contractor rule (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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contractor rule in Ohio

15 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Albain v. Flower Hospitalgreen
ohio · 1990 · cited in 6 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1993–2005
2 sentences

1993In Albain v. Flower Hosp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 251 , 553 N.E.2d 1038 , we recognized, as an exception to the independent contractor rule, the right of a plaintiff to hold an employer directly liable for injuries proximately caused by the employer’s own negligence in selecting or retaining an independent contractor.

1993In Albain v. Flower Hosp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 251 , 553 N.E.2d 1038 , we recognized, as an exception to the independent contractor rule, the right of a plaintiff to hold an employer directly liable for injuries proximately caused by the employer’s own negligence in selecting or retaining an independent contractor.

16
Clark v. Southview Hospital & Family Health Centergreen
ohio · 1994 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005See, Albain v. Flower Hospital, supra at 257 and Clark v. Southview Hosp. and Family Health Center, supra. {¶ 8} Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly found that reasonable minds could only conclude that the installer was an independent contractor.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Carrabine Construction Co. v. Chrysler Realty Corp. green
ohio · 1986
2 sentences

2007Co. v. Chrysler Realty Corp. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 222 , 25 OBR 283, 495 N.E.2d 952 , the other Ohio case cited by the majority, the delay was caused by a need to have the construction site rezoned, which by contract was the responsibility of the contractor. {¶ 57} Here, the principal cause of the delay, as determined by the finder of fact, was “an excessive number of errors, omissions and conflicts in the design documents furnished to bidders by the state and incorporated into [Dugan & Meyers’s] contracts.” There were no shifting sands, no acts of God, no surprising aquifers.

2007Co. v. Chrysler Realty Corp. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 222 , 25 OBR 283, 495 N.E.2d 952 , the other Ohio case cited by the majority, the delay was caused by a need to have the construction site rezoned, which by contract was the responsibility of the contractor. {¶ 57} Here, the principal cause of the delay, as determined by the finder of fact, was “an excessive number of errors, omissions and conflicts in the design documents furnished to bidders by the state and incorporated into [Dugan & Meyers’s] contracts.” There were no shifting sands, no acts of God, no surprising aquifers.

22003–2007
Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co. green
· 1941
2 sentences

2000Id; Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 178 ; Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584 , paragraph four of the syllabus.

1990Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 178 , 20 O.O. 233 , 34 N.E. 2d 202 ; Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584 , 26 O.O. 161 , 49 N.E. 2d 925 , paragraph four of the syllabus.

21990–2000
Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. green
· 1943
2 sentences

2000Id; Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 178 ; Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584 , paragraph four of the syllabus.

1990Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 178 , 20 O.O. 233 , 34 N.E. 2d 202 ; Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584 , 26 O.O. 161 , 49 N.E. 2d 925 , paragraph four of the syllabus.

21990–2000
Best v. Energized Substation Service, Inc. green
ohioctapp · 1993
2 sentences

1999Black cites Best v. Energized Substation Serv., Inc. (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 109, 115 , 623 N.E.2d 158, 162 , where the court held that a principal cannot be held liable for negligent selection of the independent contractor in a claim by an employee of the independent contractor.

1999Black cites Best v. Energized Substation Serv., Inc. (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 109, 115 , 623 N.E.2d 158, 162 , where the court held that a principal cannot be held liable for negligent selection of the independent contractor in a claim by an employee of the independent contractor.

21999–1999
Goldfuss v. Davidson green
ohio · 1997
2 sentences

2020Franklin No. 14AP-783, 2015-Ohio-3008 , ¶ 7 (applying plain error where appellant failed to file a memorandum opposing summary judgment). {¶ 78} “In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (199

2020Franklin No. 14AP-783, 2015-Ohio-3008 , ¶ 7 (applying plain error where appellant failed to file a memorandum opposing summary judgment). {¶ 78} “In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (199

12020–2020
Strayer v. Lindeman green
ohio · 1981
2 sentences

1990Co. v. Miller (1936), 131 Ohio St. 424 , 6 O.O. 119 , 3 N.E. 2d 360 , paragraphs one through four of the syllabus (duty to refrain from interfering with the right of the public to safe and unimpeded use of highways and streets, and the duty to keep premises reasonably safe); Strayer v. Lindeman (1981), 68 Ohio St. 2d 32 , 22 O.O. 3d 159, 427 N.E. 2d 781 , at syllabus (duty of a landlord to exercise reasonable care in proceeding with repairs).

