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18 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1897–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Roadway Express, Inc.green1 sentence1989After appeal by Roadway, this court, in Davis v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 764 S.W.2d 145, 150-151 (Mo.App.1989), although agreeing that Roadway had failed to prove a willful violation by Davis of the safety belt rule, remanded the case to the commission for additional findings of fact on several other issues, none of which are relevant here since not preserved for appellate review, except for a requested finding as to whether the posting by Roadway in its drivers’ room of a company rule requiring its drivers to wear seat belts while driving company trucks was posting in a conspicuous place as requi | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Weber Implement & Auto Co.green2 sentences1985Likewise, the penalty as set forth in Section 287.120(5) RSMo., 1978, as amended, shall not apply.” Under § 287.120.5, RSMo 1978, and Brown v. Weber Implement & Auto Co., 357 Mo. 1 , 206 S.W.2d 350, 355 (1947), the failure of an employee to obey a safety rule does not authorize the reduction of an award unless the injury is caused by such failure. 1985Likewise, the penalty as set forth in Section 287.120(5) RSMo., 1978, as amended, shall not apply.” Under § 287.120.5, RSMo 1978, and Brown v. Weber Implement & Auto Co., 357 Mo. 1 , 206 S.W.2d 350, 355 (1947), the failure of an employee to obey a safety rule does not authorize the reduction of an award unless the injury is caused by such failure. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nydegger v. Mason
green
2 sentences1966In support of this theory Company cites Stakelback v. Neff, Mo.App., 13 S.W.2d 575 ; Nydegger v. Mason, Mo.Sup., 315 S.W.2d 816 ; Burke v. Renick, Mo.App., 249 S.W.2d 513 ; Greenwood v. Bridgeways, Inc., Mo.App., 243 S.W.2d 111 , and Rosenkoetter v. Fleer, Mo.Sup., 155 S.W.2d 157 . 1963In support of this theory Company cites Stakelback v. Neff, Mo.App., 13 S.W. 2d 575 ; Nydegger v. Mason, Mo.Sup., 315 S.W.2d 816 ; Burke v. Renick, Mo.App., 249 S.W.2d 513 ; Greenwood v. Bridgeways Inc., Mo.App., 243 S.W .2d 111, and Rosenkoetter v. Fleer, Mo.Sup., 155 S.W.2d 157 . | 2 | 1963–1966 |
Burke v. Renick
green
2 sentences1966In support of this theory Company cites Stakelback v. Neff, Mo.App., 13 S.W.2d 575 ; Nydegger v. Mason, Mo.Sup., 315 S.W.2d 816 ; Burke v. Renick, Mo.App., 249 S.W.2d 513 ; Greenwood v. Bridgeways, Inc., Mo.App., 243 S.W.2d 111 , and Rosenkoetter v. Fleer, Mo.Sup., 155 S.W.2d 157 . 1963In support of this theory Company cites Stakelback v. Neff, Mo.App., 13 S.W. 2d 575 ; Nydegger v. Mason, Mo.Sup., 315 S.W.2d 816 ; Burke v. Renick, Mo.App., 249 S.W.2d 513 ; Greenwood v. Bridgeways Inc., Mo.App., 243 S.W .2d 111, and Rosenkoetter v. Fleer, Mo.Sup., 155 S.W.2d 157 . | 2 | 1963–1966 |
McComas v. Covenant Mutual Life Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1903Co., 56 Mo. 573 , it was ruled that in.a suit on a policy of life insurance when the company in its defense denies all responsibility and refuses to pay anything, such defense amounts to a waiver of notice and proof of death.” So this court in that case did say, but that language must be understood as referring to the facts of the case. 1903Co., 56 Mo. 573 , it was ruled that in a suit on a policy of life insurance, where the company in its defense denies all responsibility and refuses to pay anything, such defense amounts to a waiver of notice and proof of death. | 2 | 1897–1903 |
United States v. St. Louis University, a Corporation
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 299 . 2008Id. at 299 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hurlbut v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission
green
1 sentence1997In Hurlbut v. Labor and Industrial Relations Comm’n, 761 S.W.2d 282 (Mo.App. 1988), the manager of a convenience store was discharged for violating a company rule requiring that she or her employees verify *452 funds prior to completing their shift, including “running” a copy of the register tape. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Skaggs v. Skaggs
green
1 sentence1997Skaggs v. Skaggs, 938 S.W.2d 302 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Barkley v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence1995For the same reasons, Star Electric’s citation to Barkley v. Mitchell, 411 S.W.2d 817 (Mo.App.1967), regarding the failure to follow a company rule as the test for negligence, is distinguishable from the current case. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Lorenzo R. Ybarra v. Burlington Northern, Inc., a Corporation
green
1 sentence1992Ybarra v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 689 F.2d 147 (8th Cir.1982) is relied upon by Glover. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Mosby v. Aetna Insurance
