comparative negligence doctrine in Virginia

2003Miles appealed and maintained, among other assignments of error, that the trial court erred by refusing to set aside the verdict in favor of each plaintiff because “the smallness of the verdicts in these cases indicates either (1) that ‘the jury recognized that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any recovery against Miles’ or (2) that the jury applied the doctrine of comparative negligence . . . .” Id. at 595 , 175 S.E. at 240 .

2003Miles appealed and maintained, among other assignments of error, that the trial court erred by refusing to set aside the verdict in favor of each plaintiff because “the smallness of the verdicts in these cases indicates either (1) that ‘the jury recognized that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any recovery against Miles’ or (2) that the jury applied the doctrine of comparative negligence . . . .” Id. at 595 , 175 S.E. at 240 .

1991However, in LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W.

1956Co. v. Epling, 189 Va. 551, 557 , 53 S. E. 2d 817, 820 , we said, “If a traveler on a highway drives blindly upon a grade crossing, whether his view is obstructed or unobstructed, and takes no precaution for his own safety and is injured, his negligence precludes recovery, if, as in this case, the doctrine of comparative negligence” is not applicable.

1956Co. v. Epling, 189 Va. 551, 557 , 53 S. E. 2d 817, 820 , we said, “If a traveler on a highway drives blindly upon a grade crossing, whether his view is obstructed or unobstructed, and takes no precaution for his own safety and is injured, his negligence precludes recovery, if, as in this case, the doctrine of comparative negligence” is not applicable.

1944We have no doctrine of comparative negligence in Virginia in such cases; the disclosure of negligence on the plaintiff’s part provides the defendant a complete' defense and precludes any recovery by the plaintiff.” See also, Nicholson v. Garland, 156 Va. 745 , 158 S. E. 901 ; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240 , 3 S. E. (2d) 419 ; Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134 , 12 S. E. (2d) 826 ; Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647 , 194 S. E. 692 .

1944We have no doctrine of comparative negligence in Virginia in such cases; the disclosure of negligence on the plaintiff’s part provides the defendant a complete' defense and precludes any recovery by the plaintiff.” See also, Nicholson v. Garland, 156 Va. 745 , 158 S. E. 901 ; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240 , 3 S. E. (2d) 419 ; Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134 , 12 S. E. (2d) 826 ; Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647 , 194 S. E. 692 .

1944We have no doctrine of comparative negligence in Virginia in such cases; the disclosure of negligence on the plaintiff’s part provides the defendant a complete' defense and precludes any recovery by the plaintiff.” See also, Nicholson v. Garland, 156 Va. 745 , 158 S. E. 901 ; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240 , 3 S. E. (2d) 419 ; Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134 , 12 S. E. (2d) 826 ; Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647 , 194 S. E. 692 .

1944We have no doctrine of comparative negligence in Virginia in such cases; the disclosure of negligence on the plaintiff’s part provides the defendant a complete' defense and precludes any recovery by the plaintiff.” See also, Nicholson v. Garland, 156 Va. 745 , 158 S. E. 901 ; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240 , 3 S. E. (2d) 419 ; Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134 , 12 S. E. (2d) 826 ; Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647 , 194 S. E. 692 .

1944In each of the cases: Armstrong v. Rose, 170 Va. 190 , 196 S. E. 613 , Ferguson v. Virginia Tractor Co., 170 Va. 486 , 197 S. E. 438 , and others cited by the plaintiff, there were facts, quite controlling, which clearly differentiate them from the present case.

1944In each of the cases: Armstrong v. Rose, 170 Va. 190 , 196 S. E. 613 , Ferguson v. Virginia Tractor Co., 170 Va. 486 , 197 S. E. 438 , and others cited by the plaintiff, there were facts, quite controlling, which clearly differentiate them from the present case.

1944In each of the cases: Armstrong v. Rose, 170 Va. 190 , 196 S. E. 613 , Ferguson v. Virginia Tractor Co., 170 Va. 486 , 197 S. E. 438 , and others cited by the plaintiff, there were facts, quite controlling, which clearly differentiate them from the present case.

