contractor defense in West Virginia

2003In Sanders v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 159 W.Va. 621, 627 , 225 S.E.2d 218, 222 (1976), this Court stated the respective burdens of proof regarding respondeat superior liability and the independent contractor exception: It is always incumbent upon one who asserts vicarious [respondeat superior ] liability to make a pruna facie showing of the existence of the relation of master and servant or principal and agent or employer and employee.

2003In Sanders v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 159 W.Va. 621, 627 , 225 S.E.2d 218, 222 (1976), this Court stated the respective burdens of proof regarding respondeat superior liability and the independent contractor exception: It is always incumbent upon one who asserts vicarious [respondeat superior ] liability to make a pruna facie showing of the existence of the relation of master and servant or principal and agent or employer and employee.

2024Va. 19, 24 , 585 S.E.2d 19, 24 (2003) (the burden of establishing the independent contractor defense exception to respondeat superior lies on the party asserting the exception). 17 Human Res., __W.

2012As we stated in Kirkhart v. United Fuel Gas Co., 86 W.Va. 79 , 102 S.E. 806 (1920): “[proving that the work was being done under a contact does not constitute the defense of independent contractor.” Zirkle v. Winkler, 214 W.Va. 19, 23 , 585 S.E.2d 19,23 (2003) (per curiam). 1.

2004See also West v. National Mines Corp., 168 W.Va. 578, 588 , 285 S.E.2d 670, 677 (1981) ("The general rule that an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor is subject to numerous exceptions").

2004See also West v. National Mines Corp., 168 W.Va. 578, 588 , 285 S.E.2d 670, 677 (1981) ("The general rule that an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor is subject to numerous exceptions").

2022Va. 333 , 524 S.E.2d 688 (1999) (discussing the illegal work exception to the independent contractor defense). 13 “[b]eyond the question of foreseeability, the existence of duty also involves policy considerations underlying the core issue of the scope of the legal system’s protection[.]” [Robertson v. LeMaster, 171 W.

2022Va. 607, 612 , 301 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1983)].

2010See Felder v. Old Falls Sanitation Co., Inc., 78 Misc.2d 868 , 359 N.Y.S.2d 166, 170 (1974) ('"Thus when one engages an independent contractor to perform certain work and the contractor employs infants in violation of the statute, the one engaging the contractor will be held to have violated the law in permitting the infant to do the work.'" (quoting Bernal v. Baptist Fresh Air Home Soc'y, 275 A.D. 88 , 87 N.Y.S.2d 458 , 464 (1949))).

2010See Felder v. Old Falls Sanitation Co., Inc., 78 Misc.2d 868 , 359 N.Y.S.2d 166, 170 (1974) ('"Thus when one engages an independent contractor to perform certain work and the contractor employs infants in violation of the statute, the one engaging the contractor will be held to have violated the law in permitting the infant to do the work.'" (quoting Bernal v. Baptist Fresh Air Home Soc'y, 275 A.D. 88 , 87 N.Y.S.2d 458 , 464 (1949))).

2010The plaintiff in Robertson argued that the defendant homeowner was not entitled to rely on the independent contractor defense, in part because cutting down trees is inherently dangerous work. 209 W.Va. at 289-90 , 546 S.E.2d at 771-72 .

2010The plaintiff in Robertson argued that the defendant homeowner was not entitled to rely on the independent contractor defense, in part because cutting down trees is inherently dangerous work. 209 W.Va. at 289-90 , 546 S.E.2d at 771-72 .

2003In a non-respondeat superior case, Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 91 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky.2002), the court held that newspaper carriers were properly classified as employees and not independent contractors for unemployment insurance purposes.

2003Sand Co., 131 W.Va. 736, 740 , 50 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1948), we held that the issue of respondeat superior liability and the applicability of the independent contractor exception was to be determined by the jury, stating: In this jurisdiction it is settled that in cases involving no controversy concerning the actual facts, if different inferences could be drawn therefrom, submission to a jury is nevertheless required.

2003Sand Co., 131 W.Va. 736, 740 , 50 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1948), we held that the issue of respondeat superior liability and the applicability of the independent contractor exception was to be determined by the jury, stating: In this jurisdiction it is settled that in cases involving no controversy concerning the actual facts, if different inferences could be drawn therefrom, submission to a jury is nevertheless required.

