appearance requirement in Washington

2007Dlouhy, 55 Wash.2d at 719, 724 , 349 P.2d 1073 . ¶ 23 Respondents may have been misled by dicta in Gage v. Boeing Co., 55 Wash. App. 157 , 776 P.2d 991 (1989).

2007Id. at 719, 724 . ¶23 Respondents may have been misled by dicta in Gage v. Boeing Co., 55 Wn.

2025In Sacotte Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 143 Wn.

2023App. 488 , 41 P.3d 506 (2002), to argue that Dahb substantially complied with the appearance requirement when he communicated with Harting’s counsel.

2020Morin v. Burns, 160 Wn.2d 745 , 749, 161 P.3d 956 (2007).

2019See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122 ; Jackson, 66 Wn.2d at 28-29 ; In re Pers.

2019For the priority of action rule to apply, the cases must be identical "such that a decision ofthe controversy by one tribunal would, as res judicata, bar further proceedings in the other tribunal." Fire Fighters, 117 Wn.2d at 675 .

2018Cf. State v. Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d 130, 137-40 , 216 P.3d 1024 (2009) (under speedy trial rule, judicial unavailability or court congestion may justify trial delay if trial court documents the lack of available courtrooms, judges, visiting judges, or judges pro tempore).

2018Cf. State v. Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d 130, 137-40 , 216 P.3d 1024 (2009) (under speedy trial rule, judicial unavailability or court congestion may justify trial delay if trial court documents the lack of available courtrooms, judges, visiting judges, or judges pro tempore).

2014ANALYSIS Mr. Brooks contends that the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the order of default, both because he had substantially complied with the appearance requirement and because all of the factors identified in White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348 , 438 P.2d 581 (1968) as weighing in favor of relieving a defendant from default are met in his case.

2014ANALYSIS Mr. Brooks contends that the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the order of default, both because he had substantially complied with the appearance requirement and because all of the factors identified in White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348 , 438 P.2d 581 (1968) as weighing in favor of relieving a defendant from default are met in his case.

2014Yet it rejected an "informal appearance doctrine" that had been adopted by the Court of Appeals in Matia Investment Fund, Inc. v. City a/Tacoma, 129 Wn.

2014A litigant can demonstrate substantial compliance with the appearance requirement for purposes of CR 55(a)(3) if "the record clearly reflects that after [plaintiff] filed suit, [defendant] intended to litigate or settle the case." Meade v. Nelson. 174 Wn.

2014App. 740, 749 , 300 P.3d 828 (2013) (citing Morin. 160 Wn.2d at 755).

2013In Morin, the Washington Supreme Court refused to adopt the “manifested intent” test this court used in Smith, 127 Wn.

1975App. 116 , 504 P.2d 331 (1972). *125 The defendants were “brought to trial within 60 days following [their] preliminary appearance.” 1 Hence, they are not entitled to have the charges against them dismissed with prejudice solely because of the 60-day rule. 2 Essential to their position on appeal is their contention that the 60-day rule and the preliminary appearance rule 3 must be read together in order to ascertain the true intent of the court in promulgating the “speedy trial” portions of the new criminal rules.