1944In each of the cases: Armstrong v. Rose, 170 Va. 190 , 196 S. E. 613 , Ferguson v. Virginia Tractor Co., 170 Va. 486 , 197 S. E. 438 , and others cited by the plaintiff, there were facts, quite controlling, which clearly differentiate them from the present case.

1944We have no doctrine of comparative negligence in Virginia in such cases; the disclosure of negligence on the plaintiff’s part provides the defendant a complete' defense and precludes any recovery by the plaintiff.” See also, Nicholson v. Garland, 156 Va. 745 , 158 S. E. 901 ; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240 , 3 S. E. (2d) 419 ; Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134 , 12 S. E. (2d) 826 ; Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647 , 194 S. E. 692 .

1944We have no doctrine of comparative negligence in Virginia in such cases; the disclosure of negligence on the plaintiff’s part provides the defendant a complete' defense and precludes any recovery by the plaintiff.” See also, Nicholson v. Garland, 156 Va. 745 , 158 S. E. 901 ; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240 , 3 S. E. (2d) 419 ; Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134 , 12 S. E. (2d) 826 ; Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647 , 194 S. E. 692 .

1944We have no doctrine of comparative negligence in Virginia in such cases; the disclosure of negligence on the plaintiff’s part provides the defendant a complete' defense and precludes any recovery by the plaintiff.” See also, Nicholson v. Garland, 156 Va. 745 , 158 S. E. 901 ; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240 , 3 S. E. (2d) 419 ; Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134 , 12 S. E. (2d) 826 ; Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647 , 194 S. E. 692 .

1944We have no doctrine of comparative negligence in Virginia in such cases; the disclosure of negligence on the plaintiff’s part provides the defendant a complete' defense and precludes any recovery by the plaintiff.” See also, Nicholson v. Garland, 156 Va. 745 , 158 S. E. 901 ; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240 , 3 S. E. (2d) 419 ; Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134 , 12 S. E. (2d) 826 ; Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647 , 194 S. E. 692 .

1943Southern Ry. v. Mays, 239 F. 41 ; Chesapeake, etc., Ry.

1939Said he (page 667) : “To apply the last clear chance to the facts here would in effect amount to the introduction of the comparative negligence doctrine which, of course, has not been adopted in Virginia except in certain cases, and to wipe out as a defense contributory or concurring negligence.” To like effect we cite Roanoke Railway & Electric Co. v. Carroll, 112 Va. 598 , 72 S. E. 125 ; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714 , 153 S. E. 691 ; Frazier v. Stout, 165 Va. 68 , 181 S. E. 377 ; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Ford, supra. The case of Catron v. Birchfield, 159 Va. 60 , 165 S. E. 499 , r

1939Said he (page 667) : “To apply the last clear chance to the facts here would in effect amount to the introduction of the comparative negligence doctrine which, of course, has not been adopted in Virginia except in certain cases, and to wipe out as a defense contributory or concurring negligence.” To like effect we cite Roanoke Railway & Electric Co. v. Carroll, 112 Va. 598 , 72 S. E. 125 ; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714 , 153 S. E. 691 ; Frazier v. Stout, 165 Va. 68 , 181 S. E. 377 ; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Ford, supra. The case of Catron v. Birchfield, 159 Va. 60 , 165 S. E. 499 , r

1939Said he (page 667) : “To apply the last clear chance to the facts here would in effect amount to the introduction of the comparative negligence doctrine which, of course, has not been adopted in Virginia except in certain cases, and to wipe out as a defense contributory or concurring negligence.” To like effect we cite Roanoke Railway & Electric Co. v. Carroll, 112 Va. 598 , 72 S. E. 125 ; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714 , 153 S. E. 691 ; Frazier v. Stout, 165 Va. 68 , 181 S. E. 377 ; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Ford, supra. The case of Catron v. Birchfield, 159 Va. 60 , 165 S. E. 499 , r

