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17 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1902–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsettgreen2 sentences2009Standard of Review We review summary judgments de novo, Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005), and follow the usual standards that apply when a summary judgment order grants relief without specifying grounds. 2009Standard of Review We review summary judgments de novo, Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005), and follow the usual standards that apply when a summary judgment order grants relief without specifying grounds. | 4 | 4 |
Brown v. Forum Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2003Co., 507 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (employee killed while flying a private plane in furtherance of employer’s work was still in the course of his employment in spite of the company rule against using private or chartered aircraft in connection with work duties). . 2003Co., 507 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (employee killed while flying a private plane in furtherance of employer's work was still in the course of his employment in spite of the company rule against using private or chartered aircraft in connection with work duties). [27] See Tex. Lab.Code §§ 401.011(18), 406.001, 401.012(a). [28] Del Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d at 593 (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.1994)). [29] Tex. Lab.Code § 92.002(7). [30] Id. § 92.002(3) [31] Id. § 92.002(8). [32] See id. §§ 92.002, 92.011, 92.012, 92.022, 92.0 | 1 | 1 |
Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund v. Del Industrial, Inc.green2 sentences2003Co., 507 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (employee killed while flying a private plane in furtherance of employer's work was still in the course of his employment in spite of the company rule against using private or chartered aircraft in connection with work duties). [27] See Tex. Lab.Code §§ 401.011(18), 406.001, 401.012(a). [28] Del Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d at 593 (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.1994)). [29] Tex. Lab.Code § 92.002(7). [30] Id. § 92.002(3) [31] Id. § 92.002(8). [32] See id. §§ 92.002, 92.011, 92.012, 92.022, 92.0 2003Co., 507 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (employee killed while flying a private plane in furtherance of employer's work was still in the course of his employment in spite of the company rule against using private or chartered aircraft in connection with work duties). [27] See Tex. Lab.Code §§ 401.011(18), 406.001, 401.012(a). [28] Del Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d at 593 (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.1994)). [29] Tex. Lab.Code § 92.002(7). [30] Id. § 92.002(3) [31] Id. § 92.002(8). [32] See id. §§ 92.002, 92.011, 92.012, 92.022, 92.0 | 1 | 1 |
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jonesgreen1 sentence2003Co., 507 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (employee killed while flying a private plane in furtherance of employer's work was still in the course of his employment in spite of the company rule against using private or chartered aircraft in connection with work duties). [27] See Tex. Lab.Code §§ 401.011(18), 406.001, 401.012(a). [28] Del Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d at 593 (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.1994)). [29] Tex. Lab.Code § 92.002(7). [30] Id. § 92.002(3) [31] Id. § 92.002(8). [32] See id. §§ 92.002, 92.011, 92.012, 92.022, 92.0 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
MacIas v. Schwedler
green
1 sentence2016Id.- On appeal, Macias argued, among other things, that, “because this is not a suit to recover compensation benefits as damages, there is no determination of benefits or medical treatment for the Commission to make, and therefore, there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies under the [Act].” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Leonard K. Hoskins v. Colonel Clifton Hoskins and Hoskins Inc.
green
2 sentences2016In the court of appeals, Leonard conceded that his original “complaint ‘focused’ on the conveyance of the Tilden Ranch which was the basis of Clifton and the Company’s motion for summary judgment.” 498 S.W.3d at 83-85 , 2014 WL 5176384, at *5 . 2016In the court of appeals, Leonard conceded that his original “complaint ‘focused’ on the conveyance of the Tilden Ranch which was the basis of Clifton and the Company’s motion for summary judgment.” 498 S.W.3d at 83-85 , 2014 WL 5176384, at *5 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Schreiber
green
1 sentence2015Despite Dresser's 1459, 1467-1468, 1470, 14 L.Ed.2d 383 suggestion to the contrary, see brief of re- (1965). spondent-appellant at 42--47, we conclude We recognize that Judge Parker in the that the District Court did not reach the grand jury investigation of Dresser said merits of Dresser's claims on these points. that Dresser's concern for the lives of its With respect to confidentiality, the court employees and their families and property noted that the SEC had offered to give abroad in the event of public disclosure of Dresser ten days notice in advance of disclo- portions of the documents | 1 | 2015–2015 |
McGalliard v. Kuhlmann
green
