27 California opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bouton v. USAA Casualty Insurancegreen2 sentences2017Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 412, 427 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 152 ] (Bouton) [parties in a special proceeding to compel arbitration “have discovery rights under the [discovery act], subject to the relevancy requirement and other provisions limiting the scope and timing of that discovery”].) The general scope of discovery is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010: “Unless otherwise limited by order of the court . . . , any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... if the matter either is itsel 2017Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 412, 427 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 152 ] (Bouton) [parties in a special proceeding to compel arbitration “have discovery rights under the [discovery act], subject to the relevancy requirement and other provisions limiting the scope and timing of that discovery”].) The general scope of discovery is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010: “Unless otherwise limited by order of the court . . . , any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... if the matter either is itsel | 3 | 5 |
Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc.green2 sentences2023But most potential abuse of this privilege for prelitigation communications can be prevented by enforcement of the relevancy requirement.” (Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 573, 578, fn. 6 .) C. 1999But most potential abuse of this privilege for prelitigation communications can be prevented by enforcement of the relevancy requirement . . . .” (Lerette, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 578, fn. 6 , italics added.) *151 Or, as our colleagues in Division Three of this district recently noted (lifting ever so gently from the language of Rubin 10 in the process): “It is not too late in the day to establish the appropriate standards for extending the litigation privilege to communications made in anticipation of litigation.” (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 33 ; see als | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hallgreen2 sentences2013Code,] § 352).” (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834 .) In People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535 (Elliott), the Supreme Court further explained the relevancy inquiry: “ „[T]o be admissible, evidence of the culpability of a third party offered by a defendant to demonstrate that a reasonable doubt exists concerning his or her guilt . . . must link the third person either directly or circumstantially to the actual perpetration of the crime. 2013Code,] § 352).” (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834 .) In People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535 (Elliott), the Supreme Court further explained the relevancy inquiry: “ ‘[T]o be admissible, evidence of the culpability of a third party offered by a defendant to demonstrate that a reasonable doubt exists concerning his or her guilt . . . must link the third person either directly or circumstantially to the actual perpetration of the crime. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lucasgreen1 sentence2022(See People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 466 [rejecting the People’s argument that the defendant forfeited his claim that the trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant evidence because defendant objected to the evidence on the ground of lack of foundation, not irrelevance, stating that “the trial court evidently understood the objection as encompassing a relevancy claim, so we will reach the merits”].) 9 Evidence Code section 1230 provides: “Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is un | 1 | 1 |
People v. Combsgreen2 sentences2007(People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 859 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 , 101 P.3d 1007 ].) This relevancy requirement was met by Susan M.’s testimony at the penalty phase that, late in the *187 evening on January 27, 1980, defendant and another man raped her at gunpoint in the backseat of a car. 2007(People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 859 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 , 101 P.3d 1007 ].) This relevancy requirement was met by Susan M.’s testimony at the penalty phase that, late in the *187 evening on January 27, 1980, defendant and another man raped her at gunpoint in the backseat of a car. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2005(People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 182 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 785 P.2d 857 ].) Nor does defendant clearly assert a relevancy challenge to the testimony regarding the property found within the Datsun 280 ZX, although his characterization of that testimony as being of “minimal probative value,” which in his reply brief is amplified to “irrelevant, cumulative, and prejudicial,” could be construed as a challenge to its relevancy. 2005(People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 182 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 785 P.2d 857 ].) Nor does defendant clearly assert a relevancy challenge to the testimony regarding the property found within the Datsun 280 ZX, although his characterization of that testimony as being of “minimal probative value,” which in his reply brief is amplified to “irrelevant, cumulative, and prejudicial,” could be construed as a challenge to its relevancy. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bledsoegreen1 sentence2004Among the problems with such an exception, it effectively evades application of section 1107 and, in particular, the express limitation on the use of BWS evidence “against a criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge.” (§ 1107, subd. (a); cf. People v. Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 251 [RTS evidence not admissible to prove victim was raped].) As defense counsel explained at oral argument, the expert’s testimony on the question of recantation is relevant only if Pipes were a victim of domestic violence so that her experie | 1 | 1 |
People v. Roscoegreen2 sentences2004That being the case, admission of expert testimony runs a substantial risk of invading the exclusive factfinding province of the jury (cf. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1099-1100 (cone. opn. of Brown, J.)) and undermining the trial court’s gatekeeper function in exercising discretion to exclude such evidence for that reason. (§ 352; see, e.g., People v. Roscoe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1100 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 45 ].) The majority’s holding creates a special rule for the admission of expert testimony when the defendant and alleged victim of an assault have or have had a personal relationship 2004That being the case, admission of expert testimony runs a substantial risk of invading the exclusive factfinding province of the jury (cf. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1099-1100 (cone. opn. of Brown, J.)) and undermining the trial court’s gatekeeper function in exercising discretion to exclude such evidence for that reason. (§ 352; see, e.g., People v. Roscoe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1100 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 45 ].) The majority’s holding creates a special rule for the admission of expert testimony when the defendant and alleged victim of an assault have or have had a personal relationship | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smitheygreen2 sentences2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa 2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boxgreen2 sentences2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa 2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa | 1 | 1 |
