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6 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1959–1989 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Willmar Poultry Co. v. Carus Chemical Co.green1 sentence1989Willmar Poultry Co. v. Carus Chemical Co., 378 N.W.2d 830, 836 (Minn.Ct.App.1985); Kantorowicz, 349 N.W.2d at 600 . | 1 | 1 |
Keefer v. Al Johnson Construction Co.green2 sentences1974We discussed this primary-secondary liability theory in Keefer v. Al Johnson Const. Co. 292 Minn. 91, 101 , 193 N. W. 2d 305, 311 (1971), as follows: «* * * [T]he difference between primary and secondary liability, as used in determining the right of indemnity, is based, not on a difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of comparative negligence, but on the difference in the character or kind of wrongs which caused the injury and in the nature of the legal obligation owed by each wrongdoer to the injured person.” *359 Therefore, it is apparent that, in determining the right to in 1974We discussed this primary-secondary liability theory in Keefer v. Al Johnson Const. Co. 292 Minn. 91, 101 , 193 N. W. 2d 305, 311 (1971), as follows: «* * * [T]he difference between primary and secondary liability, as used in determining the right of indemnity, is based, not on a difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of comparative negligence, but on the difference in the character or kind of wrongs which caused the injury and in the nature of the legal obligation owed by each wrongdoer to the injured person.” *359 Therefore, it is apparent that, in determining the right to in | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kantorowicz v. VFW Post, No. 230
green
1 sentence1989Willmar Poultry Co. v. Carus Chemical Co., 378 N.W.2d 830, 836 (Minn.Ct.App.1985); Kantorowicz, 349 N.W.2d at 600 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Peterson v. City of Minneapolis
green
2 sentences1988In Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282 , 173 N.W.2d 353 (1969), the supreme court concluded the trial court should have submitted the comparative negligence rule to the jury even though legislation establishing the comparative negligence rule was not in effect at the time of the injuries. 1988In Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282 , 173 N.W.2d 353 (1969), the supreme court concluded the trial court should have submitted the comparative negligence rule to the jury even though legislation establishing the comparative negligence rule was not in effect at the time of the injuries. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Tate v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1972In this connection, their brief cites a number of foreign decisions: Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57 , 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 366 P. 2d 641 (1961); Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238 , 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1963); Liberty Mutual Ins. 1972In this connection, their brief cites a number of foreign decisions: Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57 , 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 366 P. 2d 641 (1961); Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238 , 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1963); Liberty Mutual Ins. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Witt v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1972In this connection, their brief cites a number of foreign decisions: Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57 , 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 366 P. 2d 641 (1961); Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238 , 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1963); Liberty Mutual Ins. 1972In this connection, their brief cites a number of foreign decisions: Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57 , 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 366 P. 2d 641 (1961); Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238 , 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1963); Liberty Mutual Ins. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Hanson v. Bailey
green
2 sentences1971Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495 , 83 N. W. 2d 252 (1957); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co. supra. It should also be kept in mind that the difference between primary and secondary liability, as used in determining the right of indemnity, is based, not on a difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of comparative negligence, but on the difference in the character or kind of wrongs which caused the injury and in the nature of the legal obligation owed by each wrongdoer to the injured person. 1971Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495 , 83 N. W. 2d 252 (1957); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co. supra. It should also be kept in mind that the difference between primary and secondary liability, as used in determining the right of indemnity, is based, not on a difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of comparative negligence, but on the difference in the character or kind of wrongs which caused the injury and in the nature of the legal obligation owed by each wrongdoer to the injured person. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Craig v. Benedictine Sisters Hospital Ass'n
green
2 sentences1959Although the additional instruction was technically incorrect under Craig v. Benedictine Sisters Hospital Assn. 88 Minn. 535 , 93 N. W. 669 , it was intended only to answer the question as to applicability of the comparative negligence rule and not as a general statement of the law of negligence. 1959Although the additional instruction was technically incorrect under Craig v. Benedictine Sisters Hospital Assn. 88 Minn. 535 , 93 N. W. 669 , it was intended only to answer the question as to applicability of the comparative negligence rule and not as a general statement of the law of negligence. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.