relevancy test in Colorado

9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

Case	Followed	Cited
People v. Watsongreen coloctapp · 1982 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025To the contrary, under Colorado case law, “although it is not claimed nor proved that the 7 articles introduced in evidence were actually used in the commission of the crime, a weapon or other instrument found in the possession of the accused when arrested has been held admissible as part of the history of the arrest.” Davis v. People, 321 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Colo. 1958); see also People v. Watson, 650 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Colo. App. 1982) (concluding that “weapons found during a search are admissible as a part of the history of the arrest, notwithstanding that there is no evidence that they were use	1	1
Hafer v. Peoplegreen colo · 1972 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025To the contrary, under Colorado case law, “although it is not claimed nor proved that the 7 articles introduced in evidence were actually used in the commission of the crime, a weapon or other instrument found in the possession of the accused when arrested has been held admissible as part of the history of the arrest.” Davis v. People, 321 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Colo. 1958); see also People v. Watson, 650 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Colo. App. 1982) (concluding that “weapons found during a search are admissible as a part of the history of the arrest, notwithstanding that there is no evidence that they were use	1	1
Davis v. Peoplegreen colo · 1958 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025To the contrary, under Colorado case law, “although it is not claimed nor proved that the 7 articles introduced in evidence were actually used in the commission of the crime, a weapon or other instrument found in the possession of the accused when arrested has been held admissible as part of the history of the arrest.” Davis v. People, 321 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Colo. 1958); see also People v. Watson, 650 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Colo. App. 1982) (concluding that “weapons found during a search are admissible as a part of the history of the arrest, notwithstanding that there is no evidence that they were use	1	1
Adrian v. Peoplegreen colo · 1989 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024Adrian v. People, 770 P.2d 1243, 1245-46 (Colo. 1989).	1	1
Fishback v. Peoplegreen colo · 1993 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995 2 sentences 1995Under that test, “[a]s long as the proffered evidence is reliable and has support, although there may be controversy in the scientific field, such evidence would be admissible.” Id. at 899. 1995Under that test, "[a]s long as the proffered evidence is reliable and has support, although there may be controversy in the scientific field, such evidence would be admissible." Id. at 899.	1	1
United States v. Isiah Williams and Michael Manninggreen ca2 · 1978 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1
Bomengo v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1
Kelly v. Louisianagreen scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1
Huddleston v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1988 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991In Huddleston , the Supreme Court recognized the danger of unfair prejudice presented by the admission of other-crime evidence, but went on to conclude that the source of protection against such prejudice did not emanate from the requirement of a preliminary finding of the conditional fact that rendered the proffered evidence relevant, but rather from the following provisions of the Rules of Evidence: first, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402 — as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, from the 1991In Huddleston , the Supreme Court recognized the danger of unfair prejudice presented by the admission of other-crime evidence, but went on to conclude that the source of protection against such prejudice did not emanate from the requirement of a preliminary finding of the conditional fact that rendered the proffered evidence relevant, but rather from the following provisions of the Rules of Evidence: first, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402 — as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, from the	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

