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8 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blair v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2026In Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1996), our Supreme Court established what is often referred to as the contractor exception to premises liability. 2024Bridgestone asserts that it owed Decedent no duty and relies on the contractor exception established by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W. 2d 75 (Tenn. 1996). | 2 | 6 |
Bennett v. Trevecca Nazarene Universitygreen2 sentences2018The Estate of Cunningham court held that the independent contractor exception “can be extended to security guards,” and that, where “an independent contractor faces a risk that is inherent in the job, the premises owner or occupier is not, ipso facto, relieved of a duty of care.” Id. at *7 (citing Bennett v. Trevecca Nazarene Univ., 216 S.W.3d 293, 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). 2016Instead, the Court held that the independent contractor exception does not apply when ―a premises owner provides an independent contractor inaccurate information germane to the contractor‘s work.‖ Id. at 298 . | 1 | 4 |
Shell Oil Company v. Blanksgreen2 sentences2026The Supreme Court, in Blair, expressly adopted the contractor exception recognized in Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959), and quoted the following description of the rule: “An exception to the general rule is recognized where the risks arise from, or are intimately connected with, defects of the premises or of machinery or appliances located thereon which the contractor has undertaken to repair. 2018The Estate of Cunningham court held that the independent contractor exception “can be extended to security guards,” and that, where “an independent contractor faces a risk that is inherent in the job, the premises owner or occupier is not, ipso facto, relieved of a duty of care.” Id. at *7 (citing Bennett v. Trevecca Nazarene Univ., 216 S.W.3d 293, 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). | 1 | 3 |
Biscan v. Browngreen1 sentence2018“For example, the premises owner or possessor may voluntarily assume a duty of care to the independent contractor.”7 Id. 7 Voluntary assumption of a duty of care encompasses the idea that “[o]ne who assumes to act . . . may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully.” Biscan v. Brown, 160 S.W.3d 462, 482-83 (Tenn. 5 Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we focus our inquiry to determine whether there is evidence that Newport acted in a manner that affected Mr. Foust’s execution of his job duties, thereby assuming a duty to act with reasonable care. | 1 | 1 |
Marshalls of Nashville, Tennessee, Inc. v. Harding Mall Associates, Ltd.green1 sentence2016This Court has previously held that employment is inherently dangerous where ―the danger must be involved in the performance of the contract and must result directly from the work to be done and not from the collateral negligence of the contractor.‖ Marshalls of Nashville, Tennessee, Inc. v. Harding Mall Assocs., Ltd., 799 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (involving the employer‘s liability for injuries to third parties caused by independent contractors, rather than injuries to the independent contractors themselves). | 1 | 1 |
National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Westgate Construction Co.green1 sentence2010Co., of Hartford v. Westgate Const., Co., 227 F. Supp. 835, 838 (D.Del. 1964). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coln v. City of Savannah
green
2 sentences2016“The principles stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A[3] relate directly to foreseeability and facilitate consideration of the duty issue.” Coln, 966 S.W.2d at 42 . 3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) states the rule as follows: “A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) (1965). 9 Even though Tennessee has followed the mod 2016“The principles stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A[3] relate directly to foreseeability and facilitate consideration of the duty issue.” Coln, 966 S.W.2d at 42 . 3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) states the rule as follows: “A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) (1965). 9 Even though Tennessee has followed the mod | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.