1990Co. v. Miller (1936), 131 Ohio St. 424 , 6 O.O. 119 , 3 N.E. 2d 360 , paragraphs one through four of the syllabus (duty to refrain from interfering with the right of the public to safe and unimpeded use of highways and streets, and the duty to keep premises reasonably safe); Strayer v. Lindeman (1981), 68 Ohio St. 2d 32 , 22 O.O. 3d 159, 427 N.E. 2d 781 , at syllabus (duty of a landlord to exercise reasonable care in proceeding with repairs).

11990–1990
Kisil v. City of Sandusky green
ohio · 1984
1 sentence

1990Rather, the contractor asserts that the zoning board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably in denying, its request for a variance 'The standard for granting a variance which relates solely to area requirements should be a lesser standard than that applied to variances which relate to usa An application for an area variance need not establish unnecessary hardship; it is sufficient that the application show practical difficulties" Kisil v. Sandusky (1984), 12 Ohio St. 3d 30 , syllabus. 'The factors to be considered and weighed in determining whether a property owner seeking an area v

11990–1990
Duncan v. Village of Middlefield green
ohio · 1986
1 sentence

1990Rather, the contractor asserts that the zoning board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably in denying, its request for a variance 'The standard for granting a variance which relates solely to area requirements should be a lesser standard than that applied to variances which relate to usa An application for an area variance need not establish unnecessary hardship; it is sufficient that the application show practical difficulties" Kisil v. Sandusky (1984), 12 Ohio St. 3d 30 , syllabus. 'The factors to be considered and weighed in determining whether a property owner seeking an area v

11990–1990
Richman Bros. v. Miller green
ohio · 1936
2 sentences

1990Co. v. Miller (1936), 131 Ohio St. 424 , 6 O.O. 119 , 3 N.E. 2d 360 , paragraphs one through four of the syllabus (duty to refrain from interfering with the right of the public to safe and unimpeded use of highways and streets, and the duty to keep premises reasonably safe); Strayer v. Lindeman (1981), 68 Ohio St. 2d 32 , 22 O.O. 3d 159, 427 N.E. 2d 781 , at syllabus (duty of a landlord to exercise reasonable care in proceeding with repairs).

1990Co. v. Miller (1936), 131 Ohio St. 424 , 6 O.O. 119 , 3 N.E. 2d 360 , paragraphs one through four of the syllabus (duty to refrain from interfering with the right of the public to safe and unimpeded use of highways and streets, and the duty to keep premises reasonably safe); Strayer v. Lindeman (1981), 68 Ohio St. 2d 32 , 22 O.O. 3d 159, 427 N.E. 2d 781 , at syllabus (duty of a landlord to exercise reasonable care in proceeding with repairs).

11990–1990
Christhilf v. Mayor of Baltimore green
md · 1927
2 sentences

1959In Christhilf v. Baltimore, 152 Md., 204 , 136 A., 527 , it was held that the contractor could not recover for delay in *141 securing a right of way, where the contractor knew that the city did not own the right of way, and where the contract provided that, if the contractor was delayed because of failure to obtain the right of way, an extension of time would be granted, that the contractor would have no claim for damages on account of the delay.

1959In Christhilf v. Baltimore, 152 Md., 204 , 136 A., 527 , it was held that the contractor could not recover for delay in *141 securing a right of way, where the contractor knew that the city did not own the right of way, and where the contract provided that, if the contractor was delayed because of failure to obtain the right of way, an extension of time would be granted, that the contractor would have no claim for damages on account of the delay.

11959–1959

Where else courts name it

CA 27 (1918–2026) NY 27 (1915–2025) FL 25 (1957–2026) PA 23 (1911–2023) TX 18 (1913–2024) WV 15 (1957–2024) MO 15 (1938–2025) OH 15 (1959–2020) LA 13 (1915–2013) IN 12 (1924–2023) IL 12 (1908–2025) WI 11 (1934–2023) CT 10 (1936–2005) NJ 9 (1913–2025) TN 8 (2007–2026) MT 8 (1971–2009) GA 7 (1976–2008) OR 7 (1959–2021) VA 6 (1923–2016) ID 6 (1908–2013) MA 6 (1932–2015) WA 4 (1912–2018) KY 4 (1883–2018) OK 4 (1939–2025) AZ 4 (1990–2026) DE 4 (1973–2017) MD 3 (1977–2003) MS 3 (1990–2007) NC 3 (1993–2010) HI 3 (1970–2010) DC 3 (1991–2023) WY 3 (1958–2012) MI 3 (1924–1973) NM 2 (1934–1992) ND 2 (1984–2006) RI 2 (1927–2004) AK 2 (1980–1987) CO 2 (1983–2020) IA 2 (1883–1981)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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