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16 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City Council v. Hydrickgreen2 sentences2002Harvey III, relying on City Council of Augusta v. Hydrick, 126 Ga. App. 611, 614 (3) ( 191 SE2d 563 ) (1972), contends that the trial court erred in limiting his damages to those accrued up to the time of trial, contending that OCGA § 10-6-37 is not applicable to his contract because it was for more than one year. 2002Harvey III, relying on City Council of Augusta v. Hydrick, 126 Ga. App. 611, 614 (3) ( 191 SE2d 563 ) (1972), contends that the trial court erred in limiting his damages to those accrued up to the time of trial, contending that OCGA § 10-6-37 is not applicable to his contract because it was for more than one year. | 1 | 1 |
Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Meigsgreen2 sentences1991The Court rejected a railroad's argument that the decedent's life insurance policy should be allowed to reduce the amount it owed the widow for the wrongful death of her husband in The Western and Atlantic Railroad v. Meigs, 74 Ga. 857, 868 (1885), and stated: If her recovery could thus be reduced, it might be insisted that, where the husband's life was insured for more than she was allowed to recover under the law as its actual cash value, the company could claim a balance against the family of the deceased, on the idea that the killing of the husband and father was a positive pecuniary benef 1991The Court rejected a railroad’s argument that the decedent’s life insurance policy should be allowed to reduce the amount it owed the widow for the wrongful death of her husband in Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Meigs, 74 Ga. 857, 868 (1885), and stated: If her recovery could thus be reduced, it might be insisted that, where the husband’s life was insured for more than she was allowed to recover under the law as its actual cash value, the company could claim a balance against the family of the deceased, on the idea that the killing of the husband and father was a positive pecuniary benefit to | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mutual Casualty Insurance v. Hillgreen2 sentences1975Co. v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 283, 286-290 ( 148 SE2d 83 ), the gist of which is that unless the money was paid and accepted in extinguishment of all claims of every kind and against everybody, others may still be held liable. 1975Co. v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 283, 286-290 ( 148 SE2d 83 ), the gist of which is that unless the money was paid and accepted in extinguishment of all claims of every kind and against everybody, others may still be held liable. | 1 | 1 |
Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Stevensgreen2 sentences1939See Standard Oil Co. v. Stevens, 103 Vt. 1 ( 151 Atl. 507 ); Eastin v. Phillips Petroleum Co. (Mo. App.), 57 S. W. (2d) 547 . 1939See Standard Oil Co. v. Stevens, 103 Vt. 1 ( 151 Atl. 507 ); Eastin v. Phillips Petroleum Co. (Mo. App.), 57 S. W. (2d) 547 . | 1 | 1 |
Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance v. Franklingreen2 sentences1933The Supreme Court disapproved the above ruling of this court in the case of Corporation of Royal Exchange Assurance v. Franklin, 158 Ga. 644, 653, 654 ( 124 S. E. 172 ), wherein that court said “This ruling of the Court of Appeals is not in harmony with the great weight of authority.” A clause in a policy of insurance prohibiting any waiver unless endorsed thereon refers only to those provisions of the policy which enter into and form a part of the contract of insurance, and which may properly be designated as conditions; it has no reference to those stipulations which are to be performed afte 1933The Supreme Court disapproved the above ruling of this court in the case of Corporation of Royal Exchange Assurance v. Franklin, 158 Ga. 644, 653, 654 ( 124 S. E. 172 ), wherein that court said “This ruling of the Court of Appeals is not in harmony with the great weight of authority.” A clause in a policy of insurance prohibiting any waiver unless endorsed thereon refers only to those provisions of the policy which enter into and form a part of the contract of insurance, and which may properly be designated as conditions; it has no reference to those stipulations which are to be performed afte | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sweeney v. Boston & Albany Railroad
neutral
2 sentences1899St. 424; 128 Mass. 5 ; 29 Ohio St. 364 . 1899St. 424; 128 Mass. 5 ; 29 Ohio St. 364 . | 2 | 1899–1899 |
Barney v. Oyster Bay & Huntington Steamboat Co.
