. State, 843 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810-811 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). | 1 | 1 |
McClanahan Ex Rel. McClanahan v. St. Louis Public Service Co.green2 sentences1982Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 500 , 251 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1952), the same court quoted a previous opinion and stated, “negligence is one kind of tort, an unintentional injury usually predicated upon failure to observe the prescribed standard of care, 52 Am.Jur., Torts, § 20, pp. 373-374, while a willful, wanton, reckless act is another kind of tort, an intentional act often based upon an act done in utter disregard of the consequences . ... ” See Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo.App.1970); Gime nez v. Rissen, 12 Cal.App.2d 152 , 55 P.2d 292, 296-97 (1936), and Cosentino v. Heffelfi 1982Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 500 , 251 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1952), the same court quoted a previous opinion and stated, “negligence is one kind of tort, an unintentional injury usually predicated upon failure to observe the prescribed standard of care, 52 Am.Jur., Torts, § 20, pp. 373-374, while a willful, wanton, reckless act is another kind of tort, an intentional act often based upon an act done in utter disregard of the consequences . ... ” See Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo.App.1970); Gime nez v. Rissen, 12 Cal.App.2d 152 , 55 P.2d 292, 296-97 (1936), and Cosentino v. Heffelfi | 1 | 1 |
Cosentino v. Heffelfingergreen2 sentences1982Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 500 , 251 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1952), the same court quoted a previous opinion and stated, “negligence is one kind of tort, an unintentional injury usually predicated upon failure to observe the prescribed standard of care, 52 Am.Jur., Torts, § 20, pp. 373-374, while a willful, wanton, reckless act is another kind of tort, an intentional act often based upon an act done in utter disregard of the consequences . ... ” See Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo.App.1970); Gime nez v. Rissen, 12 Cal.App.2d 152 , 55 P.2d 292, 296-97 (1936), and Cosentino v. Heffelfi 1982Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 500 , 251 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1952), the same court quoted a previous opinion and stated, “negligence is one kind of tort, an unintentional injury usually predicated upon failure to observe the prescribed standard of care, 52 Am.Jur., Torts, § 20, pp. 373-374, while a willful, wanton, reckless act is another kind of tort, an intentional act often based upon an act done in utter disregard of the consequences . ... ” See Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo.App.1970); Gime nez v. Rissen, 12 Cal.App.2d 152 , 55 P.2d 292, 296-97 (1936), and Cosentino v. Heffelfi | 1 | 1 |
Gimenez v. Rissengreen2 sentences1982Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 500 , 251 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1952), the same court quoted a previous opinion and stated, “negligence is one kind of tort, an unintentional injury usually predicated upon failure to observe the prescribed standard of care, 52 Am.Jur., Torts, § 20, pp. 373-374, while a willful, wanton, reckless act is another kind of tort, an intentional act often based upon an act done in utter disregard of the consequences . ... ” See Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo.App.1970); Gime nez v. Rissen, 12 Cal.App.2d 152 , 55 P.2d 292, 296-97 (1936), and Cosentino v. Heffelfi 1982Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 500 , 251 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1952), the same court quoted a previous opinion and stated, “negligence is one kind of tort, an unintentional injury usually predicated upon failure to observe the prescribed standard of care, 52 Am.Jur., Torts, § 20, pp. 373-374, while a willful, wanton, reckless act is another kind of tort, an intentional act often based upon an act done in utter disregard of the consequences . ... ” See Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo.App.1970); Gime nez v. Rissen, 12 Cal.App.2d 152 , 55 P.2d 292, 296-97 (1936), and Cosentino v. Heffelfi | 1 | 1 |
Ervin v. Colemangreen1 sentence1982Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 500 , 251 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1952), the same court quoted a previous opinion and stated, “negligence is one kind of tort, an unintentional injury usually predicated upon failure to observe the prescribed standard of care, 52 Am.Jur., Torts, § 20, pp. 373-374, while a willful, wanton, reckless act is another kind of tort, an intentional act often based upon an act done in utter disregard of the consequences . ... ” See Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo.App.1970); Gime nez v. Rissen, 12 Cal.App.2d 152 , 55 P.2d 292, 296-97 (1936), and Cosentino v. Heffelfi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Lohse
green
1 sentence2024See Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 224-25 (explaining that “illegal acts” are not authorized by law, that “irregular acts” are acts that do not adhere to a prescribed rule or mode of proceeding, “that errors involving statutory procedure are merely voidable,” not void, and that trial court actions that are illegal are void but actions that are irregular are merely voidable); Onion, 741 S.W.2d at 434-35 (“There is no grant of jurisdiction to the county courts which precludes a District Court from exercising its plenary power over issuance of writs of habeas corpus in misdemeanor actions.”); Flores v. Sta | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Vista Medical Center Hospital v. Texas Mutual Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2022Application of the exception “tends to yield hospitals reimbursement for a given hospital admission that is substantially more generous—indeed, potentially several times larger—than the amounts prescribed under the standard per diem methodology.” Vista II, 416 S.W.3d at 18 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Klapesky v. State
green
1 sentence2015State, 256 S.W.3d 442 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008), which both of those defendants had argured on their appeals, that their _13_ involuntarily-exclusion[Absence] from their -New Trial hearings violated their valuable rights to be physically present in the courtroom during a critical-stage of the proceedings against them; When The Texas Court Of Criminal Appeals, and The Austin Court Of Appeals addressed those contentions raised in Kincard and in Kla- p§§ky; The Texas Court Of Criminal Appeals' in Kincard, held that a Motion-For-New-trial hearing was a critical-stage of the proc- eeding, and that Kin | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Abeles v. Adams Engineering Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Metcalf v. Taylor