People v. Crittendengreen2 sentences2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa 2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa | 1 | 1 |
People v. Weavergreen2 sentences2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa 2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa | 1 | 1 |
Lantz v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000(See Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1853 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ].) He is required to demonstrate a “compelling need” for the discovery, and “that compelling need must be so strong as to outweigh the privacy right when these two compelling , interests are carefully balanced.” (Id. at pp. 1853-1854.) The Britt court, in analyzing the interests that would warrant disclosure, noted that the filing of a lawsuit “may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of associational privacy.” (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 859 .) The court cautioned, however, 2000(See Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1853 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ].) He is required to demonstrate a “compelling need” for the discovery, and “that compelling need must be so strong as to outweigh the privacy right when these two compelling , interests are carefully balanced.” (Id. at pp. 1853-1854.) The Britt court, in analyzing the interests that would warrant disclosure, noted that the filing of a lawsuit “may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of associational privacy.” (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 859 .) The court cautioned, however, | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wellsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sand v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wetmorered | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Northgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Younger v. Solomongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2017Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 412, 427 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 152 ] (Bouton) [parties in a special proceeding to compel arbitration “have discovery rights under the [discovery act], subject to the relevancy requirement and other provisions limiting the scope and timing of that discovery”].) The general scope of discovery is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010: “Unless otherwise limited by order of the court . . . , any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... if the matter either is itsel 2017Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 412, 427 (Bouton) [parties in a special proceeding to compel arbitration “have discovery rights under the [discovery act], subject to the relevancy requirement and other provisions limiting the scope and timing of that discovery”].) The general scope of discovery is set forth in section 2017.010, subdivision (a): “Unless otherwise limited by order of the court. . ., any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or ap | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp.
green
2 sentences2013Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 412, 427 .) Nonetheless, the failure to afford a party discovery may be harmless. ( Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 412-413.) As explained below, that is the case here. 2013Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 412, 427 .) Nonetheless, the failure to afford a party discovery may be harmless. ( Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 412-413.) As explained below, that is the case here. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Elliott
green
2 sentences2013Code,] § 352).” (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834 .) In People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535 (Elliott), the Supreme Court further explained the relevancy inquiry: “ „[T]o be admissible, evidence of the culpability of a third party offered by a defendant to demonstrate that a reasonable doubt exists concerning his or her guilt . . . must link the third person either directly or circumstantially to the actual perpetration of the crime. 2013Code,] § 352).” (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834 .) In People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535 (Elliott), the Supreme Court further explained the relevancy inquiry: “ ‘[T]o be admissible, evidence of the culpability of a third party offered by a defendant to demonstrate that a reasonable doubt exists concerning his or her guilt . . . must link the third person either directly or circumstantially to the actual perpetration of the crime. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Grimes
green
1 sentence2022Fn. omitted.]” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 711 .) In determining whether a statement is admissible as against the declarant’s penal interest, the question “‘is always whether the statement was sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest “that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true,” and this question can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 127 .) Defendant argues that “Griffis’s reference to ‘me and Bloods’ served not so much t | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Cortez
green
1 sentence2022Fn. omitted.]” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 711 .) In determining whether a statement is admissible as against the declarant’s penal interest, the question “‘is always whether the statement was sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest “that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true,” and this question can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 127 .) Defendant argues that “Griffis’s reference to ‘me and Bloods’ served not so much t | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Sotelo-Urena
green
1 sentence2021Evidence that would assist the jury in evaluating the situation from 8 defendant’s perspective was thus relevant.” (People v. Sotelo-Urena, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 745 .) Defendant asserts “Sotelo-Urena, first, rejected the trial court’s relevancy analysis, given the defendant’s frame of mind in killing the victim was squarely at issue in the murder trial. [Citation.] Sotelo-Urena, then, highlighted that evidence establishing a defendant’s tendency to overreact is highly relevant to explaining the defendant’s reaction on a given occasion. [Citation.] Finding the jury’s assessment as to the | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Nguyen v. PROTON TECHNOLOGY CORP.