green
2 sentences1899The business of selling lunches to passengers, or of soliciting from them orders for the same, is not one which every citizen has the right to engage in upon the tracks and premises of a railway company, and consequently those who do engage in it and cayry it on must depend upon the company for the privilege.” Citing 67 N. Y. 301 ; 31 Ark. 50 ; 2 Gray, 577 ; 88 Penn. 1899The business of selling lunches to passengers, or of soliciting from them orders for the same, is not one which every citizen has the right to engage in upon the tracks and premises of a railway company, and consequently those who do engage in it and cayry it on must depend upon the company for the privilege.” Citing 67 N. Y. 301 ; 31 Ark. 50 ; 2 Gray, 577 ; 88 Penn. | 2 | 1899–1899 |
Landrigan v. State
neutral
2 sentences1899The business of selling lunches to passengers, or of soliciting from them orders for the same, is not one which every citizen has the right to engage in upon the tracks and premises of a railway company, and consequently those who do engage in it and cayry it on must depend upon the company for the privilege.” Citing 67 N. Y. 301 ; 31 Ark. 50 ; 2 Gray, 577 ; 88 Penn. 1899The business of selling lunches to passengers, or of soliciting from them orders for the same, is not one which every citizen has the right to engage in upon the tracks and premises of a railway company, and consequently those who do engage in it and cayry it on must depend upon the company for the privilege.” Citing 67 N. Y. 301 ; 31 Ark. 50 ; 2 Gray, 577 ; 88 Penn. | 2 | 1899–1899 |
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chicago Railway Co. v. Bingham
green
2 sentences1899St. 424; 128 Mass. 5 ; 29 Ohio St. 364 . 1899St. 424; 128 Mass. 5 ; 29 Ohio St. 364 . | 2 | 1899–1899 |
Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins
green
2 sentences1999After the trial court granted Heard & Company’s motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, Stanford filed this appeal. 1. (a) The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment generally are announced in Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 1999After the trial court granted Heard & Company’s motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, Stanford filed this appeal. 1. (a) The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment generally are announced in Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Collins v. Davis
green
2 sentences1991Our Courts have adhered to the principle that evidence of collateral sources is inherently prejudicial because its infectious nature tends to contaminate the entire trial. *271 Collins v. Davis, 186 Ga.App. 192, 193 , 366 S.E.2d 769 (1988) (does not matter whose insurance coverage is admitted, it is prejudicial because its effect is not self-limiting, but flows over into other considerations); Moore v. Price, 158 Ga.App. 566, 567 , 281 S.E.2d 269 (1981) (admission of the existence of insurance policy grounds for a mistrial). 1991Our Courts have adhered to the principle that evidence of collateral sources is inherently prejudicial because its infectious nature tends to contaminate the entire trial. *271 Collins v. Davis, 186 Ga.App. 192, 193 , 366 S.E.2d 769 (1988) (does not matter whose insurance coverage is admitted, it is prejudicial because its effect is not self-limiting, but flows over into other considerations); Moore v. Price, 158 Ga.App. 566, 567 , 281 S.E.2d 269 (1981) (admission of the existence of insurance policy grounds for a mistrial). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Moore v. Price
green
2 sentences1991Our Courts have adhered to the principle that evidence of collateral sources is inherently prejudicial because its infectious nature tends to contaminate the entire trial. *271 Collins v. Davis, 186 Ga.App. 192, 193 , 366 S.E.2d 769 (1988) (does not matter whose insurance coverage is admitted, it is prejudicial because its effect is not self-limiting, but flows over into other considerations); Moore v. Price, 158 Ga.App. 566, 567 , 281 S.E.2d 269 (1981) (admission of the existence of insurance policy grounds for a mistrial). 1991Our Courts have adhered to the principle that evidence of collateral sources is inherently prejudicial because its infectious nature tends to contaminate the entire trial. *271 Collins v. Davis, 186 Ga.App. 192, 193 , 366 S.E.2d 769 (1988) (does not matter whose insurance coverage is admitted, it is prejudicial because its effect is not self-limiting, but flows over into other considerations); Moore v. Price, 158 Ga.App. 566, 567 , 281 S.E.2d 269 (1981) (admission of the existence of insurance policy grounds for a mistrial). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Georgia Ports Authority v. Rogers
