company rule in New York

1985While not every violation of a company rule may give rise to a finding of misconduct sufficient to disqualify a claimant for benefits (see, Matter of McHugh [Levine], 47 AD2d 676 ), there was testimony in the record that it was routine policy to dismiss employees who made material misrepresentations or omissions on their applications for employment.

1981Not every violation of a company rule, whether express or implied, constitutes misconduct (Matter of James [Levine], 34 NY2d 491 ; Matter of Wade [Ross], 59 AD2d 1003 ; Matter of McHugh [Levine], 47 AD2d 676 ).

1993Violation of a company rule of which an employee is aware has been held to constitute misconduct (see, Matter of Sylvester [Hartnett] 143 AD2d 478 ; Matter of Green [Levine] 53 AD2d 782 ).

1992A violation of a company rule of which an employee is aware has been held to constitute misconduct (see, Matter of Sylvester [Hartnett], 143 AD2d 478 ; Matter of Beykirch [Roberts] 125 AD2d 857 , lv denied 73 NY2d 704 ; Matter of Green [Levine] 53 AD2d 782 ).

1993Violation of a company rule of which an employee is aware has been held to constitute misconduct (see, Matter of Sylvester [Hartnett] 143 AD2d 478 ; Matter of Green [Levine] 53 AD2d 782 ).

1992A violation of a company rule of which an employee is aware has been held to constitute misconduct (see, Matter of Sylvester [Hartnett], 143 AD2d 478 ; Matter of Beykirch [Roberts] 125 AD2d 857 , lv denied 73 NY2d 704 ; Matter of Green [Levine] 53 AD2d 782 ).

1930(Sinincrope v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 207 App. Div. 114 ).” In the Hesler case it was claimed not only that the local agent made the waiver, but that his statements, upon which the waiver was found were called to the attention, of the special agent and reiterated by him.

1925(Sinincrope v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 207 App. Div. 114 .) That evidence became competent, however,, when the plaintiff testified that she told Mr. Dosser, a special agent, of the defendant, about her conversation with Mr. Bromley and. he replied: “ Mr. Bromley knows his business * * *.

1997An employee’s knowing violation of a company rule or policy has been found to constitute disqualifying misconduct (see, Matter of Shay [Eastern Alloys—Hudacs], 192 AD2d 1043 ) as has the use of offensive language in the workplace (see, Matter of Weiss [Sweeney], 232 AD2d 672 ).

1997An employee’s knowing violation of a company rule or policy has been found to constitute disqualifying misconduct (see, Matter of Shay [Eastern Alloys—Hudacs], 192 AD2d 1043 ) as has the use of offensive language in the workplace (see, Matter of Weiss [Sweeney], 232 AD2d 672 ).

1996Co., 125 AD2d 247, 248 ), for the Homestead policies each incorporate a requirement that the insured notify the company of a claim, in writing "as soon as practicable” after it is received.

1994Therefore, as the record reveals that claimant had not received any prior warnings for any misconduct during his 7 Vi years of employment with Pepsi and did not know that the sidewalk in front of the warehouse was company property, we find that the Board’s conclusion that claimant’s action did not constitute misconduct, since it was an isolated incident and merely a technical violation of Pepsi’s rule, is supported by substantial evidence (see, Matter of Figueroa [Levine], 50 AD2d 998 ).

1994Even if we accept Pepsi’s argument that the Board was bound by the arbitrator’s findings that claimant violated a company rule, we need not reverse since not every violation of a company rule constitutes misconduct (see, Matter of Watson [Hudacs], 189 AD2d 1088 ; Matter of Green [Hartnett] 178 AD2d 717 ).

1994Even if we accept Pepsi’s argument that the Board was bound by the arbitrator’s findings that claimant violated a company rule, we need not reverse since not every violation of a company rule constitutes misconduct (see, Matter of Watson [Hudacs], 189 AD2d 1088 ; Matter of Green [Hartnett] 178 AD2d 717 ).

1993Although claimant denied that he ever actually read the rules, this merely presented a question of credibility for the Board to resolve (see, Matter of McGlynn [Levine] 52 AD2d 709 ).

1993In reaching this conclusion, we note that violation of a company rule of which an employee is aware has been held to constitute misconduct (see, Matter of Brewer [Levine] 53 AD2d 751 ), as has continued lateness after previous warnings (see, Matter of Grosso [Levine] 52 AD2d 964 ).

1993In reaching this conclusion, we note that violation of a company rule of which an employee is aware has been held to constitute misconduct (see, Matter of Brewer [Levine] 53 AD2d 751 ), as has continued lateness after previous warnings (see, Matter of Grosso [Levine] 52 AD2d 964 ).

1992A violation of a company rule of which an employee is aware has been held to constitute misconduct (see, Matter of Sylvester [Hartnett], 143 AD2d 478 ; Matter of Beykirch [Roberts] 125 AD2d 857 , lv denied 73 NY2d 704 ; Matter of Green [Levine] 53 AD2d 782 ).

