relevancy standard in District of Columbia

1996Despite the "reasonable possibility" explication in Johnson , even in that case, this court did not relax the relevancy requirement which included a foundational proffer of "a set of facts or circumstances, which, in the aggregate, establishes the necessary link, connection or nexus between the proffered evidence and the crime at issue." Johnson, 552 A.2d at 516 .

1996Despite the “reasonable possibility” explication in Johnson , even in that case, this court did not relax the relevancy requirement which included a foundational proffer of “a set of facts or circumstances, which, in the aggregate, establishes the necessary link, connection or nexus between the proffered evidence and the crime at issue.” Johnson, 552 A.2d at 516 .

2008As we explained in Winfield , though trial courts may not impose a heightened relevancy standard to the admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence, they retain discretion to weigh the probative value of that evidence against its prejudicial potential: "In the context of third-party perpetrator evidence, this means the trial judge will have discretion to exclude marginally relevant evidence creating the danger that proof of prior *294 dealings or hostility between the victim and the third persons will distract the jury from the issue in this case." 676 A.2d at 5 .

2008As we explained in Winfield , though trial courts may not impose a heightened relevancy standard to the admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence, they retain discretion to weigh the probative value of that evidence against its prejudicial potential: “In the context of third-party perpetrator evidence, this means the trial judge will have discretion to exclude marginally relevant evidence creating the danger that proof of prior dealings or hostility between the victim and the third persons will distract the jury from the issue in this case.” 676 A.2d at 5 .

1995Arthur Treacher's, 92 F.R.D. at 435 . [12] See note 10, supra. [1] See D.C.Code §§ 1-616.3 (1992); 1-2525, -2556; 11-1913 (1989); 36-220.9, -220.10 (1993); 36-342; 36-1217; 36-1307, -1310. [2] It is impossible to read Gray and reasonably conclude, as the dissent would, that a majority there intended future divisions to be free to adopt new exceptions to the doctrine. [1] In Gray, one member of the panel (concurring in affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of a complaint) agreed it would be "more seemly" to act en banc, 602 A.2d at 1099 ; another, relying on the specific factual allegations

1995Arthur Treacher's, 92 F.R.D. at 435 . [12] See note 10, supra. [1] See D.C.Code §§ 1-616.3 (1992); 1-2525, -2556; 11-1913 (1989); 36-220.9, -220.10 (1993); 36-342; 36-1217; 36-1307, -1310. [2] It is impossible to read Gray and reasonably conclude, as the dissent would, that a majority there intended future divisions to be free to adopt new exceptions to the doctrine. [1] In Gray, one member of the panel (concurring in affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of a complaint) agreed it would be "more seemly" to act en banc, 602 A.2d at 1099 ; another, relying on the specific factual allegations

1994See Watson, supra, 612 A.2d at 182 ; Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516 ; Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1097 .

1994See Watson, supra, 612 A.2d at 182 ; Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516 ; Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1097 .

1977The rules of discovery are limited by Rule 26(b), which imposes a relevancy standard upon any matter that a party seeks a to discover. 2 See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 117 , 85 S.Ct. 234 , 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964); Guilford National Bank of Greensboro v. Southern R.R.

1977The rules of discovery are limited by Rule 26(b), which imposes a relevancy standard upon any matter that a party seeks a to discover. 2 See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 117 , 85 S.Ct. 234 , 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964); Guilford National Bank of Greensboro v. Southern R.R.