principle underlying rule in Texas

2015The doctrine of election is generally regarded as being founded on the intention of the testator.” As early as 1859, the Supreme Court of this state, in the case of Philleo v. Holliday et al., 24 Tex. 38 , in discussing the doctrine of an election under a will, announced the following rule: “The principle of election is, that he who accepts a benefit under a will, must adopt the whole contents of the instrument, so far as it concerns him; conforming to its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with it; as where the wife claims something under the will which will disappoint the wi

1951The doctrine of election is generally regarded as being founded on the intention of the testator.' "As early as 1859, the Supreme Court of this state, in the case of Philleo v. Holliday, et al, 24 Tex. 38 , in discussing the doctrine of an election under a will, announced the following rule: `The principle of election is, that he who accepts a benefit under *627 a will, must adopt the whole contents of the instrument, so far as it concerns him; conforming to its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with it; as where the wife claims something under the will which will disappoint

2021App. 2007) (“Some factors supporting the overruling of precedent are: (1) that the original rule or decision was flawed from the outset, (2) that the rule's application produces inconsistent results, (3) that the rule conflicts with other precedent, especially when the other precedent is newer and more soundly reasoned, (4) that the rule regularly produces results that are unjust, that are unanticipated by the principle underlying the rule, or that place unnecessary burdens on the system, and (5) that the reasons that support the rule have been undercut with the passage of time.”). 61 Paulson,

2021App. 2007) (“Some factors supporting the overruling of precedent are: (1) that the original rule or decision was flawed from the outset, (2) that the rule's application produces inconsistent results, (3) that the rule conflicts with other precedent, especially when the other precedent is newer and more soundly reasoned, (4) that the rule regularly produces results that are unjust, that are unanticipated by the principle underlying the rule, or that place unnecessary burdens on the system, and (5) that the reasons that support the rule have been undercut with the passage of time.”). 61 Paulson,

2021App. 2007) (“Some factors supporting the overruling of precedent are: (1) that the original rule or decision was flawed from the outset, (2) that the rule's application produces inconsistent results, (3) that the rule conflicts with other precedent, especially when the other precedent is newer and more soundly reasoned, (4) that the rule regularly produces results that are unjust, that are unanticipated by the principle underlying the rule, or that place unnecessary burdens on the system, and (5) that the reasons that support the rule have been undercut with the passage of time.”). 61 Paulson,

2021App. 2007) (“Some factors supporting the overruling of precedent are: (1) that the original rule or decision was flawed from the outset, (2) that the rule's application produces inconsistent results, (3) that the rule conflicts with other precedent, especially when the other precedent is newer and more soundly reasoned, (4) that the rule regularly produces results that are unjust, that are unanticipated by the principle underlying the rule, or that place unnecessary burdens on the system, and (5) that the reasons that support the rule have been undercut with the passage of time.”). 61 Paulson,

2009In re Scariati , 988 S.W.2d 270 , 273 n.2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, orig. proceeding).

2009Ex parte Johns , 807 S.W.2d at 771 . [5] Relator’s complaints regarding the civil-contempt portion of the contempt order are addressed below. [6] The principle underlying this rule is akin to jurisdictional ripeness.

1992The principle underlying this doctrine is that “no person deriving his authority from the law, and obligated to execute it according to the rules of law, can be holden by process of this kind.” Pace, 57 Tex. at 558 .

1981The only thing which distinguishes this river from other streams, in the matter of accretion, is in the rapidity of the change caused by the velocity of the current; and this in itself, in the very nature of things, works no change in the principle underlying the rule of law in respect thereto.” *646 Nebraska v. Iowa has been followed by the Court of Civil Appeals in Denny v. Cotton, supra, and by the Supreme Court in Hancock v. Moore, 135 Tex. 619 , 146 S.W.2d 369 (1941).

1981The only thing which distinguishes this river from other streams, in the matter of accretion, is in the rapidity of the change caused by the velocity of the current; and this in itself, in the very nature of things, works no change in the principle underlying the rule of law in respect thereto.” *646 Nebraska v. Iowa has been followed by the Court of Civil Appeals in Denny v. Cotton, supra, and by the Supreme Court in Hancock v. Moore, 135 Tex. 619 , 146 S.W.2d 369 (1941).