green
2 sentences2020And as the Nguyen court observed, enforcing the relevancy requirement does not narrow the litigation privilege, but rather prevents its abuse. ( Nguyen, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 140, 150 .) 19 4. 2020And as the Nguyen court observed, enforcing the relevancy requirement does not narrow the litigation privilege, but rather prevents its abuse. ( Nguyen, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 140, 150 .) 19 4. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Estevez v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2013(See Estevez v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 423, 431 .) As explained above, Secarea I decided all medical experimentation claims against Plaintiff and the law of the case doctrine prevented Plaintiff from continuing to pursue those claims on remand. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
John B. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2013Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.‖ (§ 2017.010; John B., supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1186 .) A party may obtain a protective order for discovery regarding issues that fail to meet this relevancy standard and therefore are unduly burdensome and oppressive. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Arizona v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences2007Defendant further argues that the prosecutor in the rape case failed to preserve “potentially useful” evidence, in violation of Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 [ 102 L.Ed.2d 281 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ], That case holds that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the [government], failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” (Id. at p. 58, italics added.) Here, defendant merely speculates that the police files contained information that would have been “potentially useful” to his defense of the rape allegations. 2007Defendant further argues that the prosecutor in the rape case failed to preserve “potentially useful” evidence, in violation of Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 [ 102 L.Ed.2d 281 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ], That case holds that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the [government], failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” (Id. at p. 58, italics added.) Here, defendant merely speculates that the police files contained information that would have been “potentially useful” to his defense of the rape allegations. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Pride
green
2 sentences2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa 2003(See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 , 5 P.3d 130 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) Moreover, "the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ]." ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 , 885 P.2d 887 ; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 .) In sum, the photographs clearly sa | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Patterson v. Board of Supervisors
green
1 sentence2002It was idle scandal-mongering that bore “no relationship” to the measure, and was “totally unrelated” to the proposed rezoning [see Patterson v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 32 ].) But as the absolutist language used by the Patterson court (“no relationship,” “totally unrelated”) reveals, the relevancy requirement is an extremely light burden to carry. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Johnson v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2000(Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 855 ; Johnson, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 .) The party seeking discovery of private matters must do more than satisfy the relevancy standard set forth in section 2017. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Britt v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2000(Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 855 ; Johnson, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 .) The party seeking discovery of private matters must do more than satisfy the relevancy standard set forth in section 2017. 2000(See Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1853 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ].) He is required to demonstrate a “compelling need” for the discovery, and “that compelling need must be so strong as to outweigh the privacy right when these two compelling , interests are carefully balanced.” (Id. at pp. 1853-1854.) The Britt court, in analyzing the interests that would warrant disclosure, noted that the filing of a lawsuit “may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of associational privacy.” (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 859 .) The court cautioned, however, | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp.
green
2 sentences1999But most potential abuse of this privilege for prelitigation communications can be prevented by enforcement of the relevancy requirement . . . .” (Lerette, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 578, fn. 6 , italics added.) *151 Or, as our colleagues in Division Three of this district recently noted (lifting ever so gently from the language of Rubin 10 in the process): “It is not too late in the day to establish the appropriate standards for extending the litigation privilege to communications made in anticipation of litigation.” (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 33 ; see als 1999But most potential abuse of this privilege for prelitigation communications can be prevented by enforcement of the relevancy requirement . . . .” (Lerette, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 578, fn. 6 , italics added.) *151 Or, as our colleagues in Division Three of this district recently noted (lifting ever so gently from the language of Rubin 10 in the process): “It is not too late in the day to establish the appropriate standards for extending the litigation privilege to communications made in anticipation of litigation.” (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 33 ; see als | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Castro
green
1 sentence1991Although the court employed the more flexible approach of the relevancy test in finding that DNA profiling was unanimously accepted within the scientific community, the debate centered upon whether adequate technology and knowledge now exist to “allow DNA profiling to pierce the protective evidentiary boundaries of the criminal trial.” (747 F.Supp. at pp. 253-254.) *861 Jakobetz appears to reflect the reoccurring refrain throughout cases on DNA typing in other jurisdictions: except for the Lifecodes’ debacle in People v. Castro, supra, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 , RFLP analysis and DNA profiling has bee | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Union Pacific Railroad v. Looney
neutral
2 sentences1989The majority fail to point out that Union Pacific conceded before the Idaho court that information as to its corporate plan—substantially the same information the board seeks here—“could be relevant to contradict or impeach other evidence of valuation.” ( 729 P.2d at p. 1066 .) 4 Furthermore, the majority state that the Idaho Supreme Court noted only that the plan “could be relevant” but “never squarely held that it was.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 151.) Under a correct application of the relevancy standard, a determination that the plan “could be relevant” is sufficient to justify the demand for 1989The majority fail to point out that Union Pacific conceded before the Idaho court that information as to its corporate plan substantially the same information the board seeks here "could be relevant to contradict or impeach other evidence of valuation." ( 729 P.2d at p. 1066 .) [4] Furthermore, the majority state that the *163 Idaho Supreme Court noted only that the plan "could be relevant" but "never squarely held that it was." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 151.) Under a correct application of the relevancy standard, a determination that the plan "could be relevant" is sufficient to justify the | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Thompson green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Durham green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Barrick red | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Schader green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Terry green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| National Labor Relations Board v. Leland Stanford Junior University green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Zerillo green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.