10 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Service, Incgreen1 sentence2020In the context of rebuttable presumptions like the one at issue here, the relevancy of a violation “is usually inherently established when the traffic regulation which was violated concerns the manner in which an automobile was operated.” Klanseck, 426 Mich at 88 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Emerygreen1 sentence1999People v Emery, 812 P2d 665, 667 (Colo App, 1990). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Starrgreen1 sentence1999There, the United States Supreme Court adopted a similar rule relating to other-acts evidence: [F]irst, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402—as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, see Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed Rule Evid 404(b), 28 USC App, p 691; S Rep No 93-1277 at 25; and fourth, from the | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Floridagreen2 sentences1993See Williams v Florida, 399 US 78 ; 90 S Ct 1893 ; 26 L Ed 2d 446 (1970). [54] MRE 103. [55] MRE 611. [1] evaluate this claim in light of the clarified standard articulated today: First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury. [ Ante, p 55.] [2] Ante, p 69. [3] Ante, p 74. [4] from the requirement of 1993See Williams v Florida, 399 US 78 ; 90 S Ct 1893 ; 26 L Ed 2d 446 (1970). [54] MRE 103. [55] MRE 611. [1] evaluate this claim in light of the clarified standard articulated today: First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury. [ Ante, p 55.] [2] Ante, p 69. [3] Ante, p 74. [4] from the requirement of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. VanderVliet
green
2 sentences2019Our Supreme Court has held that the following four-part test applies to evaluating the admissibility of other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b): First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting -14- instruction to the jury. [People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55 ; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).] In the context 2019Our Supreme Court has held that the following four-part test applies to evaluating the admissibility of other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b): First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting -14- instruction to the jury. [People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55 ; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).] In the context | 2 | 1999–2019 |
Huddleston v. United States
green
2 sentences1999There, the United States Supreme Court adopted a similar rule relating to other-acts evidence: [F]irst, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402—as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, see Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed Rule Evid 404(b), 28 USC App, p 691; S Rep No 93-1277 at 25; and fourth, from the 1993In place of the four-pronged test of Golochowicz , we direct the bench and bar to employ the evidentiary safeguards already present in the Rules of Evidence, as identified by the unanimous United States Supreme Court decision in Huddleston : [FJirst, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402— as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its pote | 2 | 1993–1999 |
People v. Campbell
green
1 sentence2020This Court concluded that “the implied consent statute and the policy regarding drinking and driving support the conclusion that the only prerequisite to admission of blood alcohol test results is a threshold relevancy requirement, as codified in MRE 401, 402, and 403.” Id. at 506 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People of Michigan v. Anthony Ray McFarlane Jr
green
1 sentence2019Our Supreme Court has held that the following four-part test applies to evaluating the admissibility of other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b): First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting -14- instruction to the jury. [People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55 ; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).] In the context | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Pickens
green
2 sentences2019However, in its ruling on the admissibility of this evidence, the trial court also cited an unpublished opinion of this Court14 that relied on Michigan Supreme Court precedent stating that “evidence underlying the basis of an expert opinion” is generally admissible subject to the relevancy requirement and MRE 403, Pickens, 446 Mich at 334-336 , citing MRE 703 and MRE 705, and that “signs of past physical abuse of [a] child [are] relevant to prove that his subsequent fatal injuries were not inflicted accidentally,” People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 513 ; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). 2019The Pickens Court reasoned that evidence underlying the basis for an expert’s opinion “is relevant because it places the expert’s opinions into a factual context, thereby enabling the trier of fact to determine the weight due an expert’s opinion.” Pickens, 446 Mich at 335 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Knox
green
2 sentences2019However, in its ruling on the admissibility of this evidence, the trial court also cited an unpublished opinion of this Court14 that relied on Michigan Supreme Court precedent stating that “evidence underlying the basis of an expert opinion” is generally admissible subject to the relevancy requirement and MRE 403, Pickens, 446 Mich at 334-336 , citing MRE 703 and MRE 705, and that “signs of past physical abuse of [a] child [are] relevant to prove that his subsequent fatal injuries were not inflicted accidentally,” People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 513 ; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). 2019However, in its ruling on the admissibility of this evidence, the trial court also cited an unpublished opinion of this Court14 that relied on Michigan Supreme Court precedent stating that “evidence underlying the basis of an expert opinion” is generally admissible subject to the relevancy requirement and MRE 403, Pickens, 446 Mich at 334-336 , citing MRE 703 and MRE 705, and that “signs of past physical abuse of [a] child [are] relevant to prove that his subsequent fatal injuries were not inflicted accidentally,” People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 513 ; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Mardlin
green
1 sentence2016In short, at this stage of the proceedings, defendant’s differing version of events does not mandate exclusion of the other-acts evidence, and by allowing defendant’s credibility arguments to control, the trial court failed to conduct the proper relevancy analysis. 5 Cf. Mardlin, 487 Mich at 625-626 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Woodington v. Shokoohi
green
2 sentences2015Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352, 363 ; 792 NW2d 63 (2010). 2015Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352, 363 ; 792 NW2d 63 (2010). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Kowalski
green
2 sentences2014In other words, the ACOG criteria would not fulfill the relevancy requirement incorporated within MRE 702. “[E]ven proposed expert testimony that is offered by a qualified expert and based on reliable scientific data and methods may be properly excluded if it is not relevant to the facts of the case[.]” People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106, 122 ; 821 NW2d 14 (2012). 2014In other words, the ACOG criteria would not fulfill the relevancy requirement incorporated within MRE 702. “[E]ven proposed expert testimony that is offered by a qualified expert and based on reliable scientific data and methods may be properly excluded if it is not relevant to the facts of the case[.]” People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106, 122 ; 821 NW2d 14 (2012). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Wager
neutral
1 sentence1999Under this standard for admissibility, we agree with the reasoning of Judge Smolenski in his dissenting opinion in People v Wager, 233 Mich App 1, 13 , that “[finding nothing inherently unreasonable” solely in the delay between the time of the offense and the time of the blood test, we are “unwilling to second-guess the trial court’s considerable discretion.” In the case before us, the district court was aware that there was a delay between the accident and the blood test of about two hours and twenty-four minutes, and that defendant denied having ingested any alcohol after the accident. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Community National Bank v. Michigan Basic Property Insurance
green
2 sentences1998Community Nat’l Bank of Pontiac v Michigan Basic Property Ins Ass’n, 159 Mich App 510, 520-521 ; 407 NW2d 31 (1987). 1998Community Nat’l Bank of Pontiac v Michigan Basic Property Ins Ass’n, 159 Mich App 510, 520-521 ; 407 NW2d 31 (1987). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.