100 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1869–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alvis v. Ribargreen2 sentences2018See Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1981) (“[W]e believe that the need to deter negligent parties supports the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine in which each party would be liable for damages in direct proportion to his degree of carelessness.”). 2017See Alvis v. Ribar , 85 Ill. 2d 1 , 18, 52 Ill.Dec. 23 , 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981) ("[W]e believe that the need to deter negligent parties supports the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine in which each party would be liable for damages in direct proportion to his degree of carelessness."). | 6 | 42 |
Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicagogreen2 sentences1997Adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence did not, however, result in the elimination of proximate cause as an element in a negligence action (see Owens v. Stokoe, 115 Ill.2d 177, 183 , 104 Ill.Dec. 694 , 503 N.E.2d 251 (1986); see also Leonardi, 168 Ill.2d at 93 , 212 Ill.Dec. 968 , 658 N.E.2d 450 ), and there can be more than one proximate cause contributing to any one injury ( Johanek v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 157 Ill. 1997Adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence did not, however, result in the elimination of proximate cause as an element in a negligence action (see Owens v. Stokoe, 115 Ill. 2d 177, 183 (1986); see also Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 93 ), and there can be more than one proximate cause contributing to any one injury (Johanek v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 157 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Johanek v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc.green2 sentences1997Adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence did not, however, result in the elimination of proximate cause as an element in a negligence action (see Owens v. Stokoe, 115 Ill.2d 177, 183 , 104 Ill.Dec. 694 , 503 N.E.2d 251 (1986); see also Leonardi, 168 Ill.2d at 93 , 212 Ill.Dec. 968 , 658 N.E.2d 450 ), and there can be more than one proximate cause contributing to any one injury ( Johanek v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 157 Ill. 1997Adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence did not, however, result in the elimination of proximate cause as an element in a negligence action (see Owens v. Stokoe, 115 Ill. 2d 177, 183 (1986); see also Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 93 ), and there can be more than one proximate cause contributing to any one injury (Johanek v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 157 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Malanowski v. Jabamonigreen2 sentences2005More specifically, “[i]n a medical malpractice action, a comparative negligence instruction is appropriate if a party presents a theory of the case in which the patient’s negligence precedes or is contemporaneous with the physician’s malpractice; for example, when a patient delays in seeking treatment for his or her medical condition or injury.” Malanowski, 332 Ill. 2005More specifically, "[i]n a medical malpractice action, a comparative negligence instruction is appropriate if a party presents a theory of the case in which the patient's negligence precedes or is contemporaneous with the physician's malpractice; for example, when a patient delays in seeking treatment for his or her medical condition or injury." Malanowski , 332 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
Owens v. Stokoegreen2 sentences1997Adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence did not, however, result in the elimination of proximate cause as an element in a negligence action (see Owens v. Stokoe, 115 Ill.2d 177, 183 , 104 Ill.Dec. 694 , 503 N.E.2d 251 (1986); see also Leonardi, 168 Ill.2d at 93 , 212 Ill.Dec. 968 , 658 N.E.2d 450 ), and there can be more than one proximate cause contributing to any one injury ( Johanek v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 157 Ill. 1997Adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence did not, however, result in the elimination of proximate cause as an element in a negligence action (see Owens v. Stokoe, 115 Ill. 2d 177, 183 (1986); see also Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 93 ), and there can be more than one proximate cause contributing to any one injury (Johanek v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 157 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
Fetzer v. Woodgreen2 sentences2008“In Illinois, the parties are entitled to have the jury instructed on the issues presented, the principles of law to be applied, and the necessary facts to be proved to support its verdict.” Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505 (2002); Fetzer v. Wood, 211 Ill. 2008“In Illinois, the parties are entitled to have the jury instructed on the issues presented, principles of law to be applied, and the necessary facts to be proved to support its verdict.” Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505 (2002); Fetzer v. Wood, 211 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Gratzle v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.green2 sentences2008See Gratzle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 245 Ill. 2008See Gratzle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 245 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Dillon v. Evanston Hospitalgreen2 sentences2008“In Illinois, the parties are entitled to have the jury instructed on the issues presented, the principles of law to be applied, and the necessary facts to be proved to support its verdict.” Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505 (2002); Fetzer v. Wood, 211 Ill. 2008“In Illinois, the parties are entitled to have the jury instructed on the issues presented, principles of law to be applied, and the necessary facts to be proved to support its verdict.” Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505 (2002); Fetzer v. Wood, 211 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc.green2 sentences2005In support of her forfeiture argument, Socha cites Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc. , 105 Ill. 2d 537, 550 (1984), a products liability action in which, at trial, the plaintiff argued against a comparative negligence instruction but, on appeal, argued that a new trial was required because this court had recently applied comparative fault to a products liability claim. 2005In support of her forfeiture argument, Socha cites Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 537, 550 (1984), a products liability action in which, at trial, the plaintiff argued against a comparative negligence instruction but, on appeal, argued that a new trial was required because this court had recently applied comparative fault to a products liability claim. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maki v. Frelk
green
2 sentences1981In Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196 , 239 N.E.2d 445 , the supreme court rejected arguments similar to those advanced here 2 and it refused to judicially adopt a comparative negligence doctrine. 1981In Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196 , 239 N.E.2d 445 , the supreme court rejected arguments similar to those advanced here 2 and it refused to judicially adopt a comparative negligence doctrine. | 9 | 1969–1981 |
Smith v. Perlmutter
green
2 sentences2002Smith v. Perlmutter, 145 Ill. 2002Smith v. Perlmutter , 145 Ill.App.3d 783 , 496 N.E.2d 358 (1986) (delay in seeking treatment for heart attack). | 4 | 2000–2002 |
Ralston v. Plogger
green
2 sentences2007App. 3d 90, 98 , 476 N.E.2d 1378 , the court found that superimposing comparative negligence onto section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act 'would plainly be a forbidden judicial amendment to the statute.' It would be incumbent upon the legislature itself to revise the Wrongful Death Act to make it more compatible with the emergent doctrine of comparative negligence." -58- 1-05-2126 Haist v. Wu, 235 Ill. 2007App. 3d 90, 98 , 476 N.E.2d 1378 , the court found that superimposing comparative negligence onto section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act ‘would plainly be a forbidden judicial amendment to the statute.’ It would be incumbent upon the legislature itself to revise the Wrongful Death Act to make it more compatible with the emergent doctrine of comparative negligence.” Haist v. Wu, 235 Ill. | 3 | 1992–2007 |
Ward v. K Mart Corp.
green
2 sentences2002Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 143 . 2002Ward, 136 Ill.2d at 143 , 143 Ill.Dec. 288 , 554 N.E.2d 223 . | 3 | 1993–2002 |
Casey v. Baseden
green
2 sentences1994(Casey v. Baseden (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 341 .) However, not every negligent act of a claimant will be considered under the doctrine of comparative negligence. 1993(Casey v. Baseden (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 341, 346 , 490 N.E.2d 4, 6 .) However, not every negligence of plaintiff will be considered under the doctrine of comparative negligence. “ ‘The plaintiff’s negligence will not bar recovery unless it is a “proximate cause” of his injury. | 3 | 1987–1994 |
Michalak v. County of La Salle
green
2 sentences1993Relying on Michalak, the appellate court expressed what we construe to be views questioning the viability of the “cause vs. condition” doctrine after the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence in Illinois in Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1 , 421 N.E.2d 886 : “As pointed out (see Michalak, 121 Ill. 1989With the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence, courts have been less willing to label an actor's conduct as a remote *641 or superseding cause of injury. ( Michalak v. County of La Salle (1984), 121 Ill. | 3 | 1989–1993 |
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package MacHinery Co.
green
2 sentences1988(See Allison v. Shell Oil Co. (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 26, 32-34 .) We have left open, however, the question whether certain other theories of implied indemnity, such as an action based on vicarious liability, or an action brought by a “downstream” seller against an “upstream” product manufacturer or distributor, which is the form asserted by Munsterman in this case, survived the decision in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1 , and the subsequent enactment of the Contribution Act. 1986Heinrich v. Peabody International Corp. (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 344 , 459 N.E.2d 935 ; Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1 , 374 N.E.2d 437 , cert. denied (1978), 436 U.S. 946 , 56 L. | 3 | 1978–1988 |
Haist v. Wu
green
2 sentences2007App. 3d 90, 98 , 476 N.E.2d 1378 , the court found that superimposing comparative negligence onto section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act 'would plainly be a forbidden judicial amendment to the statute.' It would be incumbent upon the legislature itself to revise the Wrongful Death Act to make it more compatible with the emergent doctrine of comparative negligence." -58- 1-05-2126 Haist v. Wu, 235 Ill. 2007App. 3d 90, 98 , 476 N.E.2d 1378 , the court found that superimposing comparative negligence onto section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act ‘would plainly be a forbidden judicial amendment to the statute.’ It would be incumbent upon the legislature itself to revise the Wrongful Death Act to make it more compatible with the emergent doctrine of comparative negligence.” Haist v. Wu, 235 Ill. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Aimonette v. Hartmann
green
2 sentences2000Aimonette, 214 Ill. 1999Aimonette , 214 Ill. | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Bofman v. Material Service Corp.