1 sentence2011Because the Company does not challenge the findings and the evidence supports them, they are binding on us.16 We therefore hold that (1) the Company did not establish that Basic’s performance amounted to a breach for which Legend was liable as a matter of law and (2) the trial court’s refusal to hold Legend liable for a breach by Basic that the trial court did not find occurred is not 16 See McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 696 ; Rischon Dev. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rischon Development Corp. v. City of Keller
green
1 sentence2011Corp., 242 S.W.3d at 166 . 14 against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Boucher v. Texas Turnpike Authority
green
1 sentence1967Boucher v. Texas Turnpike Authority, 317 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Civ.App., 1958, no writ). | 1 | 1967–1967 |
O. P. Teets v. Chicago, South Shore and South Bend Railroad
green
1 sentence1958We are impressed with the decision of Teets v. Chicago, South Shore & South Bend Railroad, 7 Cir., 1956, 238 F.2d 223 , and are of the opinion that the question of whether an employee’s violation of a company rule constitutes negligence on his part and a proximate cause of his injuries .must be considered from the entire circumstances. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Southern Surety Co. v. Benton
neutral
1 sentence1938We quote from Southern Surety Co. v. Benton, Tex.Com.App., 280 S.W. 551 , 553: “In executing such application as he did, Benton had notice that Harris had no authority to bind, the company by a waiver of any stipulation contained in such application or the policy of which it forms a part. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Texas Glass & Paint Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland
green
1 sentence1937The investigation to ascertain the various defaults of McICnight continued after the giving of the preliminary notice of default, and the evidence in the record fails to give any support to the contention that the proof of claim was unreasonably delayed, and was not made as soon as practicable after the full particulars thereof were ascertained.” In Texas Glass & Paint Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 244 S.W. 113, 114 , the Commission of Appeals, Section B, through Judge McClendon, discussing a similar provision of the policy, said: “While the language of clause (b) requiring immediate notice o | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Texas & New Orleans Railroad v. Buch
neutral
2 sentences1933App.) 102 S. W. 124 ; Id., 101 Tex. 200 , 105 S. W. 987 , that testimony is admissible to prove that it was the custom of brakemen to put off trespassers, "as a custom of the company’s employees, though the company had a rule prohibiting any employee except the conductor to eject trespassers. 1933App.) 102 S. W. 124 ; Id., 101 Tex. 200 , 105 S. W. 987 , that testimony is admissible to prove that it was the custom of brakemen to put off trespassers, "as a custom of the company’s employees, though the company had a rule prohibiting any employee except the conductor to eject trespassers. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Wright
green
1 sentence1932Without making an extended discussion of the question, we think the case of Federal Life Insurance Company v. Wright, first, by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, 230 S. W. 795, 800 , on appellant’s motion for a rehearing beginning on page 799, and by the Commission of Appeals, Sec. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co. v. Gill
green
2 sentences1909Co. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649 .) In the case cited the court said: "The company can not claim the right to earn a net profit from every mile, section, or other part into which the road might be divided, nor attack as unjust a regulation which fixed a rate at which some such part would be unremunerative; that it would be practically impossible to ascertain in what proportion the several parts should share with others in the expenses and receipts in which they participated." We think it unnecessary to discuss the other questions submitted. 1909Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S., 649 .) In the case cited the court said: “The company can not claim the right to earn a net profit from every mile, section, or other part into which the road might be divided, nor attack as unjust a regulation which fixed a rate at which some such part would be unremunerative; that it would be practically impossible to ascertain in what proportion the several parts should share with others in the expenses and receipts in which they participated.” We think it unnecessary to discuss the other questions submitted. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Houston & Texas Central Railway Co. v. Moore
green
1 sentence1902Railway v. Moore, 49 Texas, 31 ; Prince v. Railway, 64 Texas, 144 ; Railway v. Campbell, 76 Texas, 174 ; Railway v. Black, 87 Texas, 160 ; Railway v. Hayden, 6 Texas Civ. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Prince v. I. & G. N. R'y Co.
neutral
1 sentence1902Railway v. Moore, 49 Texas, 31 ; Prince v. Railway, 64 Texas, 144 ; Railway v. Campbell, 76 Texas, 174 ; Railway v. Black, 87 Texas, 160 ; Railway v. Hayden, 6 Texas Civ. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Campbell
green
1 sentence1902Railway v. Moore, 49 Texas, 31 ; Prince v. Railway, 64 Texas, 144 ; Railway v. Campbell, 76 Texas, 174 ; Railway v. Black, 87 Texas, 160 ; Railway v. Hayden, 6 Texas Civ. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Black
green
1 sentence1902Railway v. Moore, 49 Texas, 31 ; Prince v. Railway, 64 Texas, 144 ; Railway v. Campbell, 76 Texas, 174 ; Railway v. Black, 87 Texas, 160 ; Railway v. Hayden, 6 Texas Civ. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.