timely objection claim in California

1982(Cf. People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27, 34 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ] [objection normally required to preserve issue but where admonition would not have cured the error, reviewing courts do not adhere to the timely objection requirement].) Here, the error clearly was not prejudicial by either the normal standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]) or the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt constitutional standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]).

1982(Cf. People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27, 34 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ] [objection normally required to preserve issue but where admonition would not have cured the error, reviewing courts do not adhere to the timely objection requirement].) Here, the error clearly was not prejudicial by either the normal standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]) or the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt constitutional standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]).

2016(See People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 954 [superseded by statute on a different point].) Given its utility, it cannot be said that the search condition would have been stricken upon a timely objection by defense counsel.

2009Describing its earlier decision in Barquis , the California Supreme Court has stated, “In Barquis , the plaintiffs alleged the defendant collection agency violated former [section] 396a by ‘filing actions in improper counties, pursuant to statutorily inadequate complaints, for the purpose of impairing its adversaries’ ability to defend these actions, and with the intent, and effect, of obtaining an increased number of default judgments.’ [Citation.] Due to a statutory exception, the general rule that failure to move for a change of venue constitutes a waiver of any venue defects was inapplicab

2009Describing its earlier decision in Barquis , the California Supreme Court has stated, “In Barquis , the plaintiffs alleged the defendant collection agency violated former [section] 396a by ‘filing actions in improper counties, pursuant to statutorily inadequate complaints, for the purpose of impairing its adversaries’ ability to defend these actions, and with the intent, and effect, of obtaining an increased number of default judgments.’ [Citation.] Due to a statutory exception, the general rule that failure to move for a change of venue constitutes a waiver of any venue defects was inapplicab

2004(Id. at p. 115.) We nevertheless concluded that “when a trial court erroneously fails to dismiss or transfer the action and the defendant does not raise a timely objection to such error, ... a final judgment rendered on an inadequate complaint is not void for lack of jurisdiction and thus cannot be set aside at any time in the future.” (Id. at p. 116.) We observed that while former Code of Civil Procedure section 396a was “intended to protect litigants against the evil of distantly obtained default judgments, the section contemplates that the trial judge’s independent scrutiny of the plaintiff

2004(Id. at p. 115.) We nevertheless concluded that “when a trial court erroneously fails to dismiss or transfer the action and the defendant does not raise a timely objection to such error, ... a final judgment rendered on an inadequate complaint is not void for lack of jurisdiction and thus cannot be set aside at any time in the future.” (Id. at p. 116.) We observed that while former Code of Civil Procedure section 396a was “intended to protect litigants against the evil of distantly obtained default judgments, the section contemplates that the trial judge’s independent scrutiny of the plaintiff

2002(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 858 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ]; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656 , 952 P.2d 673 ].) In the absence of a timely objection the claim is reviewable only if an admonition would not have otherwise cured the harm caused by the misconduct.

2002(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 858 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ]; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656 , 952 P.2d 673 ].) In the absence of a timely objection the claim is reviewable only if an admonition would not have otherwise cured the harm caused by the misconduct.

2002(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 858 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ]; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656 , 952 P.2d 673 ].) In the absence of a timely objection the claim is reviewable only if an admonition would not have otherwise cured the harm caused by the misconduct.

2002(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 858 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ]; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656 , 952 P.2d 673 ].) In the absence of a timely objection the claim is reviewable only if an admonition would not have otherwise cured the harm caused by the misconduct.

1982(Cf. People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27, 34 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ] [objection normally required to preserve issue but where admonition would not have cured the error, reviewing courts do not adhere to the timely objection requirement].) Here, the error clearly was not prejudicial by either the normal standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]) or the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt constitutional standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]).

1982(Cf. People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27, 34 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ] [objection normally required to preserve issue but where admonition would not have cured the error, reviewing courts do not adhere to the timely objection requirement].) Here, the error clearly was not prejudicial by either the normal standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]) or the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt constitutional standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]).

1982(Cf. People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27, 34 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ] [objection normally required to preserve issue but where admonition would not have cured the error, reviewing courts do not adhere to the timely objection requirement].) Here, the error clearly was not prejudicial by either the normal standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]) or the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt constitutional standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]).

1982(Cf. People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27, 34 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ] [objection normally required to preserve issue but where admonition would not have cured the error, reviewing courts do not adhere to the timely objection requirement].) Here, the error clearly was not prejudicial by either the normal standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]) or the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt constitutional standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]).

1980(Simmons v. United *181 States, supra, 390 U.S. 377, 383 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1252 ].) The extraordinary suggestiveness of this identification procedure raises considerable doubt that the prosecution would have been able to introduce Mrs. S.’s identification over a timely objection by defense counsel.

1980(Simmons v. United *181 States, supra, 390 U.S. 377, 383 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1252 ].) The extraordinary suggestiveness of this identification procedure raises considerable doubt that the prosecution would have been able to introduce Mrs. S.’s identification over a timely objection by defense counsel.

1967(Cf. People v. Perry (1939) 14 Cal.2d 387, 396 [ 94 P.2d 559 , 124 A.L.R. 1123 ].) Here, as in Bandhauer, the objectionable statements entered the prosecutor's argument gradually; but in this case, unlike Bandhauer, a timely objection by the defense would have *717 prevented the most harmful comments from ever reaching the jury; and an appropriate instruction could have prevented those remarks which did reach the jury from exerting any impact beyond that of defense counsel's own statements.

1967(Cf. People v. Perry (1939) 14 Cal.2d 387, 396 [ 94 P.2d 559 , 124 A.L.R. 1123 ].) Here, as in Bandhauer, the objectionable statements entered the prosecutor's argument gradually; but in this case, unlike Bandhauer, a timely objection by the defense would have *717 prevented the most harmful comments from ever reaching the jury; and an appropriate instruction could have prevented those remarks which did reach the jury from exerting any impact beyond that of defense counsel's own statements.