appearance hearing in California

2025Given this similarity, it is appropriate to look to case law interpreting the appearance requirements under the former rule for guidance. 8 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 121 .) Ranger considered whether a trial court lost jurisdiction to forfeit bail on a defendant’s nonappearance after the court excused the defendant’s appearance at a rule 227.6 readiness conference. ( Ranger, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1305–1306.) It found no such loss of jurisdiction, including because the court was authorized to excuse the presence of a defendant at a rule 227.6 hearing.

2025Given this similarity, it is appropriate to look to case law interpreting the appearance requirements under the former rule for guidance. 8 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 121 .) Ranger considered whether a trial court lost jurisdiction to forfeit bail on a defendant’s nonappearance after the court excused the defendant’s appearance at a rule 227.6 readiness conference. ( Ranger, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1305–1306.) It found no such loss of jurisdiction, including because the court was authorized to excuse the presence of a defendant at a rule 227.6 hearing.

2025Given this similarity, it is appropriate to look to case law interpreting the appearance requirements under the former rule for guidance. 8 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 121 .) Ranger considered whether a trial court lost jurisdiction to forfeit bail on a defendant’s nonappearance after the court excused the defendant’s appearance at a rule 227.6 readiness conference. ( Ranger, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1305–1306.) It found no such loss of jurisdiction, including because the court was authorized to excuse the presence of a defendant at a rule 227.6 hearing.

2025Given this similarity, it is appropriate to look to case law interpreting the appearance requirements under the former rule for guidance. 8 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 121 .) Ranger considered whether a trial court lost jurisdiction to forfeit bail on a defendant’s nonappearance after the court excused the defendant’s appearance at a rule 227.6 readiness conference. ( Ranger, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1305–1306.) It found no such loss of jurisdiction, including because the court was authorized to excuse the presence of a defendant at a rule 227.6 hearing.

2015(Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 342-343 ; Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697-698 ; Farrar v. McCormick (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 701, 705 ; see Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 561 .) “The principal purpose of the requirement to file and serve a notice of motion a specified number of days before the hearing [citation] is to provide the opposing party adequate time to prepare an opposition.” (Arambula, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 343 .) “Courts applying the waiver rule generally have concluded that the party’s appearance at the hea

2015(Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 342-343 ; Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697-698 (Carlton); Farrar v. McCormick (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 701, 705 .) "The principal purpose of the requirement to file and serve a notice of motion . . . is to provide the opposing party adequate time to prepare an opposition." (Arambula, at p. 343.) "Courts applying the waiver rule generally have concluded that the party's appearance at the hearing and opposition on the merits showed that the notice 'served its purpose,' despite any defect [citations], and that any defect in t

1958In Jacobs v. Ellet, 108 Utah 162 [ 158 P.2d 555 ]; the court issued a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to enter default in a divorce action wherein the trial court had refused to enter the default on the grounds that the defendant’s appearance and waiver had been executed five days before the complaint was filed, and in Vayette v. Myers, 303 Ill. 562 [ 136 N.E. 467 ], the court held that the decree of divorce was valid even though defendant had signed appearance before the filing of the complaint.

1958In Jacobs v. Ellet, 108 Utah 162 [ 158 P.2d 555 ]; the court issued a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to enter default in a divorce action wherein the trial court had refused to enter the default on the grounds that the defendant’s appearance and waiver had been executed five days before the complaint was filed, and in Vayette v. Myers, 303 Ill. 562 [ 136 N.E. 467 ], the court held that the decree of divorce was valid even though defendant had signed appearance before the filing of the complaint.

1958In Jacobs v. Ellet, 108 Utah 162 [ 158 P.2d 555 ]; the court issued a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to enter default in a divorce action wherein the trial court had refused to enter the default on the grounds that the defendant’s appearance and waiver had been executed five days before the complaint was filed, and in Vayette v. Myers, 303 Ill. 562 [ 136 N.E. 467 ], the court held that the decree of divorce was valid even though defendant had signed appearance before the filing of the complaint.

1958In Jacobs v. Ellet, 108 Utah 162 [ 158 P.2d 555 ]; the court issued a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to enter default in a divorce action wherein the trial court had refused to enter the default on the grounds that the defendant’s appearance and waiver had been executed five days before the complaint was filed, and in Vayette v. Myers, 303 Ill. 562 [ 136 N.E. 467 ], the court held that the decree of divorce was valid even though defendant had signed appearance before the filing of the complaint.

2025(Meehan v. Hopps (1955) 45 Cal.2d 213 ; Reed v. Superior Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 448 , 452– 453.) The rationale for this holding is that orders on disqualification motions are either a final collateral order or an order granting or denying a request 3 for an injunction “to restrain counsel from participating in the case.” (Reed, at pp. 452–453.) Another line of authority, perhaps even more venerable, holds that orders on evidentiary matters, including motions in limine, are not themselves appealable.

