15 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1947–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Affordable Cabs, Inc. v. Employment Security Departmentgreen2 sentences2010Although Casteel testified that he did not know if Smith was present at the seminar for this portion of the training, this is substantial evidence that Smith " should have known of the existence of the rule." RCW 50.04.294(2)(f) (emphasis added); see also WAC 192-150-210(5) ("The department will find that you knew or should have known about a company rule if you were provided an employee orientation on company rules."). ¶ 19 Although there was conflicting testimony regarding the existence of the county rule against recording without consent, the Commissioner apparently found Casteel's testimon 2010Although Casteel testified that he did not know if Smith was present at the seminar for this portion of the training, this is substantial evidence that Smith “should have known of the existence of the rule.” RCW 50.04.294(2)(f) (emphasis added); see also WAC 192-150-210(5) (“The department will find that you knew or should have known about a company rule if you were provided an employee orientation on company rules.”). ¶19 Although there was conflicting testimony regarding the existence of the county rule against recording without consent, the Commissioner apparently found Casteel’s testimony | 2 | 2 |
National Labor Relations Board v. Washington Aluminum Co.green2 sentences2009See Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 16-17 , 82 S.Ct. 1099 (holding that the violation of a company rule does not grant the employer authority "to punish a man by discharging him for engaging in concerted activities"). 2009See Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 16-17 (holding that the violation of a company rule does not grant the employer authority “to punish a man by discharging him for engaging in concerted activities”). | 2 | 2 |
ACI v. Department of Employment SEC.green1 sentence2010Although Casteel testified that he did not know if Smith was present at the seminar for this portion of the training, this is substantial evidence that Smith " should have known of the existence of the rule." RCW 50.04.294(2)(f) (emphasis added); see also WAC 192-150-210(5) ("The department will find that you knew or should have known about a company rule if you were provided an employee orientation on company rules."). ¶ 19 Although there was conflicting testimony regarding the existence of the county rule against recording without consent, the Commissioner apparently found Casteel's testimon | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021The Supreme Court held that Gardner could not be terminated for violating the company rule where the violation occurred “because he saw a woman who faced imminent life-threatening harm, and he reasonably believed his intervention was necessary to save her life.” Id. at 950 . 2008In Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931, 933 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996), we determined termination of “an at-will employee who violated a company rule in order to go to the assistance of a citizen who was in danger of serious physical injury or death” violated public policy. | 5 | 2006–2021 |
Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc.
green
2 sentences2008In Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931, 933 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996), we determined termination of "an at-will employee *142 who violated a company rule in order to go to the assistance of a citizen who was in danger of serious physical injury or death" violated public policy. 2008In Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931, 933 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996), we determined termination of “an at-will employee who violated a company rule in order to go to the assistance of a citizen who was in danger of serious physical injury or death” violated public policy. | 3 | 2006–2008 |
Daniels v. Employment Security Department
green
2 sentences2018Dep’t, 168 Wn. 2017However, “there is no requirement in the [Employment Security Act] or the Department’s regulations that a company rule [must] be written or contained in a handbook for its violation to constitute misconduct.” Daniels, 168 Wn. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Ives v. Ramsden
green
1 sentence2016In Ives v. Ramsden, 142 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hamel v. Employment Security Department
green
1 sentence1999Hamel, 93 Wn. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Miller v. Anderson
green
1 sentence1999App. 822 , 825 n.l, 964 P.2d 365 (1998). 5 In Hamel , Division Two held that a violation of a company rule after repeated warnings in and of itself is not enough to establish willful misconduct. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Eddy v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990Underwriters, Inc., 113 Wn.2d 168 , 776 P.2d 966 (1989) (an employer-furnished vehicle came within the policy exclusion since it was being used for business purposes although in violation of a company rule of no alcohol); Dairy land Ins. 1990Underwriters, Inc., 113 Wn.2d 168 , 776 P.2d 966 (1989) (an employer-furnished vehicle came within the policy exclusion since it was being used for business purposes although in violation of a company rule of no alcohol); Dairy land Ins. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
City of Corbin v. Payne
neutral
2 sentences1947It appears in Corbin v. Payne, 288 Ky. 566 , 156 S. W. (2d) 850 , that an action was begun to collect damages for injuries sustained on a bridge, the city defending upon the ground that the bridge was not within the city limits. 1947It appears in Corbin v. Payne, 288 Ky. 566 , 156 S. W. (2d) 850 , that an action was begun to collect damages for injuries sustained on a bridge, the city defending upon the ground that the bridge was not within the city limits. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Hubbell v. City of South Hutchinson
green
2 sentences1947J. 1190, Webster v. School District, 313 Ill. 54 , we conclude that this is a case where justice and right require that it be held that when the mayor advised the company to go ahead and violate the ordinance while its validity was being tested, and the council stood by and acquiesced in the violation, the city council should not be permitted to stultify itself by.subsequently prosecuting the company for a violation of the ordinance.” See, also, Hubbell v. South Hutchinson, 64 Kan. 645 , 68 Pac. 52 , and Cole v. Kanopolis, 159 Kan. 304 , 153 P. (2d) 920 . 1947J. 1190, Webster v. School District, 313 Ill. 54 , we conclude that this is a case where justice and right require that it be held that when the mayor advised the company to go ahead and violate the ordinance while its validity was being tested, and the council stood by and acquiesced in the violation, the city council should not be permitted to stultify itself by.subsequently prosecuting the company for a violation of the ordinance.” See, also, Hubbell v. South Hutchinson, 64 Kan. 645 , 68 Pac. 52 , and Cole v. Kanopolis, 159 Kan. 304 , 153 P. (2d) 920 . | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Cole v. City of Kanopolis
green
2 sentences1947J. 1190, Webster v. School District, 313 Ill. 54 , we conclude that this is a case where justice and right require that it be held that when the mayor advised the company to go ahead and violate the ordinance while its validity was being tested, and the council stood by and acquiesced in the violation, the city council should not be permitted to stultify itself by.subsequently prosecuting the company for a violation of the ordinance.” See, also, Hubbell v. South Hutchinson, 64 Kan. 645 , 68 Pac. 52 , and Cole v. Kanopolis, 159 Kan. 304 , 153 P. (2d) 920 . 1947J. 1190, Webster v. School District, 313 Ill. 54 , we conclude that this is a case where justice and right require that it be held that when the mayor advised the company to go ahead and violate the ordinance while its validity was being tested, and the council stood by and acquiesced in the violation, the city council should not be permitted to stultify itself by.subsequently prosecuting the company for a violation of the ordinance.” See, also, Hubbell v. South Hutchinson, 64 Kan. 645 , 68 Pac. 52 , and Cole v. Kanopolis, 159 Kan. 304 , 153 P. (2d) 920 . | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.