15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1987–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Com. Ex Rel. Pappert v. Tap Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.green2 sentences2014Com. v. TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 904 A.2d 986, 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. Super. 2002). 2014Com. v. TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 904 A.2d 986, 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. Super. 2002). | 4 | 4 |
George v. Schirragreen2 sentences2014Com. v. TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 904 A.2d 986, 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. Super. 2002). 2004George, 814 A. 2d at 205-206 (holding that although the documents requested “may not ultimately be admissible at trial or may not prove germane to the matters that will be litigated, we believe the relevancy standard applicable to discovery matters has been met.”); Fitt v. General Motors Corp., 13 D.&C.4th 336, 338 (Lacka. | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Stoltzfusgreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 337 A.2d 873, 881 (Pa. 1975) (stating: “It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that if the ground upon which an objection is based is specifically stated, all other reasons for [the evidence’s] exclusion are waived, and may not be raised post[-]trial”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Stallworthgreen2 sentences2008“Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.” Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 566 Pa. 349 , 781 A.2d 110, 117-118 (2001). 2008“Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.” Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 566 Pa. 349 , 781 A.2d 110, 117-118 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Everett v. Stategreen2 sentences1988See, e.g., Everrett v. State, 435 So.2d 955, 960, 961 (Fla.App.1983) (Smith, J., concurring): If . . . it is deemed irrelevant, that the decedent jaywalked into the path of defendant's vehicle and, let us say, lay down drunk in the street, then that proof would also seem irrelevant, except as it is unavoidably and narrowly adduced to show that a fatal accident in fact occurred. 1988See, e.g., Everrett v. State, 435 So.2d 955, 960, 961 (FIa.App.1983) (Smith, J., concurring): If ... it is deemed irrelevant, that the decedent jaywalked into the path of defendant’s vehicle and, let us say, lay down drunk in the street, then that proof would also seem irrelevant, except as it is unavoidably and narrowly adduced to show that a fatal accident in fact occurred. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Vucich
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 1107-09 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Walker
green
1 sentence2017Second, although we agree with the Commonwealth that Walker permits exclusion of expert testimony about eyewitness identifications on grounds of relevance if the case is not “solely and primarily dependent” on the identifications, see Walker, 92 A.3d at 787 , we do not read Walker to require such exclusion. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Rhodes v. USAA Casualty Insurance
green
1 sentence2014On appeal, the Rhodeses claimed that the trial court “abused its discretion by ordering [them] to produce their attorney’s entire work product, without identifying, performing a relevancy analysis, or examining any of counsel’s protected records under Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3.” Rhodes II, 21 A.3d at 1258 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Rae v. PA FUNERAL DIRECTORS ASS'N
green
1 sentence2011Rae, 602 Pa. at 78 n. 13, 977 A.2d at 1129 n. 13. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass'n
green
1 sentence2011Rae, 602 Pa. at 78 n. 13, 977 A.2d at 1129 n. 13. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. Crews
green
2 sentences1994Id. at 522-24 , 640 A.2d at 402 . 1994Id. at 522-24 , 640 A.2d at 402 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Wax
green
2 sentences1991Consequently, a traditional relevancy analysis was applied, and the court used, “a common sense evaluation of the disputed evidence and an inquiry into whether the probative value of the evidence exceeds its prejudicial impact,” Id., 571 A.2d at 389 . 1991Consequently, a traditional relevancy analysis was applied, and the court used, “a common sense evaluation of the disputed evidence and an inquiry into whether the probative value of the evidence exceeds its prejudicial impact,” Id., 571 A.2d at 389 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Commonwealth v. Amos
green
2 sentences1987The trial court held that while there was a possible basis for a self-defense claim, the excluded evidence was, nonetheless, inadmissible under the two-prong relevancy test announced in Commonwealth v. Amos, 445 Pa. 297 , 284 A.2d 748 (1971). 1987The trial court held that while there was a possible basis for a self-defense claim, the excluded evidence was, nonetheless, inadmissible under the two-prong relevancy test announced in Commonwealth v. Amos, 445 Pa. 297 , 284 A.2d 748 (1971). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.