2003See also Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 513 , 794 P.2d 138, 145 (1990), where the court stated that: Home delivery is critical to the survival of a local daily paper; it may be its essential core_[The newspaper] is hard-pressed to detach the business of delivering news from that of reporting and printing it, especially when it retains an individual relationship with each carrier, [citations omitted] The Santiago court held that “[w]hether an employer-employee relationship exists may not be determined as a matter of law in either side’s favor, because reasonable minds may

2003See also Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 513 , 794 P.2d 138, 145 (1990), where the court stated that: Home delivery is critical to the survival of a local daily paper; it may be its essential core_[The newspaper] is hard-pressed to detach the business of delivering news from that of reporting and printing it, especially when it retains an individual relationship with each carrier, [citations omitted] The Santiago court held that “[w]hether an employer-employee relationship exists may not be determined as a matter of law in either side’s favor, because reasonable minds may

2003See also Fitzwater v. Harding, 203 W.Va. 627 , 510 S.E.2d 286 (1998) (jury question whether trucking company was independent contractor for re-spondeat superior purposes).

2003See also Fitzwater v. Harding, 203 W.Va. 627 , 510 S.E.2d 286 (1998) (jury question whether trucking company was independent contractor for re-spondeat superior purposes).

1999Co., Inc., 647 So.2d 1302 , 1307 *345 (La.Ct.App.1994) (“[W]e cannot say that the hauling of clay-based dirt .is an ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which the exception to the independent contractor rule was intended to cover”);Eckard v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 538, 541 , 70 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1952) (“Nor should the Court characterize the driving of an empty ton and a half-truck along the highway as an activity involving unusual or unreasonable risk of harm to Others”); Kime v. Hobbs, 252 Neb. 407, 418 , 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (1997) (“We hold that the transportation of cattle in a tracto

1999Co., Inc., 647 So.2d 1302 , 1307 *345 (La.Ct.App.1994) (“[W]e cannot say that the hauling of clay-based dirt .is an ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which the exception to the independent contractor rule was intended to cover”);Eckard v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 538, 541 , 70 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1952) (“Nor should the Court characterize the driving of an empty ton and a half-truck along the highway as an activity involving unusual or unreasonable risk of harm to Others”); Kime v. Hobbs, 252 Neb. 407, 418 , 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (1997) (“We hold that the transportation of cattle in a tracto

1999Co., Inc., 647 So.2d 1302 , 1307 *345 (La.Ct.App.1994) (“[W]e cannot say that the hauling of clay-based dirt .is an ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which the exception to the independent contractor rule was intended to cover”);Eckard v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 538, 541 , 70 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1952) (“Nor should the Court characterize the driving of an empty ton and a half-truck along the highway as an activity involving unusual or unreasonable risk of harm to Others”); Kime v. Hobbs, 252 Neb. 407, 418 , 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (1997) (“We hold that the transportation of cattle in a tracto

1999Co., Inc., 647 So.2d 1302 , 1307 *345 (La.Ct.App.1994) (“[W]e cannot say that the hauling of clay-based dirt .is an ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which the exception to the independent contractor rule was intended to cover”);Eckard v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 538, 541 , 70 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1952) (“Nor should the Court characterize the driving of an empty ton and a half-truck along the highway as an activity involving unusual or unreasonable risk of harm to Others”); Kime v. Hobbs, 252 Neb. 407, 418 , 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (1997) (“We hold that the transportation of cattle in a tracto

1999Accord Syl. pt. 3, Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W.Va. 77 , 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990). 13 The court in Ryobi Die Casting v. Montgomery, 705 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) addressed the relationship between a statutory violation and the independent contractor rule as follows: It must be regarded as well-settled doctrine, first, that, if one upon whom the statute imposes a duty, violates that duty, and the violation results in an injury, he is liable, irrespective of all questions of care and prudence; and, second, that it is no defense to prove that the actual breach of law was committed by a person e

1999See Ryobi Die Casting v. Montgomery, 705 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind.App.1999); Williamson v. Fowler Toyota, Inc., 956 P.2d 858, 860 (Okla.1998); Hester v. Bandy, 627 So.2d 833, 841 (Miss.1993); MacCoy v. Colony House Builders, Inc., 239 Va. 64, 69 , 387 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1990); Spell v. Port City Adhesives, Inc., 183 Ga.App. 816, 818 , 360 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1987); State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 117 Misc.2d 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 979 (Sup.1983); Davis v. Charter Mortg.

