contractor defense in New Jersey

2025To require privity . . . would defeat the purpose of the implied warranty of good workmanship" and consequently "leave innocent homeowners without a remedy for negligently built structures[.]" 98 N.J. at 102 .

2021The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, relying on an independent contractor exception to strict liability under the Dog Bite Statute recognized by the Appellate Division in Reynolds v. Lancaster County Prison, 325 N.J.

2000Ibid. (quoting Golomore Assocs. v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 173 N.J.Super. 55, 59 , 413 A. 2d 361 (App.Div. 1980)); see Ell-Dorer Contracting Co. v. State, 197 N.J.Super. 175 , 484 A. 2d 356 (App.Div.1984); Sasso Contracting Co. v. State, 173 N.J.Super. 486 , 414 A. 2d 603 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 101 , 425 A. 2d 265 (1980).

2000Ibid. (quoting Golomore Assocs. v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 173 N.J.Super. 55, 59 , 413 A. 2d 361 (App.Div. 1980)); see Ell-Dorer Contracting Co. v. State, 197 N.J.Super. 175 , 484 A. 2d 356 (App.Div.1984); Sasso Contracting Co. v. State, 173 N.J.Super. 486 , 414 A. 2d 603 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 101 , 425 A. 2d 265 (1980).

2000Ibid. (quoting Golomore Assocs. v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 173 N.J.Super. 55, 59 , 413 A. 2d 361 (App.Div. 1980)); see Ell-Dorer Contracting Co. v. State, 197 N.J.Super. 175 , 484 A. 2d 356 (App.Div.1984); Sasso Contracting Co. v. State, 173 N.J.Super. 486 , 414 A. 2d 603 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 101 , 425 A. 2d 265 (1980).

2000Ibid. (quoting Golomore Assocs. v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 173 N.J.Super. 55, 59 , 413 A. 2d 361 (App.Div. 1980)); see Ell-Dorer Contracting Co. v. State, 197 N.J.Super. 175 , 484 A. 2d 356 (App.Div.1984); Sasso Contracting Co. v. State, 173 N.J.Super. 486 , 414 A. 2d 603 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 101 , 425 A. 2d 265 (1980).

2000P.T. & L., supra, 108 N.J. at 551-52 , 531 A. 2d 1330 . [2] Nevertheless, the Court held that if the contract specifications made "positive averments which purported to actually describe the land" but which were not correct, then the contractor had a claim for additional expenses generated by the work.

2000P.T. & L., supra, 108 N.J. at 551-52 , 531 A. 2d 1330 . [2] Nevertheless, the Court held that if the contract specifications made "positive averments which purported to actually describe the land" but which were not correct, then the contractor had a claim for additional expenses generated by the work.

2000Ibid. (quoting Golomore Assocs. v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 173 N.J.Super. 55, 59 , 413 A. 2d 361 (App.Div. 1980)); see Ell-Dorer Contracting Co. v. State, 197 N.J.Super. 175 , 484 A. 2d 356 (App.Div.1984); Sasso Contracting Co. v. State, 173 N.J.Super. 486 , 414 A. 2d 603 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 101 , 425 A. 2d 265 (1980).

2000Ibid. (quoting Golomore Assocs. v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 173 N.J.Super. 55, 59 , 413 A. 2d 361 (App.Div. 1980)); see Ell-Dorer Contracting Co. v. State, 197 N.J.Super. 175 , 484 A. 2d 356 (App.Div.1984); Sasso Contracting Co. v. State, 173 N.J.Super. 486 , 414 A. 2d 603 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 101 , 425 A. 2d 265 (1980).

1995E.g., Lewis v. Babcock, supra (determining that Boyle applied not only to .design defect suits, but also to failure-to-warn claims); Garner v. Santoro, supra, 865 F.2d at 642 (holding, after analyzing Boyle , that the contractor defense can be applied in a failure-to-warn case); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., supra, 716 F.Supp. 589 (determining that although the contractor defense expressed by Boyle’s three-part test itself is limited to design-defect cases, the reasoning underpinning Boyle applies in the failure-to-warn context); cf. Harduvel, supra, 878 F.2d at 1317 (Boyle, by its te

1995E.g., Lewis v. Babcock, supra (determining that Boyle applied not only to design defect suits, but also to failure-to-warn claims); Garner v. Santoro, supra, 865 F. 2d at 642 (holding, after analyzing Boyle , that the contractor defense can be applied in a failure-to-warn case); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., supra, 716 F. Supp. 589 (determining that although the contractor defense expressed by Boyle 's three-part test itself is limited to design-defect cases, the reasoning underpinning Boyle applies in the failure-to-warn context); cf. Harduvel, supra, 878 F. 2d at 1317 ( Boyle, by it

1995E.g., Lewis v. Babcock, supra (determining that Boyle applied not only to .design defect suits, but also to failure-to-warn claims); Garner v. Santoro, supra, 865 F.2d at 642 (holding, after analyzing Boyle , that the contractor defense can be applied in a failure-to-warn case); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., supra, 716 F.Supp. 589 (determining that although the contractor defense expressed by Boyle’s three-part test itself is limited to design-defect cases, the reasoning underpinning Boyle applies in the failure-to-warn context); cf. Harduvel, supra, 878 F.2d at 1317 (Boyle, by its te

1995E.g., Lewis v. Babcock, supra (determining that Boyle applied not only to design defect suits, but also to failure-to-warn claims); Garner v. Santoro, supra, 865 F. 2d at 642 (holding, after analyzing Boyle , that the contractor defense can be applied in a failure-to-warn case); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., supra, 716 F. Supp. 589 (determining that although the contractor defense expressed by Boyle 's three-part test itself is limited to design-defect cases, the reasoning underpinning Boyle applies in the failure-to-warn context); cf. Harduvel, supra, 878 F. 2d at 1317 ( Boyle, by it

1992Since Feres prohibits all service-related tort claims against the Government, a contractor defense that rests upon it should prohibit all service-related tort claims against the manufacturer — making inexplicable the three limiting criteria for contractor immunity (which we will discuss presently) that the Court of Appeals adopted. [ 487 U.S. at 510-511 , 108 S.Ct. at 2517-2518 , 101 L.Ed. 2d at 456-457 ] Justice Scalia concluded that the proper basis was found in the Federal Tort Claims Act and stated: United States itself, since defense contractors will predictably raise their prices to cove

1992Since Feres prohibits all service-related tort claims against the Government, a contractor defense that rests upon it should prohibit all service-related tort claims against the manufacturer — making inexplicable the three limiting criteria for contractor immunity (which we will discuss presently) that the Court of Appeals adopted. [ 487 U.S. at 510-511 , 108 S.Ct. at 2517-2518 , 101 L.Ed. 2d at 456-457 ] Justice Scalia concluded that the proper basis was found in the Federal Tort Claims Act and stated: United States itself, since defense contractors will predictably raise their prices to cove

1984The builder always has available the defense that the defects are not attributable to him. [ 439 So.2d at 672 .] We agree with the Mississippi Supreme Court that the privity requirement should be abandoned in suits brought by a homeowner against a contractor for violation of an implied promise of good workmanship.

1932In the latter instance, as stated in the last cited case ( Post McCord v. City of New York, 86 Misc.

1913At an earlier stage of the case upon a demurrer to the declaration the Supreme Court ( 54 Vroom, 149 ) held that the declaration was good for the reason that “the operation of an electric lighting plant for the furnishing of light to private consumers for gain cannot in any sense be the performance of a governmental function,” citing Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 51 Vroom 416 , and the cases there referred to.