1991Under the circumstances, the conclusion that claimant’s actions did not rise to the level of misconduct is supported by substantial evidence and the decision in claimant’s favor must be upheld (see, Matter of Garcia [Haller Plastics Corp. — Roberts], 104 AD2d 675 ; cf., Matter of Marquez [Roberts] 107 AD2d 959 ; Matter of Fisher [Levine], 49 AD2d 787 ).

1991Accordingly, the conclusion that claimant lost his employment due to misconduct is supported by substantial evidence and must be upheld (see, Matter of Rossano [Levine] 52 AD2d 1006 ).

1991Violation of a company rule of which an employee is aware has been held to constitute misconduct (see, Matter of Sylvester [Hartnett] 143 AD2d 478 ; Matter of Cirlin [Ross] 70 AD2d 1030 ).

1991Under the circumstances, the conclusion that claimant’s actions did not rise to the level of misconduct is supported by substantial evidence and the decision in claimant’s favor must be upheld (see, Matter of Garcia [Haller Plastics Corp. — Roberts], 104 AD2d 675 ; cf., Matter of Marquez [Roberts] 107 AD2d 959 ; Matter of Fisher [Levine], 49 AD2d 787 ).

1991Under the circumstances, the conclusion that claimant’s actions did not rise to the level of misconduct is supported by substantial evidence and the decision in claimant’s favor must be upheld (see, Matter of Garcia [Haller Plastics Corp. — Roberts], 104 AD2d 675 ; cf., Matter of Marquez [Roberts] 107 AD2d 959 ; Matter of Fisher [Levine], 49 AD2d 787 ).

1981Actions that display inefficiency, negligence or bad judgment may provide sufficient justification for discharge from employment but not for disqualification from benefits (Matter of James [Levine], 34 NY2d 491 , supra; Matter of Poss [Levine], 49 AD2d 288 ).

1981Not every violation of a company rule, whether express or implied, constitutes misconduct (Matter of James [Levine], 34 NY2d 491 ; Matter of Wade [Ross], 59 AD2d 1003 ; Matter of McHugh [Levine], 47 AD2d 676 ).

1981Not every violation of a company rule, whether express or implied, constitutes misconduct (Matter of James [Levine], 34 NY2d 491 ; Matter of Wade [Ross], 59 AD2d 1003 ; Matter of McHugh [Levine], 47 AD2d 676 ).

1981Actions that display inefficiency, negligence or bad judgment may provide sufficient justification for discharge from employment but not for disqualification from benefits (Matter of James [Levine], 34 NY2d 491 , supra; Matter of Poss [Levine], 49 AD2d 288 ).

1971Co., 177 App. Div. 351 .) The mortgagee clause in the insurance policy issued by Public provides, in part: 11 If this company shall claim that no liability existed as to the mortgagor or owner, it shall to the extent of payment of loss to the mortgagee, be subrogated to all of the mortgagee’s rights of recovery, but without impairing mortgagee’s right to sue; or it may pay off the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof and of the mortgage. ’ ’ June 23, 1971, by stipulation of counsel in open court, all affirmative defenses in Public’s answers were withdrawn as to Benderson.

1946A. Corporation ( 143 N. Y. 311, 324 , supra) the court said: “ By taking the insurance in the manner the mortgagee herein did, instead of taking out a separate policy, all the provisions in the policy, which from their nature would-properly apply to the case of an insurance of the mortgagee’s interest, would' be regarded as forming part of the contract with him, while those provisions which antagonize or impair the force of the particular and specific provisions contained in- the clause providing for the insurance of the mortgagee, must be regarded as ineffective and inapplicable to the case o

1942After the making of the 1924 agreement, the Roth Estate received, besides $80,000 in dividends on the Necaro stock of Henry Newman and Carey, the following payments: $20,000 00 in July, 1925, from the Interborough Rapid Transit Company; 986,864 95 on June 12,1935, from the city of New York, being the net proceeds, after the payment of counsel fees and expenses, of a judgment of $1,246,515.23 against the city of New York, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on April 23, 1935 (Newman & Carey Subway Const. Co. v. City of New York, 267 N. Y. 548 ); 3,556 56 on May 3, 1938, being the dividen

1930Since the policies have contained a clause that the local agent may not bind the company by waiver, except in writing attached to the policy, the courts have uniformly held that his implied authority is limited by the provision in the policy, and that the provision is controlling except in cases like Satz v. Massachusetts Bonding Co. ( 243 N. Y. 385, 390 ), where an exception is made based upon the theory that the company should not defeat the insurance by asserting its terms when it was in fact aware of facts that made it void.

1930Co. ( 198 App. Div. 408 ), where there was a provision in the policy that no representative of the company had power to waive any of the terms of the policy unless such waiver was written upon or attached thereto, the court said: “It is well established by authority that under it an agent may not effect a waiver unless it is written upon or attached to the policy as therein provided.” In Hessler v. North River Insurance Co. ( 211 App. Div. 595 ) the court recognizes the rule that a local agent is without authority to waive the due fihng of proofs of loss in the following language: “ A local ag