Gilbert analysis (Texas) · Go Syfert
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Gilbert analysis in Texas

15 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1988–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co.green
tex · 1989 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co. , 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989).

2010See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989).

33
In Re Smith Barney, Inc.green
tex · 1998 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004See In re Smith Barney, 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex.1998). 3 .

2004See In re Smith Barney, 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex.1998). 3 .

22
Direct Color Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.green
texapp · 1996 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–2004
2 sentences

2004See In re Smith Barney , 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998). [3] See Exxon Corp. v. Choo , 881 S.W.2d 301 , 302 n.2 (Tex. 1994). [4] In dismissing the claims of the seventy non-resident plaintiffs, the trial court = s order did not identify an alternative forum, but accepted appellees = stipulation that, if the dismissed plaintiffs file actions in their respective home states within one year of the dismissal, ESC would not object to jurisdiction, and any applicable statute of limitations would be tolled. [5] See, e.g., Direct Color Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 929 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. App

2004See In re Smith Barney , 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998). [3] See Exxon Corp. v. Choo , 881 S.W.2d 301 , 302 n.2 (Tex. 1994). [4] In dismissing the claims of the seventy non-resident plaintiffs, the trial court = s order did not identify an alternative forum, but accepted appellees = stipulation that, if the dismissed plaintiffs file actions in their respective home states within one year of the dismissal, ESC would not object to jurisdiction, and any applicable statute of limitations would be tolled. [5] See, e.g., Direct Color Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 929 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. App

22
Martinez v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1969 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1990–1997
2 sentences

1997He asserts that if he had earlier been aware of State's exhibit 24, he would have asked for a Wade/Gilbert hearing, see Martinez v. State , 437 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Tex. Crim.

1990Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).

22
Heien v. North Carolinagreen
scotus · 2014 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 540 .

11
State of Texas v. Rosseau, Robert Louisgreen
texcrimapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016State v. Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (“[T]o prevail on a facial challenge, a party must establish that the statute always operates unconstitutionally in all possible circumstances.”); State ex rel.

11
Exxon Corp. v. Choogreen
tex · 1994 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004See In re Smith Barney , 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998). [3] See Exxon Corp. v. Choo , 881 S.W.2d 301 , 302 n.2 (Tex. 1994). [4] In dismissing the claims of the seventy non-resident plaintiffs, the trial court = s order did not identify an alternative forum, but accepted appellees = stipulation that, if the dismissed plaintiffs file actions in their respective home states within one year of the dismissal, ESC would not object to jurisdiction, and any applicable statute of limitations would be tolled. [5] See, e.g., Direct Color Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 929 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. App

2004See In re Smith Barney , 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998). [3] See Exxon Corp. v. Choo , 881 S.W.2d 301 , 302 n.2 (Tex. 1994). [4] In dismissing the claims of the seventy non-resident plaintiffs, the trial court = s order did not identify an alternative forum, but accepted appellees = stipulation that, if the dismissed plaintiffs file actions in their respective home states within one year of the dismissal, ESC would not object to jurisdiction, and any applicable statute of limitations would be tolled. [5] See, e.g., Direct Color Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 929 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. App

11
Sarieddine v. Moussagreen
texapp · 1991 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004See In re Smith Barney , 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998). [3] See Exxon Corp. v. Choo , 881 S.W.2d 301 , 302 n.2 (Tex. 1994). [4] In dismissing the claims of the seventy non-resident plaintiffs, the trial court = s order did not identify an alternative forum, but accepted appellees = stipulation that, if the dismissed plaintiffs file actions in their respective home states within one year of the dismissal, ESC would not object to jurisdiction, and any applicable statute of limitations would be tolled. [5] See, e.g., Direct Color Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 929 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. App

2004See In re Smith Barney , 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998). [3] See Exxon Corp. v. Choo , 881 S.W.2d 301 , 302 n.2 (Tex. 1994). [4] In dismissing the claims of the seventy non-resident plaintiffs, the trial court = s order did not identify an alternative forum, but accepted appellees = stipulation that, if the dismissed plaintiffs file actions in their respective home states within one year of the dismissal, ESC would not object to jurisdiction, and any applicable statute of limitations would be tolled. [5] See, e.g., Direct Color Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 929 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. App

11
Cole v. Leegreen
texapp · 1968 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism’d); see also Cole v. Lee, 435 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1968, writ dism’d); Forcum-Dean Co. v. Missouri Pac.

1991McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism’d); see also Cole v. Lee, 435 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1968, writ dism’d); Forcum-Dean Co. v. Missouri Pac.

11
McNutt v. Teledyne Industries, Inc.green
texapp · 1985 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism’d); see also Cole v. Lee, 435 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1968, writ dism’d); Forcum-Dean Co. v. Missouri Pac.