green
2 sentences1985The court in Mosby v. Aetna Insurance Co., 285 Mo. 242 , 225 S.W. 715 (1920) was faced with a policy provision virtually identical to the policy provision now in question. 1985The court in Mosby v. Aetna Insurance Co., 285 Mo. 242 , 225 S.W. 715 (1920) was faced with a policy provision virtually identical to the policy provision now in question. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State ex rel. Missouri Public Service Co. v. Fraas
green
1 sentence1981Mo. Public Service Co. v. Fraas, supra. 3 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Laswell v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, Division of Employment Security
green
1 sentence1978A recent Missouri case also analyzed the question of what constitutes “misconduct connected with his work.” See Laswell v. Industrial Com’n. of Missouri, etc., 534 S.W.2d 613 (Mo.App.1976). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
cluster 291918
green
1 sentence1975Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 431 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1970), (applying Nebraska law). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Greenwood v. BRIDGEWAYS
green
1 sentence1966In support of this theory Company cites Stakelback v. Neff, Mo.App., 13 S.W.2d 575 ; Nydegger v. Mason, Mo.Sup., 315 S.W.2d 816 ; Burke v. Renick, Mo.App., 249 S.W.2d 513 ; Greenwood v. Bridgeways, Inc., Mo.App., 243 S.W.2d 111 , and Rosenkoetter v. Fleer, Mo.Sup., 155 S.W.2d 157 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Welcome v. Braun
green
1 sentence1963In support of this theory, Company cites Welcome v. Braun, Mo.Sup., 319 S.W.2d 586 , in which an instruction was condemned for barring recovery on the ground of contributory negligence if plaintiff could have seen defendant’s car, could have realized that there was danger of collision, and could have stopped, thus placing upon plaintiff an absolute duty, and not merely requiring plaintiff to exercise the highest degree of care in seeing, realizing and endeavoring to stop. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
O. P. Teets v. Chicago, South Shore and South Bend Railroad
green
1 sentence1958Mech v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n, 322 Mo. 937 , 18 S.W.2d 510, 515 ; Teets v. Chicago, South Shore and South Bend Railroad, 7 Cir., 238 F.2d 223, 226 . | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Mech v. Terminal Railroad Assn.
neutral
2 sentences1958Mech v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n, 322 Mo. 937 , 18 S.W.2d 510, 515 ; Teets v. Chicago, South Shore and South Bend Railroad, 7 Cir., 238 F.2d 223, 226 . 1958Mech v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n, 322 Mo. 937 , 18 S.W.2d 510, 515 ; Teets v. Chicago, South Shore and South Bend Railroad, 7 Cir., 238 F.2d 223, 226 . | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1957Co., 321 U.S. 29 , 64 S.Ct. 409 , 88 L.Ed. 520 (in which case it was said it was not unreasonable for a jury to conclude that, in the circumstances of the failure to ring a bell when the engine was about to move, as required by respondent Company’s rule, constituted negligence); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 1957Co., 321 U.S. 29 , 64 S.Ct. 409 , 88 L.Ed. 520 (in which case it was said it was not unreasonable for a jury to conclude that, in the circumstances of the failure to ring a bell when the engine was about to move, as required by respondent Company’s rule, constituted negligence); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
First National Bank v. Guardian Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1911As was held by our own Supreme Court, in First National Bank of Kansas City v. Guardian Trust Co., 187 Mo. 494 , 86 S. W. 109 , the defense of ultra vires should not, as a general rule prevail, whether interposed for or against a corporation, when it- would not advance justice, but on the contrary would accomplish a legal wrong; that the defense is never sustained out of regard for a defendant, but only where an imperative rule of public policy requires it; that a contract merely in excess of the power granted to a private corporation, but which is not expressly forbidden either by its charter 1911As was held by our own Supreme Court, in First National Bank of Kansas City v. Guardian Trust Co., 187 Mo. 494 , 86 S. W. 109 , the defense of ultra vires should not, as a general rule prevail, whether interposed for or against a corporation, when it- would not advance justice, but on the contrary would accomplish a legal wrong; that the defense is never sustained out of regard for a defendant, but only where an imperative rule of public policy requires it; that a contract merely in excess of the power granted to a private corporation, but which is not expressly forbidden either by its charter | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.