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 58-59 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Almanza v. State
red
2 sentences1996Our precedents under article 36.19, as authoritatively construed in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (opinion on rehearing), make it clear that, unlike errors subject to review under rule 81(b)(2), the harmfulness of error in a jury charge should be measured, at least in part, against the likelihood that the jury's verdict was actually based upon an alternative available theory of culpability not affected by erroneous portions of the charge. 1996Our precedents under article 36.19, as authoritatively construed in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (opinion on rehearing), make it clear that, unlike errors subject to review under rule 81(b)(2), the harmfulness of error in a jury charge should be measured, at least in part, against the likelihood that the jury’s verdict was actually based upon an alternative available theory of culpability not affected by erroneous portions of the charge. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Carrera v. Marsh
green
2 sentences1996Id. 1996Carrera v. Marsh, 847 S.W.2d at 342 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Geesa v. State
red
1 sentence1993The prescribed instruction includes this paragraph: “In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt after considering all the evidence before you, and these instructions, you will acquit him and say by your verdict ‘Not guilty.’” 820 S.W.2d at 162 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1990For example, see Johnson v. State, 768 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.App.—Dallas) PDR refused. 6 2 Since Rose an objection is not required to preserve error, id., at 552-553 ; that § 4 mandates a prescribed instruction is calculated to render it unobjectionable, and thus might have dissuaded defense counsel from making an objection. 1990For example, see Johnson v. State, 768 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.App.—Dallas) PDR refused. 6 2 Since Rose an objection is not required to preserve error, id., at 552-553 ; that § 4 mandates a prescribed instruction is calculated to render it unobjectionable, and thus might have dissuaded defense counsel from making an objection. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
McNew v. State
green
2 sentences1984Accordingly, the McNew Court opined, “[W]e see no reason that once a hearing is held on whether the trial judge should proceed with an adjudication of guilt, the trial judge cannot immediately continue with ‘all proceedings, including assessment of punishment ... as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.” McNew, supra, at 174 . 1984Accordingly, the McNew Court opined, "[W]e see no reason that once a hearing is held on whether the trial judge should proceed with an adjudication of guilt, the *389 trial judge cannot immediately continue with `all proceedings, including assessment of punishment ... as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred." McNew, supra, at 174 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Jenkins v. North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences1982The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Jenkins v. North Carolina Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560 , 94 S.E.2d 577 (1956) said: Negligence, in all its various shades of meaning, is an outgrowth of the action of trespass on the case and does not include intentional acts of violence. 1982The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Jenkins v. North Carolina Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560 , 94 S.E.2d 577 (1956) said: Negligence, in all its various shades of meaning, is an outgrowth of the action of trespass on the case and does not include intentional acts of violence. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ex Parte J. C. Hodges
green
2 sentences1942Finally, as concerns the $10 allowance for alimony subsequent to the trial below and pending this appeal, that, too, is considered but the exercise of the power thus' given the trial court; in other words, the exercise of such power comes within the prescribed exception to the general rule that a judgment, in an ordinary case, after its rendition and after the term of the court at which it was rendered has expired, passes beyond the court’s jurisdiction. 15 Tex.Jur. 642, Sec. 147; Ex parte Hodges, 130 Tex. 280 , 109 S.W.2d 964 ; Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1 , 123 S.W.2d 306 . 1942Finally, as concerns the $10 allowance for alimony subsequent to the trial below and pending this appeal, that, too, is considered but the exercise of the power thus' given the trial court; in other words, the exercise of such power comes within the prescribed exception to the general rule that a judgment, in an ordinary case, after its rendition and after the term of the court at which it was rendered has expired, passes beyond the court’s jurisdiction. 15 Tex.Jur. 642, Sec. 147; Ex parte Hodges, 130 Tex. 280 , 109 S.W.2d 964 ; Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1 , 123 S.W.2d 306 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Ex Parte Winfield Scott
green
2 sentences1942Finally, as concerns the $10 allowance for alimony subsequent to the trial below and pending this appeal, that, too, is considered but the exercise of the power thus' given the trial court; in other words, the exercise of such power comes within the prescribed exception to the general rule that a judgment, in an ordinary case, after its rendition and after the term of the court at which it was rendered has expired, passes beyond the court’s jurisdiction. 15 Tex.Jur. 642, Sec. 147; Ex parte Hodges, 130 Tex. 280 , 109 S.W.2d 964 ; Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1 , 123 S.W.2d 306 . 1942Finally, as concerns the $10 allowance for alimony subsequent to the trial below and pending this appeal, that, too, is considered but the exercise of the power thus' given the trial court; in other words, the exercise of such power comes within the prescribed exception to the general rule that a judgment, in an ordinary case, after its rendition and after the term of the court at which it was rendered has expired, passes beyond the court’s jurisdiction. 15 Tex.Jur. 642, Sec. 147; Ex parte Hodges, 130 Tex. 280 , 109 S.W.2d 964 ; Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1 , 123 S.W.2d 306 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Lea v. Hernandez neutral | 1 | 1876–1876 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.