2025In Goodwine v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1965) 63 Cal.2d 481 , our Supreme Court addressed whether a party’s appearance to challenge the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction constituted a general appearance granting the court personal jurisdiction over the party.

2025(Meehan v. Hopps (1955) 45 Cal.2d 213 ; Reed v. Superior Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 448 , 452– 453.) The rationale for this holding is that orders on disqualification motions are either a final collateral order or an order granting or denying a request 3 for an injunction “to restrain counsel from participating in the case.” (Reed, at pp. 452–453.) Another line of authority, perhaps even more venerable, holds that orders on evidentiary matters, including motions in limine, are not themselves appealable.

2021State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 841 , quoting 63 Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1236 . 64 Id. (“There must be . . . a commitment to a result (albeit, perhaps, even a tentative commitment), before the process will be found violative of due process”); see, e.g., Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Comm’n (1970) 159 Conn. 585, 594 (“The decisive question in the instant case is whether Eno [a commissioner] had actually made up his mind, in advance of the public hearing, that he was going to approve the proposed change of zone regardle

2021State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 841 , quoting 63 Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1236 . 64 Id. (“There must be . . . a commitment to a result (albeit, perhaps, even a tentative commitment), before the process will be found violative of due process”); see, e.g., Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Comm’n (1970) 159 Conn. 585, 594 (“The decisive question in the instant case is whether Eno [a commissioner] had actually made up his mind, in advance of the public hearing, that he was going to approve the proposed change of zone regardle

2021State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 841 , quoting 63 Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1236 . 64 Id. (“There must be . . . a commitment to a result (albeit, perhaps, even a tentative commitment), before the process will be found violative of due process”); see, e.g., Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Comm’n (1970) 159 Conn. 585, 594 (“The decisive question in the instant case is whether Eno [a commissioner] had actually made up his mind, in advance of the public hearing, that he was going to approve the proposed change of zone regardle

2021State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 841 , quoting 63 Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1236 . 64 Id. (“There must be . . . a commitment to a result (albeit, perhaps, even a tentative commitment), before the process will be found violative of due process”); see, e.g., Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Comm’n (1970) 159 Conn. 585, 594 (“The decisive question in the instant case is whether Eno [a commissioner] had actually made up his mind, in advance of the public hearing, that he was going to approve the proposed change of zone regardle

2021State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 841 , quoting 63 Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1236 . 64 Id. (“There must be . . . a commitment to a result (albeit, perhaps, even a tentative commitment), before the process will be found violative of due process”); see, e.g., Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Comm’n (1970) 159 Conn. 585, 594 (“The decisive question in the instant case is whether Eno [a commissioner] had actually made up his mind, in advance of the public hearing, that he was going to approve the proposed change of zone regardle

2014Section 977, subdivision (b)(1), requires a felony defendant with an appearance waiver in place to appear only for those portions of the trial at “which evidence is taken,” whereas section 1305 more broadly requires forfeiture when a defendant fails to appear “for trial.” (Ranger, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553 .) Discerning a “conflict” between the two statutes as to the specific circumstances at hand, the Ranger court held section 1305 controlled, since with respect to bail forfeiture, it is the more “specific or special statute.” (Ranger, at pp. 1553–1554.) The court further concluded app

2014(Sergio R., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 605 .) “While such eligibility is a necessary condition for DEJ, it is not alone a sufficient basis.

2014Procedural defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties do not constitute reversible error. [Citation.]’” (Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1288 .) The record reflects that the AP timely filed and served its special motion to strike and that Sparks received the motion.

2014The form must be personally served on the custodial adult at least 24 hours before the time set for the appearance hearing.” (Rule 5.800(c), italics omitted.) “In addition, the prosecutor’s ‘written notification to the minor’ of the minor’s eligibility must include, inter alia, ‘[a] full description of the procedures for deferred 4 All further citations to rules are to the California Rules of Court, unless otherwise noted. 5. entry of judgment’ (§ 791, subd. (a)(1)) and ‘[a] clear statement that, in lieu of jurisdictional and disposition hearings, the court may grant a deferred entry of judgme

2014The form must be personally served on the custodial adult at least 24 hours before the time set for the appearance hearing.” (Rule 5.800(c), italics omitted.) “In addition, the prosecutor’s ‘written notification to the minor’ of the minor’s eligibility must include, inter alia, ‘[a] full description of the procedures for deferred 4 All further citations to rules are to the California Rules of Court, unless otherwise noted. 5. entry of judgment’ (§ 791, subd. (a)(1)) and ‘[a] clear statement that, in lieu of jurisdictional and disposition hearings, the court may grant a deferred entry of judgme