1991McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism’d); see also Cole v. Lee, 435 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1968, writ dism’d); Forcum-Dean Co. v. Missouri Pac.

11
Pizano v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1978 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
2 sentences

1988Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court recognized that apart from the felony-murder rule, "malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed by another." People v. Gilbert, supra, 408 P.2d at 373 (citing Judge Traynor's opinion in People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 , 781-82 , 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , *Page 273 402 P.2d 130 , 133 (1965), in which he noted that "when the defendant intends to kill or intentionally commits acts that are likely to kill with a

1988Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court recognized that apart from the felony-murder rule, "malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed by another." People v. Gilbert, supra, 408 P.2d at 373 (citing Judge Traynor's opinion in People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 , 781-82 , 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , *Page 273 402 P.2d 130 , 133 (1965), in which he noted that "when the defendant intends to kill or intentionally commits acts that are likely to kill with a

11
People v. Washingtongreen
cal · 1965 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
2 sentences

1988Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court recognized that apart from the felony-murder rule, "malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed by another." People v. Gilbert, supra, 408 P.2d at 373 (citing Judge Traynor's opinion in People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 , 781-82 , 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , *Page 273 402 P.2d 130 , 133 (1965), in which he noted that "when the defendant intends to kill or intentionally commits acts that are likely to kill with a

1988Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court recognized that apart from the felony-murder rule, "malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed by another." People v. Gilbert, supra, 408 P.2d at 373 (citing Judge Traynor's opinion in People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 , 781-82 , 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , *Page 273 402 P.2d 130 , 133 (1965), in which he noted that "when the defendant intends to kill or intentionally commits acts that are likely to kill with a

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert red
scotus · 1947
2 sentences

2008Williams asserts that respondent abused his discretion by failing to apply the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert , 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (the A Gilbert factors @ ).

2008Williams asserts that respondent abused his discretion by failing to apply the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert , 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (the A Gilbert factors @ ).

22004–2008
Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. green
texapp · 2007
2 sentences

2010Gilbert contends it was prejudiced because Underwriters’ actions deprived it of the opportunity to make an informed decision about which risk to take: *137 (1) assert the immunity defense and risk Underwriters’ denying coverage for the breach of contract claim, or (2) refuse to assert the immunity defense and risk Underwriters’ denying coverage because Gilbert breached the cooperation clause. 12 The court of appeals concluded that Underwriters did not assume control of Gilbert’s defense, 245 S.W.3d at 87 .

2010Id. at 37 .

12010–2010
Ulico Casualty Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n green
texapp · 2006
1 sentence

2007Gilbert relies on the case of Ulico Casualty Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 187 S.W.3d 91 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. granted) for the proposition that an insurer need not have total or even extensive control of the insured’s defense for the waiver and estoppel exception to apply.

12007–2007
People v. Gilbert green
cal · 1965
2 sentences

1988Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court recognized that apart from the felony-murder rule, "malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed by another." People v. Gilbert, supra, 408 P.2d at 373 (citing Judge Traynor's opinion in People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 , 781-82 , 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , *Page 273 402 P.2d 130 , 133 (1965), in which he noted that "when the defendant intends to kill or intentionally commits acts that are likely to kill with a

1988Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court recognized that apart from the felony-murder rule, “malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed, by another.” People v. Gilbert, supra, 408 P.2d at 373 (citing Judge Traynor’s opinion in People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781-82 , 44 Cal. *273 Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (1965), in which he noted that “when the defendant intends to kill or intentionally commits acts that are likely to kill with a consci

11988–1988
Dowden v. State green
texapp · 1982
1 sentence

1988Rather, the question is whether he voluntarily fires the gun with the requisite culpable mental state." Dowden, supra, 638 S.W.2d at 88 . 5 The Pizano case held that the " Gilbert test" — whether the killing was in response to malicious conduct in addition to the underlying felony — is inapplicable to "shield" cases.

11988–1988

Where else courts name it

IL 25 (1974–2026) TX 15 (1988–2016) OH 12 (1989–2023) CA 11 (1944–2024) GA 7 (1963–2012) IN 6 (1973–2020) FL 5 (1980–2010) PA 3 (1993–2014) MN 3 (1978–2024) MO 3 (1976–2017) MT 3 (1971–2007) AK 3 (1983–1996) CO 2 (2025–2026) UT 2 (2012–2016) DC 2 (1991–1995) LA 2 (2009–2011) WI 2 (1987–2000) NJ 2 (1967–1967) VA 2 (1998–2014) OR 2 (1978–2004) CT 2 (1970–2001) MD 2 (1994–2000)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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