prescribed standard in New York

1980The vague and general allegations of negligence in the proposed claim do not set forth a meritorious claim where the automobile in which claimant was a passenger left the highway and collided with an exit sign for no apparent reason (see Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1).

1980The vague and general allegations of negligence in the proposed claim do not set forth a meritorious claim where the automobile which claimant’s decedent was driving left the highway and collided with an exit sign for no apparent reason (see Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1 ).

1994The argument that the deposition of the 10-year-old victim was incompetent as the product of a police officer and not the child raises a nonjurisdictional latent deficiency, which was not preserved by timely objection (see, Matter of Edward B., 80 NY2d 458, 462 ; cf., Matter of Rodney J., supra, at 508).

1990The testimony of the unsworn victim was sufficiently corroborated under the prescribed standard of People v Groff (supra) and this evidence, coupled with all of the other evidence in this case, was legally sufficient to support the verdict, which was not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v Bleakley, 141 AD2d 553 , lv denied 72 NY2d 856 ).

1990The testimony of the unsworn victim was sufficiently corroborated under the prescribed standard of People v Groff (supra) and this evidence, coupled with all of the other evidence in this case, was legally sufficient to support the verdict, which was not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v Bleakley, 141 AD2d 553 , lv denied 72 NY2d 856 ).

1978The Appellate Term ruled that "the statute [Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 1194, subd 4] insofar as it permits evidence of refusal to take the prescribed test, violates a defendant’s constitutional privilege from being compelled to testify against himself and from being compelled to provide the State with evidence of a testimonial nature” (People v Thomas, 92 Misc 2d 992, 994-995 ).

1977In consequence, the statute, insofar as it permits evidence of refusal to take the prescribed test, violates a defendant’s constitutional privilege from being compelled to testify against himself and from being compelled to provide the State with evidence of a testimonial nature (Schmerber v California, supra; People v Paddock, 29 NY2d 504 ; People v Rodriguez, 80 Misc 2d 1060 ).

1977In consequence, the statute, insofar as it permits evidence of refusal to take the prescribed test, violates a defendant’s constitutional privilege from being compelled to testify against himself and from being compelled to provide the State with evidence of a testimonial nature (Schmerber v California, supra; People v Paddock, 29 NY2d 504 ; People v Rodriguez, 80 Misc 2d 1060 ).

1977In consequence, the statute, insofar as it permits evidence of refusal to take the prescribed test, violates a defendant’s constitutional privilege from being compelled to testify against himself and from being compelled to provide the State with evidence of a testimonial nature (Schmerber v California, supra; People v Paddock, 29 NY2d 504 ; People v Rodriguez, 80 Misc 2d 1060 ).

1977The admission of the refusal evidence was error of constitutional dimension, and since it cannot be said that there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant’s conviction (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 ), a reversal and new trial is mandated on this charge.

1974Having previously been put at the risk of conviction, and been acquitted of the charge of criminal impersonation (see, also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 250 ; People v Vidal, 26 NY2d 249, 253 ), constitutionally defendant could not thereafter be tried on this charge (People v Goldfarb, 152 App Div 870, 874 , affd 213 NY 664 ; Green v United States, 355 US 184 ).

1974Having previously been put at the risk of conviction, and been acquitted of the charge of criminal impersonation (see, also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 250 ; People v Vidal, 26 NY2d 249, 253 ), constitutionally defendant could not thereafter be tried on this charge (People v Goldfarb, 152 App Div 870, 874 , affd 213 NY 664 ; Green v United States, 355 US 184 ).

1974Moreover, where, at a trial, the proof falls below the prescribed standard for conviction, the accused is entitled as a matter of law to an acquittal (People v Ledwon, 153 NY 10 ).

1974Having previously been put at the risk of conviction, and been acquitted of the charge of criminal impersonation (see, also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 250 ; People v Vidal, 26 NY2d 249, 253 ), constitutionally defendant could not thereafter be tried on this charge (People v Goldfarb, 152 App Div 870, 874 , affd 213 NY 664 ; Green v United States, 355 US 184 ).

1974Co. v. Bohlinger, 308 N. Y. 174, 183 , affg. 284 App. Div. 110, 113-115 ).

1974Having previously been put at the risk of conviction, and been acquitted of the charge of criminal impersonation (see, also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 250 ; People v Vidal, 26 NY2d 249, 253 ), constitutionally defendant could not thereafter be tried on this charge (People v Goldfarb, 152 App Div 870, 874 , affd 213 NY 664 ; Green v United States, 355 US 184 ).

1974Having previously been put at the risk of conviction, and been acquitted of the charge of criminal impersonation (see, also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 250 ; People v Vidal, 26 NY2d 249, 253 ), constitutionally defendant could not thereafter be tried on this charge (People v Goldfarb, 152 App Div 870, 874 , affd 213 NY 664 ; Green v United States, 355 US 184 ).

1974Co. v. Bohlinger, 308 N. Y. 174, 183 , affg. 284 App. Div. 110, 113-115 ).

1969As stated in Harrington (supra, p. 199 ): “ The purpose of this new language is to clearly warn the driver that the mere refusal to take the prescribed test would be the cause of a revocation of his license, and that a subsequent conviction or dismissal of the charge of driving while intoxicated is immaterial.

1932Co. of N. Y. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167 .) Under a policy issued prior to the enactment of chapter 407 of the Laws of 1921 the prescribed standard provision “ that the policy shall be incontestable after two years from its date of issue ” was held in numerous cases to survive the death of the insured. “ The rule is now settled that under a policy in this form a contest by the insurer is too late if begun after two years from the date of its issue, though within the time allowed for contest the insured has died.” (Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

1925Co. v. Allison, 144 N. Y. 21, 31, 33 ; Nevius v. Dunlap, 33 N. Y. 676, 680 ).