1939Said he (page 667) : “To apply the last clear chance to the facts here would in effect amount to the introduction of the comparative negligence doctrine which, of course, has not been adopted in Virginia except in certain cases, and to wipe out as a defense contributory or concurring negligence.” To like effect we cite Roanoke Railway & Electric Co. v. Carroll, 112 Va. 598 , 72 S. E. 125 ; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714 , 153 S. E. 691 ; Frazier v. Stout, 165 Va. 68 , 181 S. E. 377 ; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Ford, supra. The case of Catron v. Birchfield, 159 Va. 60 , 165 S. E. 499 , r

1939Said he (page 667) : “To apply the last clear chance to the facts here would in effect amount to the introduction of the comparative negligence doctrine which, of course, has not been adopted in Virginia except in certain cases, and to wipe out as a defense contributory or concurring negligence.” To like effect we cite Roanoke Railway & Electric Co. v. Carroll, 112 Va. 598 , 72 S. E. 125 ; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714 , 153 S. E. 691 ; Frazier v. Stout, 165 Va. 68 , 181 S. E. 377 ; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Ford, supra. The case of Catron v. Birchfield, 159 Va. 60 , 165 S. E. 499 , r

1939Said he (page 667) : “To apply the last clear chance to the facts here would in effect amount to the introduction of the comparative negligence doctrine which, of course, has not been adopted in Virginia except in certain cases, and to wipe out as a defense contributory or concurring negligence.” To like effect we cite Roanoke Railway & Electric Co. v. Carroll, 112 Va. 598 , 72 S. E. 125 ; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714 , 153 S. E. 691 ; Frazier v. Stout, 165 Va. 68 , 181 S. E. 377 ; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Ford, supra. The case of Catron v. Birchfield, 159 Va. 60 , 165 S. E. 499 , r

1939Said he (page 667) : “To apply the last clear chance to the facts here would in effect amount to the introduction of the comparative negligence doctrine which, of course, has not been adopted in Virginia except in certain cases, and to wipe out as a defense contributory or concurring negligence.” To like effect we cite Roanoke Railway & Electric Co. v. Carroll, 112 Va. 598 , 72 S. E. 125 ; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714 , 153 S. E. 691 ; Frazier v. Stout, 165 Va. 68 , 181 S. E. 377 ; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Ford, supra. The case of Catron v. Birchfield, 159 Va. 60 , 165 S. E. 499 , r

1939Said he (page 667) : “To apply the last clear chance to the facts here would in effect amount to the introduction of the comparative negligence doctrine which, of course, has not been adopted in Virginia except in certain cases, and to wipe out as a defense contributory or concurring negligence.” To like effect we cite Roanoke Railway & Electric Co. v. Carroll, 112 Va. 598 , 72 S. E. 125 ; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714 , 153 S. E. 691 ; Frazier v. Stout, 165 Va. 68 , 181 S. E. 377 ; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Ford, supra. The case of Catron v. Birchfield, 159 Va. 60 , 165 S. E. 499 , r

1930There is language in some of the cases which apparently supports a broader application of the rule of the last clear chance; as, for instance, when it is said in Burr v. Va. Ry. & P. Co., 151 Va. 934 , 145 S. E. 833 , 838: “It is well settled, under the doctrine of last clear chance, that when the defendant could have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care, and failed, to do so, he is responsible, although the plaintiff may have been negligent in exposing himself to peril, and although his negligence may have continued until the accident happened.” Such statements, however, are to

1930There is language in some of the cases which apparently supports a broader application of the rule of the last clear chance; as, for instance, when it is said in Burr v. Va. Ry. & P. Co., 151 Va. 934 , 145 S. E. 833 , 838: “It is well settled, under the doctrine of last clear chance, that when the defendant could have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care, and failed, to do so, he is responsible, although the plaintiff may have been negligent in exposing himself to peril, and although his negligence may have continued until the accident happened.” Such statements, however, are to