Case	Cited	Years
People Ex Rel. MacFarlane v. American Banco Corp. green colo · 1977 2 sentences 1983The relevancy requirement is met by a “showing that a relationship exists between the documents which must be produced and the purposes of the inquiry.” Id. at 39, 570 P.2d at 830 . 1983The relevancy requirement is met by a "showing that a relationship exists between the documents which must be produced and the purposes of the inquiry." Id. at 39, 570 P.2d at 830 . *686 The record in this case presents sufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that the subpoenas requested documents relevant to a securities investigation.	2	1983–1983
People v. Lindsey green coloctapp · 1994 2 sentences 1995Id. at 1090 . 1995Id. at 1090 .	1	1995–1995
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. green scotus · 1993 2 sentences 1995Because I adhere to my prior position in Fishback rejecting Frye , and would apply the relevancy standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), I concur in the result only. 1995Because I adhere to my prior position in Fishback rejecting Frye , and would apply the relevancy standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), I concur in the result only.	1	1995–1995
United States v. Sample green paed · 1974 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
United States v. John W. Downing green ca3 · 1985 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
United States v. Julio Piccinonna green ca11 · 1989 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
United States v. Charles Kelly and Raymond Imp green ca2 · 1970 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
United States v. Orville E. Stifel, II green ca6 · 1970 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
United States v. Carl Joseph Baller, Jr. green ca4 · 1975 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
Stifel v. United States green scotus · 1971 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
New York Stock Exchange v. Thill Securities Corp. green scotus · 1971 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
Hicks v. Virginia green scotus · 1975 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
Cunningham v. Columbia, Newberry & Laurens Railroad green sc · 1914 2 sentences 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 1993See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 , 99 S.Ct. 1025 , 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government's expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) ( Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 9	1	1993–1993
State v. Breazeale green kan · 1986 2 sentences 1989The court stated that the “passage of time alone would not end any strand of relevance” id. at 924 .); State v. Breaszeale, 238 Kan. 714 , 714 P.2d 1356 (1986) (Evidence of rapes ten years prior to trial was held to be admissible, particularly because defendant was incarcerated for the majority of the time between the offenses. 1989The court stated that the “passage of time alone would not end any strand of relevance” id. at 924 .); State v. Breaszeale, 238 Kan. 714 , 714 P.2d 1356 (1986) (Evidence of rapes ten years prior to trial was held to be admissible, particularly because defendant was incarcerated for the majority of the time between the offenses.	1	1989–1989
Potts v. State green fladistctapp · 1983 1 sentence 1989The time of the earlier offense was one of three factors used to determine admissibility.); Potts v. State, 427 So.2d 822 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1983) (Evidence of sexual assaults twelve and eighteen years before trial was held to be admissible under a traditional relevancy test.); Jarrett v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind.1984) (Evidence of a sexual assault ten years before trial was admissible and the substantial passage of time does not render the evidence inadmissible.); Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923 (Ind.1984) (Evidence of rape conviction twenty-two years earlier was held to be admissible.	1	1989–1989
Lawrence v. State red ind · 1984 2 sentences 1989The time of the earlier offense was one of three factors used to determine admissibility.); Potts v. State, 427 So.2d 822 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1983) (Evidence of sexual assaults twelve and eighteen years before trial was held to be admissible under a traditional relevancy test.); Jarrett v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind.1984) (Evidence of a sexual assault ten years before trial was admissible and the substantial passage of time does not render the evidence inadmissible.); Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923 (Ind.1984) (Evidence of rape conviction twenty-two years earlier was held to be admissible. 1989The court stated that the “passage of time alone would not end any strand of relevance” id. at 924 .); State v. Breaszeale, 238 Kan. 714 , 714 P.2d 1356 (1986) (Evidence of rapes ten years prior to trial was held to be admissible, particularly because defendant was incarcerated for the majority of the time between the offenses.	1	1989–1989
Jarrett v. State green ind · 1984 1 sentence 1989The time of the earlier offense was one of three factors used to determine admissibility.); Potts v. State, 427 So.2d 822 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1983) (Evidence of sexual assaults twelve and eighteen years before trial was held to be admissible under a traditional relevancy test.); Jarrett v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind.1984) (Evidence of a sexual assault ten years before trial was admissible and the substantial passage of time does not render the evidence inadmissible.); Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923 (Ind.1984) (Evidence of rape conviction twenty-two years earlier was held to be admissible.	1	1989–1989
People v. Botham red colo · 1981 1 sentence 1986People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo.1981); People v. More, supra. The trial court generally has broad discretion in determining whether tendered evidence meets the relevancy test.	1	1986–1986
People v. More green coloctapp · 1983 1 sentence 1986People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo.1981); People v. More, supra. The trial court generally has broad discretion in determining whether tendered evidence meets the relevancy test.	1	1986–1986

Where else courts name it

TX 91 (1986–2024) NJ 36 (1977–2025) WI 30 (1984–2025) FL 27 (1947–2020) CA 27 (1956–2023) IN 24 (1890–2019) IL 23 (1959–2026) WV 21 (1992–2024) OH 16 (1992–2023) PA 15 (1987–2019) MA 14 (1985–2023) NC 11 (1992–2026) AL 11 (2003–2026) MI 10 (1993–2020) WA 9 (1980–2016) NH 9 (1994–2015) CO 9 (1983–2025) MS 8 (1987–2016) MD 8 (1983–2025) HI 8 (1995–2021) AZ 7 (1992–2016) VA 7 (1874–2023) IA 7 (1976–2025) KS 6 (1966–2018) NY 6 (1899–2023) CT 6 (1993–2024) DC 6 (1977–2008) KY 5 (2011–2022) TN 5 (1985–2015) LA 5 (1986–2015) MN 5 (1986–2011) MO 5 (1903–2024) SD 4 (1969–2010) NM 4 (1980–2017) WY 4 (1990–2011) GA 4 (1987–2021) RI 4 (1982–2018) OK 3 (1990–1992) NV 3 (1999–2020) AR 3 (2002–2014) OR 3 (1998–2015) NE 2 (1992–2019) MT 2 (1992–2003) DE 2 (1988–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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