portable breath test in Texas

2019See Tex. Penal Code § 49.01(2)(B); see also Fernandez v. State, 915 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (portable breath test, given as one of several field sobriety tests, used as qualitative indicator of intoxication).

2014See Fernandez v. State, 915 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (holding a PBT admissible “as another indicator of intoxication relied on by the officer, much like the other field sobriety tests.”); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub.

2013See Adams v. State, 156 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.); Hill v. State, No. 06-12-00016-CR, 2012 WL 1 In addition, appellant does not identify the statute upon which she bases her argument or provide any authority to support her contentions.

2012See Adams v. State, 156 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.); Fernandez v. State, 915 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.).

2010But see Rhodes , 945 S.W.2d at 117–18 (holding that incident was temporary investigative detention when officer testified at suppression hearing that he was not arresting Rhodes when he handcuffed him and that he handcuffed him primarily out of concern for officer safety—it was dark, the area was high-crime, and officer was alone with suspect); Arthur , 216 S.W.3d at 53 , 57–58 (holding that appellant’s statements were not a product of custodial interrogation when officer saw appellant’s vehicle drifting and speeding, initiated a traffic stop and asked some questions about whether she had had

2010But see Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 117-18 (holding that incident was temporary investigative detention when officer testified at suppression hearing that he was not arresting Rhodes when he handcuffed him and that he handcuffed him primarily out of concern for officer safety — it was dark, the area was high-crime, and officer was alone with suspect); Arthur, 216 S.W.3d at 53, 57-58 (holding that appellant’s statements were not a product of custodial interrogation when officer saw appellant’s vehicle drifting and speeding, initiated a traffic stop and asked some questions about whether she had had a

2010But see Rhodes , 945 S.W.2d at 117–18 (holding that incident was temporary investigative detention when officer testified at suppression hearing that he was not arresting Rhodes when he handcuffed him and that he handcuffed him primarily out of concern for officer safety—it was dark, the area was high-crime, and officer was alone with suspect); Arthur , 216 S.W.3d at 53 , 57–58 (holding that appellant’s statements were not a product of custodial interrogation when officer saw appellant’s vehicle drifting and speeding, initiated a traffic stop and asked some questions about whether she had had

2010But see Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 117-18 (holding that incident was temporary investigative detention when officer testified at suppression hearing that he was not arresting Rhodes when he handcuffed him and that he handcuffed him primarily out of concern for officer safety — it was dark, the area was high-crime, and officer was alone with suspect); Arthur, 216 S.W.3d at 53, 57-58 (holding that appellant’s statements were not a product of custodial interrogation when officer saw appellant’s vehicle drifting and speeding, initiated a traffic stop and asked some questions about whether she had had a

2010But see Rhodes , 945 S.W.2d at 117–18 (holding that incident was temporary investigative detention when officer testified at suppression hearing that he was not arresting Rhodes when he handcuffed him and that he handcuffed him primarily out of concern for officer safety—it was dark, the area was high-crime, and officer was alone with suspect); Arthur , 216 S.W.3d at 53 , 57–58 (holding that appellant’s statements were not a product of custodial interrogation when officer saw appellant’s vehicle drifting and speeding, initiated a traffic stop and asked some questions about whether she had had

2010But see Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 117-18 (holding that incident was temporary investigative detention when officer testified at suppression hearing that he was not arresting Rhodes when he handcuffed him and that he handcuffed him primarily out of concern for officer safety — it was dark, the area was high-crime, and officer was alone with suspect); Arthur, 216 S.W.3d at 53, 57-58 (holding that appellant’s statements were not a product of custodial interrogation when officer saw appellant’s vehicle drifting and speeding, initiated a traffic stop and asked some questions about whether she had had a

2010App. 2004); Lewis v. State , 72 S.W.3d 704 , 708–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d) (distinguishing Jordy and Alford as presenting “other circumstances” requiring Miranda when their facts went beyond the roadside questioning and sobriety tests found in DWI temporary investigation cases).

2010But see Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 117-18 (holding that incident was temporary investigative detention when officer testified at suppression hearing that he was not arresting Rhodes when he handcuffed him and that he handcuffed him primarily out of concern for officer safety — it was dark, the area was high-crime, and officer was alone with suspect); Arthur, 216 S.W.3d at 53, 57-58 (holding that appellant’s statements were not a product of custodial interrogation when officer saw appellant’s vehicle drifting and speeding, initiated a traffic stop and asked some questions about whether she had had a

2015In Soliz v. State, “Trooper Mingst testified that he witnessed four signs of appellant’s intoxication: (1) appellant smelled of alcohol, (2) appellant admitted to consuming alcohol, (3) appellant showed six of six clues on the HGN test, and (4) the PBT showed that appellant’s blood 53 Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim.

2015Ortiz’s estimation of Appellant’s speed was incorrect due to equipment problems, a stop that meets the test for reasonable suspicion is lawful, notwithstanding a subsequent determination that the equipment was faulty.”). 43 Gutierrez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (“[T]he radar reading merely confirmed Officer Lewis’s initial observation that Gutierrez appeared to be traveling faster than the posted speed limit.

2013See id. (noting that although defendant’s behavior during traffic stop may have been consistent with head 13 injury, her behavior also constituted recognized evidence of intoxication); Russell v. State, 290 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient to support intoxication finding despite defendant’s contention that his behavior and symptoms were caused by hypoglycemia and diabetes).

2012See Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93–94; King, 953 S.W.2d at 271 .