1999Accord Syl. pt. 3, Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W.Va. 77 , 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990). 13 The court in Ryobi Die Casting v. Montgomery, 705 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) addressed the relationship between a statutory violation and the independent contractor rule as follows: It must be regarded as well-settled doctrine, first, that, if one upon whom the statute imposes a duty, violates that duty, and the violation results in an injury, he is liable, irrespective of all questions of care and prudence; and, second, that it is no defense to prove that the actual breach of law was committed by a person e

1999Accord Syl. pt. 3, Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W.Va. 77 , 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990). 13 The court in Ryobi Die Casting v. Montgomery, 705 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) addressed the relationship between a statutory violation and the independent contractor rule as follows: It must be regarded as well-settled doctrine, first, that, if one upon whom the statute imposes a duty, violates that duty, and the violation results in an injury, he is liable, irrespective of all questions of care and prudence; and, second, that it is no defense to prove that the actual breach of law was committed by a person e

1999Accord Syl. pt. 3, Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W.Va. 77 , 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990). 13 The court in Ryobi Die Casting v. Montgomery, 705 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) addressed the relationship between a statutory violation and the independent contractor rule as follows: It must be regarded as well-settled doctrine, first, that, if one upon whom the statute imposes a duty, violates that duty, and the violation results in an injury, he is liable, irrespective of all questions of care and prudence; and, second, that it is no defense to prove that the actual breach of law was committed by a person e

1999Accord Syl. pt. 3, Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W.Va. 77 , 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990). 13 The court in Ryobi Die Casting v. Montgomery, 705 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) addressed the relationship between a statutory violation and the independent contractor rule as follows: It must be regarded as well-settled doctrine, first, that, if one upon whom the statute imposes a duty, violates that duty, and the violation results in an injury, he is liable, irrespective of all questions of care and prudence; and, second, that it is no defense to prove that the actual breach of law was committed by a person e

1999Co., Inc., 647 So.2d 1302 , 1307 *345 (La.Ct.App.1994) (“[W]e cannot say that the hauling of clay-based dirt .is an ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which the exception to the independent contractor rule was intended to cover”);Eckard v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 538, 541 , 70 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1952) (“Nor should the Court characterize the driving of an empty ton and a half-truck along the highway as an activity involving unusual or unreasonable risk of harm to Others”); Kime v. Hobbs, 252 Neb. 407, 418 , 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (1997) (“We hold that the transportation of cattle in a tracto

1999Co., Inc., 647 So.2d 1302 , 1307 *345 (La.Ct.App.1994) (“[W]e cannot say that the hauling of clay-based dirt .is an ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which the exception to the independent contractor rule was intended to cover”);Eckard v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 538, 541 , 70 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1952) (“Nor should the Court characterize the driving of an empty ton and a half-truck along the highway as an activity involving unusual or unreasonable risk of harm to Others”); Kime v. Hobbs, 252 Neb. 407, 418 , 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (1997) (“We hold that the transportation of cattle in a tracto

1999Co., Inc., 647 So.2d 1302 , 1307 *345 (La.Ct.App.1994) (“[W]e cannot say that the hauling of clay-based dirt .is an ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which the exception to the independent contractor rule was intended to cover”);Eckard v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 538, 541 , 70 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1952) (“Nor should the Court characterize the driving of an empty ton and a half-truck along the highway as an activity involving unusual or unreasonable risk of harm to Others”); Kime v. Hobbs, 252 Neb. 407, 418 , 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (1997) (“We hold that the transportation of cattle in a tracto

1999Co., Inc., 647 So.2d 1302 , 1307 *345 (La.Ct.App.1994) (“[W]e cannot say that the hauling of clay-based dirt .is an ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which the exception to the independent contractor rule was intended to cover”);Eckard v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 538, 541 , 70 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1952) (“Nor should the Court characterize the driving of an empty ton and a half-truck along the highway as an activity involving unusual or unreasonable risk of harm to Others”); Kime v. Hobbs, 252 Neb. 407, 418 , 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (1997) (“We hold that the transportation of cattle in a tracto