prescribed standard in California

2021Legal Principles In a custodial interrogation, “the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467 .) “[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 608 .) “In general, if a custodial suspect, having heard and understood a full explanation of his or her Miranda rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk, he or she has t

2021Legal Principles In a custodial interrogation, “the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467 .) “[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 608 .) “In general, if a custodial suspect, having heard and understood a full explanation of his or her Miranda rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk, he or she has t

2021Legal Principles In a custodial interrogation, “the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467 .) “[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 608 .) “In general, if a custodial suspect, having heard and understood a full explanation of his or her Miranda rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk, he or she has t

2021Legal Principles In a custodial interrogation, “the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467 .) “[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 608 .) “In general, if a custodial suspect, having heard and understood a full explanation of his or her Miranda rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk, he or she has t

1998The court recognized that "[a]id in arriving at the meaning of the word `willfully' may be afforded by the context in which it is used...." ( Id. at p. 395, 54 S.Ct. 223 .) In arriving at the conclusion that "willfully" signified "evil motive," the court focused on the fact that the statute punished omissions as well as affirmative acts. ( Ibid. ) "Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to me

1998The court recognized that "[a]id in arriving at the meaning of the word `willfully' may be afforded by the context in which it is used...." ( Id. at p. 395, 54 S.Ct. 223 .) In arriving at the conclusion that "willfully" signified "evil motive," the court focused on the fact that the statute punished omissions as well as affirmative acts. ( Ibid. ) "Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to me

2025Yamaha teaches that deference to a long-standing agency interpretation may be warranted when the “interpretation was contemporaneous with legislative enactment of the statute being interpreted” and the agency “ ‘has consistently maintained the interpretation in question.’ ” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 13 , italics added.) Neither is true of the new interpretation that DOI adopted to approve the BOP in 1994.

2024A. Second Amendment Principles In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller), the Supreme Court interpreted the operative clause of the Second Amendment: “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) This language “codified a pre-existing right” under English and colonial American law, the Court explained, a right that is “exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.” (Heller, at pp. 592, 581.) Specifically, the Second Amendment protects the “right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” including “the

2024In any event, even if we assume the rule violation, “not every rule imposed by an organizer . . . in a recreational activity reflects a legal duty enforceable in tort.” (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1163 ; Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319 [“even when a participant’s conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the violator to internal sanctions prescribed by the sport itself, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might well alter fundamentally the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity that falls close to, but on the permissi

2022Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 , 1011 (Bonni).) The Supreme Court has instead instructed courts ruling on anti-SLAPP motions that attack causes of action based on multiple acts to analyze each act supplying a basis for relief to determine whether or not the act is a protected activity and, if so, whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing on the claim. 16 (Bonni, at p. 1010; Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 393-395.) The court must conduct this analysis “even though the [defendant] sought to strike the entire cause of action, rather than merely parts of it.” (Bonni,

2022Such allegations are not merely “incidental background” to provide context for the claims (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012) and do not merely “provide evidence of the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty” (Gaynor v. Bulen (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 864, 880 , italics omitted [breach of fiduciary duty claim arose from trustees’ wrongful plan to retain control of trust, not from litigation activity by which plan was carried out]).

2021At worst, however, the trial court’s decision is ambiguous regarding the standard it applied, which is fatal to the Board’s claim on appeal. “[A] judgment is presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions are indulged in its favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” (Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749 , 765–766, citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; Winograd v. American 10 For this reason, the Board’s contention the trial court erroneously considered evidence that was not before the Board when determining whether the weight of the evide

2021At worst, however, the trial court’s decision is ambiguous regarding the standard it applied, which is fatal to the Board’s claim on appeal. “[A] judgment is presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions are indulged in its favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” (Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749 , 765–766, citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; Winograd v. American 10 For this reason, the Board’s contention the trial court erroneously considered evidence that was not before the Board when determining whether the weight of the evide

2020(See Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1215 .) The operative complaint alleges Respondents “owed statutory, common law, and assumed duties to protect Plaintiff from foreseeable risk of harm resulting from sorority-related events and activities that violated CSUN’s fraternal organization safety protocols and risk management procedures.” Specifically, the complaint asserts Respondents owed Plaintiff a legal duty to: register the event with CSUN; submit and receive approval of a guest list; screen people entering the event, including attendees who are visibly intoxicated; limit the amount and ty

2019(See Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 , 608, 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 [" Miranda conditioned the admissibility at trial of any custodial confession on warning a suspect of h[er] rights: failure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained."].) To determine whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes, we ask " 'first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not

2019(See Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 , 608, 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 [" Miranda conditioned the admissibility at trial of any custodial confession on warning a suspect of h[er] rights: failure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained."].) To determine whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes, we ask " 'first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not

2019(See People v. Davis (1967) 66 Cal.2d 175 , 180-181, 57 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 424 P.2d 682 .) In this case, several factors would have caused a reasonable person in Caro's position to believe that law enforcement was in control of the interaction and that she was not free to terminate the interrogation and leave.

2019(See People v. Davis (1967) 66 Cal.2d 175 , 180-181, 57 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 424 P.2d 682 .) In this case, several factors would have caused a reasonable person in Caro's position to believe that law enforcement was in control of the interaction and that she was not free to terminate the interrogation and leave.

2009(Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1003 ; Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 318 .) Indeed, “even when a participant’s conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the violator to internal sanctions prescribed by the sport itself, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might well alter fundamentally the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity that falls close to, but on the permissible side of, a prescribed rule.” ( Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319, original italics.) On the other hand, for example, while a ski resort has no duty to remo

2009(Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1003 ; Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 318 .) Indeed, “even when a participant’s conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the violator to internal sanctions prescribed by the sport itself, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might well alter fundamentally the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity that falls close to, but on the permissible side of, a prescribed rule.” ( Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319, original italics.) On the other hand, for example, while a ski resort has no duty to remo

1998The court recognized that "[a]id in arriving at the meaning of the word `willfully' may be afforded by the context in which it is used...." ( Id. at p. 395, 54 S.Ct. 223 .) In arriving at the conclusion that "willfully" signified "evil motive," the court focused on the fact that the statute punished omissions as well as affirmative acts. ( Ibid. ) "Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to me

1998The court recognized that "[a]id in arriving at the meaning of the word `willfully' may be afforded by the context in which it is used...." ( Id. at p. 395, 54 S.Ct. 223 .) In arriving at the conclusion that "willfully" signified "evil motive," the court focused on the fact that the statute punished omissions as well as affirmative acts. ( Ibid. ) "Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to me

1983In addition, we point out that this code section has been determined not to be unconstitutional on the theory that there was no rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed or because the presumption procedure failed to fix an ultimate time as a period in which the prescribed test must be taken or because the presumption violated or infringed upon a defendant’s presumption of innocence or right to remain silent. [Citation omitted.] Further, the presumption statute satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process because there is a long-recognized and scientific rel

1981(People v. Schrieber (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 917 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 812 ].) Further, the presumption statute satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process because there is a long-recognized and scientific relationship between a drunk driving suspect’s blood alcohol levels and the degree of intoxication of a suspect.

1981(People v. Schrieber (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 917 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 812 ].) Further, the presumption statute satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process because there is a long-recognized and scientific relationship between a drunk driving suspect’s blood alcohol levels and the degree of intoxication of a suspect.