Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
24 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1890–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of a defendant's "crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the defendant acted in accordance with that character." An analysis under Evidence Rule 404(b)"necessarily incorporates the relevancy test of Rule 401 and the balancing test of Rule 403." Sanders v. State , 704 N.E.2d 119 , 123 (Ind. 1999). [14] Maffett argues the trial court erred when it permitted admission of the video recording because it impugned his character with an inference of prior bad acts. 2016Hinkle’s appellate counsel did not file an Appellant’s Reply Brief. [5] When addressing Hinkle’s Rule 404(b) challenge to the admission of evidence, another panel of our Court explained that “‘[o]ur analysis of admissibility under Rule 404(b) necessarily incorporates the relevancy test of [Indiana Evidence] Rule 401 and the balancing test of [Indiana Evidence] Rule 403.’” Hinkle, No. 12A05-1204-CR-199, slip op. at *2 (quoting Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999)) (brackets added by Hinkle Court). | 5 | 6 |
Damon L. Maffett v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2019Maffett v. State, 113 N.E.3d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). [14] Mendoza argues the evidence was admitted for the sole purpose of showing Mendoza’s propensity for child molesting because Mendoza did not put his motive or intent at issue. 2019Maffett v. State, 113 N.E.3d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). [14] There are, however, exceptions that render admissible evidence that generally would be inadmissible under Evidence Rule 404(b). | 2 | 2 |
Hicks v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[o]ur analysis of admissibility under Rule 404(b) necessarily incorporates the relevancy test of [Indiana Evidence] Rule 401 and the balancing test of [Indiana Evidence] Rule 403.” Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999) (citing Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 221 ). 1999Id. at 221 . | 1 | 3 |
Allen v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Allen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Bennett v. Stategreen1 sentence2013However, “[a]n analysis of admissibility under Rule 404(b) necessarily incorporates the relevancy test of Rule 401 and the balancing test of Rule 403.” Bennett v. State, 883 N.E.2d 888, 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Sanders v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). *893 An analysis of admissibility under Rule 404(b) necessarily incorporates the relevancy test of Rule 401 and the balancing test of Rule 403. 2008Id. | 1 | 1 |
Malone v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Id. 2001See Malone, 700 N.E.2d at 788 . | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Stategreen1 sentence1998See Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1256 (Ind.1995); Ind.Evidence Rule 401 (relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less likely). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harrison v. State
green
2 sentences2001Id. 2000Id. | 4 | 2000–2001 |
Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. Runge
green
1 sentence2005This court employed a relevancy analysis to determine whether expert testimony should be admitted in Runge, 717 N.E.2d at 230-39 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bieghler v. State
green
1 sentence1986Bieghler v. State (1985), Ind., 481 N.E.2d 78 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Kordel v. United States
green
2 sentences1981One such reason is that strict construction is a means of assuring fairness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.” (footnotes omitted; emphasis added) 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 59.-03, at 7 (4th ed. 1974), citing, United States v. Bass (1971), 404 U.S. 336 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 ; Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 ; Kordel 1981One such reason is that strict construction is a means of assuring fairness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.” (footnotes omitted; emphasis added) 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 59.-03, at 7 (4th ed. 1974), citing, United States v. Bass (1971), 404 U.S. 336 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 ; Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 ; Kordel | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Bouie v. City of Columbia
green
2 sentences1981One such reason is that strict construction is a means of assuring fairness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.” (footnotes omitted; emphasis added) 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 59.-03, at 7 (4th ed. 1974), citing, United States v. Bass (1971), 404 U.S. 336 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 ; Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 ; Kordel 1981One such reason is that strict construction is a means of assuring fairness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.” (footnotes omitted; emphasis added) 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 59.-03, at 7 (4th ed. 1974), citing, United States v. Bass (1971), 404 U.S. 336 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 ; Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 ; Kordel | 1 | 1981–1981 |
United States v. Bass
green
2 sentences1981One such reason is that strict construction is a means of assuring fairness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.” (footnotes omitted; emphasis added) 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 59.-03, at 7 (4th ed. 1974), citing, United States v. Bass (1971), 404 U.S. 336 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 ; Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 ; Kordel 1981One such reason is that strict construction is a means of assuring fairness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.” (footnotes omitted; emphasis added) 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 59.-03, at 7 (4th ed. 1974), citing, United States v. Bass (1971), 404 U.S. 336 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 ; Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 ; Kordel | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co.
green
2 sentences1979Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Company, (1978) Ind. App., 373 N.E.2d 923 . 1979Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Company, (1978) Ind.App., 373 N.E.2d 923 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Gavin v. Graydon
neutral
1 sentence1890In asserting this conclusion we do not inquire whether Horn was chargeable with the rents received ■by him for leaving the amount of the rent out of consideration, it still appears that he had twelve thousand dollars in his hands; hence, we need not, and we do not, examine the ■question of the relevancy of the doctrine declared in the cases of Gavin v. Graydon, 41 Ind. 559 ; Elwood v. Beymer, 100 Ind. 504 . | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Elwood v. Beymer
neutral
1 sentence1890In asserting this conclusion we do not inquire whether Horn was chargeable with the rents received ■by him for leaving the amount of the rent out of consideration, it still appears that he had twelve thousand dollars in his hands; hence, we need not, and we do not, examine the ■question of the relevancy of the doctrine declared in the cases of Gavin v. Graydon, 41 Ind. 559 ; Elwood v. Beymer, 100 Ind. 504 . | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.