green
2 sentences1987The document provides that “Dismissal . . . shall result from a serious infraction of a Company rule involving misconduct such as: . . .” “[U]pon reading the manual as a whole, it is apparent that it was neither the intent nor the effect of the manual to limit terminations to [infractions] listed in the [manual.]” Id. 1987The document provides that “Dismissal . . . shall result from a serious infraction of a Company rule involving misconduct such as: . . .” “[U]pon reading the manual as a whole, it is apparent that it was neither the intent nor the effect of the manual to limit terminations to [infractions] listed in the [manual.]” Id. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Life Insurance Co. of Virginia v. Williams
green
2 sentences1954Co. v. Williams, 48 Ga. App. 10 ( 172 S. E. 101 ), that limitations contained in the policy on the authority of agents, officers, etc., of the company to bind the company by waiver, etc., have reference to only those provisions of the policy which enter into or form a part of the contract itself and have no reference to those stipulations which are to be performed after a loss has occurred, such as giving notice and furnishing preliminary proofs, both counts of the petition stated a cause of action and the trial court did not err in overruling the general demurrer. 1954Co. v. Williams, 48 Ga. App. 10 ( 172 S. E. 101 ), that limitations contained in the policy on the authority of agents, officers, etc., of the company to bind the company by waiver, etc., have reference to only those provisions of the policy which enter into or form a part of the contract itself and have no reference to those stipulations which are to be performed after a loss has occurred, such as giving notice and furnishing preliminary proofs, both counts of the petition stated a cause of action and the trial court did not err in overruling the general demurrer. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Schaufele v. Central of Georgia Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1953Co., 6 Ga. App. 660 ( 65 S. E. 708 ), and Atlantic Coast Line R. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Webster v. Griffin
neutral
1 sentence1953Co., 6 Ga. App. 660 ( 65 S. E. 708 ), and Atlantic Coast Line R. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Loyd v. Loyd
green
2 sentences1951Loyd v. Loyd, 203 Ga. 775 ( 48 S. E. 2d, 365 ); West v. Pollard, 202 Ga. 549 ( 43 S. E. 2d, 509 ). 1951Loyd v. Loyd, 203 Ga. 775 ( 48 S. E. 2d, 365 ); West v. Pollard, 202 Ga. 549 ( 43 S. E. 2d, 509 ). | 1 | 1951–1951 |
West v. Pollard
green
2 sentences1951Loyd v. Loyd, 203 Ga. 775 ( 48 S. E. 2d, 365 ); West v. Pollard, 202 Ga. 549 ( 43 S. E. 2d, 509 ). 1951Loyd v. Loyd, 203 Ga. 775 ( 48 S. E. 2d, 365 ); West v. Pollard, 202 Ga. 549 ( 43 S. E. 2d, 509 ). | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Trunnell v. Hardie
green
1 sentence1935Co., 164 Ga. 392 ( 138 S. E. 787 ), the substance of which rule was correctly charged to the jury by the judge, a verdict was authorized, if not demanded, in favor of the plaintiff on the issues as to total disability, and as to estoppel against the company to claim a forfeiture of the insurance certificate because of the alleged existence of the disability at the time of the application for its issuance. 4. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Cato v. Ætna Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1935Co., 164 Ga. 392 ( 138 S. E. 787 ), the substance of which rule was correctly charged to the jury by the judge, a verdict was authorized, if not demanded, in favor of the plaintiff on the issues as to total disability, and as to estoppel against the company to claim a forfeiture of the insurance certificate because of the alleged existence of the disability at the time of the application for its issuance. 4. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Folds v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1933Co., 28 Ga. App. 323 ( 110 S. E. 925 ), and Northern Assurance Co. v. Pate, 29 Ga. App. 90 ( 114 S. E. 69 ), which decisions are to the effect that where a contract of insurance contains a provision that no officer, agent, or representative of the company shall have power to waive, or be deemed to have waived, any provision or condition of the policy, unless such waiver be written upon or attached to the policy, and this by the proper officer of the company having authority to do so, a refusal to pay or denial of liability by an agent of the company, even though he be a general agent, would no | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Northern Assurance Co. v. Pate