green
2 sentences1997App. 3d 1053, 1063-64 , 466 N.E.2d 1064 (1984), the comparative negligence instruction under review required the jury to consider the negligence of "all other persons” in computing "total combined negligence.” Bofman, 125 Ill. 1997App. 3d 1053, 1063-64 , 466 N.E.2d 1064 (1984), the comparative negligence instruction under review required the jury to consider the negligence of "all other persons” in computing "total combined negligence.” Bofman, 125 Ill. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Galena & Chicago Union Railroad v. Jacobs
green
2 sentences1981Co. v. Jacobs (1858), 20 Ill. 478, 497 .) Thus, in 1858, Illinois became a State which followed the doctrine of comparative negligence. 1981Co. v. Jacobs (1858), 20 Ill. 478, 497 .) Thus, in 1858, Illinois became a State which followed the doctrine of comparative negligence. | 2 | 1869–1981 |
Maki v. Frelk
green
2 sentences1974This rule was carefully re-examined and upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in Maki v. Frelk (1968) 40 Ill.2d 193 reversing the Appellate Court which had attempted to change the contributory negligence rule and adopt the comparative negligence doctrine. [ 85 Ill.App.2d 439 ] The law remains unchanged. 1974This rule was carefully re-examined and upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in Maki v. Frelk (1968) 40 Ill.2d 193 , reversing the Appellate Court which had attempted to change the contributory negligence rule and adopt the comparative negligence doctrine. [ 85 Ill.App.2d 439 ] The law remains unchanged. | 2 | 1974–1974 |
Willard v. Swansen
green
2 sentences1904This view is sustained by the following decisions of this court: Willard v. Swansen, 126 Ill. 381 ; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Warner, 123 id. 38; Village of Mansfield v. Moore, 124 id. 133; Calumet Iron and Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 id. 358; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 103 id. 512; Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 116 id. 206.” No instruction advised the jury that the plaintiff could recover if she was guilty of negligence herself. 1900This view is sustained by the following decisions of this court: Willard v. Swansen, 126 Ill. 381 ; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Warner, 123 id. 38; Village of Mansfield v. Moore, 124 id. 133; Calumet Iron and Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 id. 358; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 103 id. 512; Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 116 id. 206. ” It is further assigned as error that the court instructed the jury orally in respect to visiting the scene of the accident or examining the location, ii appears from the abstract: “The hour for adjournment havin | 2 | 1900–1904 |
Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin
green
2 sentences1897Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546 , the court say: “We have repeatedly held, in effect, in the later decisions, beginning with Calumet Iron and Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358 , that the doctrine of comparative negligence, as announced in the earlier cases, is no longer the law of this State, and it is to be no longer regarded as a correct rule of law applicable in cases of this character. 1894We have repeatedly held, in effect, in the later decisions, beginning with Calumet Iron and Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358 , that the doctrine of comparative negligence, as announced in the earlier • cases, was no longer the law of this State, and it is to be no longer regarded as a correct rule of law applicable in cases of this character. | 2 | 1894–1897 |
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack
green
2 sentences1897Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242 ; Mansfield v. Moore, 124 Id. 133. 1894(Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242 ; Mansfield v. Moore, 124 id. 133.) The doctrine announced in the later decisions, as applied to this class of cases, requires, as a condition to recovery by the plaintiff, that the person injured be found to be in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and that the injury resulted from the negligence of the defendant. | 2 | 1894–1897 |
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Hessions
neutral
2 sentences1897Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546 , the court say: “We have repeatedly held, in effect, in the later decisions, beginning with Calumet Iron and Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358 , that the doctrine of comparative negligence, as announced in the earlier cases, is no longer the law of this State, and it is to be no longer regarded as a correct rule of law applicable in cases of this character. 1895Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546 : “We have repeatedly held, in effect, in the later decisions * * * -that the doctrine of comparative negligence, as announced in the earlier cases, was no longer the law of this State, and it is to be no longer regarded as a correct rule of law applicable in cases of this character. | 2 | 1895–1897 |
Johnson v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2021Johnson v. Johnson, 386 Ill. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Kraemer v. State
neutral
1 sentence1999(Kraemer v. State (1990), 42 Ill. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Coulson v. State
neutral
1 sentence1998(Coulson v. State (1993), 46 Ill. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Peterson v. State
neutral
1 sentence1996(Peterson v. State of Illinois (1984), 37 Ill. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Stevens v. Lou's Lemon Tree, Ltd. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Willson v. Pepich green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Briske v. Village of Burnham green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Cravens v. Inman green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Palladini v. City of East Peoria
green
1 sentence1993App. 3d 345 , 480 N.E.2d 530 , where the language of the statute was construed to be consistent with the comparative negligence doctrine first set forth in Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1 , 421 N.E.2d 886 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| DiBenedetto v. Flora Tp. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Curtis v. County of Cook green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. McGlawn green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Keller v. Kiedinger green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Gorday v. Faris green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Allison v. Shell Oil Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Superior Oil Co. v. Sterling green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Thomas v. Northington green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Dodson v. Shaw neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Magnone v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Heinrich v. Peabody International Corp. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Southpark Square, Ltd. v. City of Jackson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Long v. City of New Boston green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.