neutral
2 sentences1933Co., 28 Ga. App. 323 ( 110 S. E. 925 ), and Northern Assurance Co. v. Pate, 29 Ga. App. 90 ( 114 S. E. 69 ), which decisions are to the effect that where a contract of insurance contains a provision that no officer, agent, or representative of the company shall have power to waive, or be deemed to have waived, any provision or condition of the policy, unless such waiver be written upon or attached to the policy, and this by the proper officer of the company having authority to do so, a refusal to pay or denial of liability by an agent of the company, even though he be a general agent, would no 1933Co., 28 Ga. App. 323 ( 110 S. E. 925 ), and Northern Assurance Co. v. Pate, 29 Ga. App. 90 ( 114 S. E. 69 ), which decisions are to the effect that where a contract of insurance contains a provision that no officer, agent, or representative of the company shall have power to waive, or be deemed to have waived, any provision or condition of the policy, unless such waiver be written upon or attached to the policy, and this by the proper officer of the company having authority to do so, a refusal to pay or denial of liability by an agent of the company, even though he be a general agent, would no | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Rowe Bros. Motor Express Co. v. Twiggs County
neutral
1 sentence1933Co., 28 Ga. App. 323 ( 110 S. E. 925 ), and Northern Assurance Co. v. Pate, 29 Ga. App. 90 ( 114 S. E. 69 ), which decisions are to the effect that where a contract of insurance contains a provision that no officer, agent, or representative of the company shall have power to waive, or be deemed to have waived, any provision or condition of the policy, unless such waiver be written upon or attached to the policy, and this by the proper officer of the company having authority to do so, a refusal to pay or denial of liability by an agent of the company, even though he be a general agent, would no | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Johnson v. Ætna Insurance
green
1 sentence1924Co., 123 Ga. 404 (supra), was cited as authority for this ruling. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Williams v. Atlas Assurance Co.
green
1 sentence1924Co., 22 Ga. App. 661 ( 97 S. E. 91 ), the Court of Appeals held that under this limitation “an agent’s notice of refusal to pay the loss would not bind the company as a waiver on its behalf of the contractual duty of furnishing the proofs of loss called for by the terms of the contract of insurance.” Johnson v. Ætna Ins. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Dudley v. Taylor & Morris
green
1 sentence1924Co., 22 Ga. App. 661 ( 97 S. E. 91 ), the Court of Appeals held that under this limitation “an agent’s notice of refusal to pay the loss would not bind the company as a waiver on its behalf of the contractual duty of furnishing the proofs of loss called for by the terms of the contract of insurance.” Johnson v. Ætna Ins. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Hughes
green
1 sentence1906Co. v. Hughes, 105 Ga. 1 , where a life-tenant had made a conveyance of land to a railroad company, and rails and ties forming a part of its line of railroad had been placed on such land, upon the death of the life-tenant it was held that the remainderman could not, in an equitable proceeding, eject the company and claim the rails, ties, etc.; but the railroad company could remove them, or pay for the land, not including them. -In the case now before us there is no -evidence of any intention on the part of the purchaser to abandon to the landowners the rails and fastenings, and the doctrine of | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Massengale v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
neutral
1 sentence1895This case is stronger in its facts than the case of Massengale v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 17 Mo. App. 257 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.