86 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1898–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Placek v. City of Sterling Heightsgreen2 sentences2022McMaster argues that the Savage rule is inconsistent with our comparative-fault system. 3 To be sure, the Savage court applied its holding in the context of a contributory- 3 We adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence in Placek, 405 Mich 638 , and the Legislature later codified the state’s modified comparative-negligence scheme, MCL 600.2957. 2022McMaster argues that the Savage rule is inconsistent with our comparative-fault system. 3 To be sure, the Savage court applied its holding in the context of a contributory- 3 We adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence in Placek, 405 Mich 638 , and the Legislature later codified the state’s modified comparative-negligence scheme, MCL 600.2957. | 7 | 33 |
Pietrzyk v. City of Detroitgreen2 sentences2004See Pietrzyk v Detroit, 123 Mich App 244, 248-249 ; 333 NW2d 236 (1983), and Jalaba v Borovoy, 206 Mich App 17, 23 ; 520 NW2d 349 (1994). 2004See Pietrzyk v Detroit, 123 Mich App 244, 248-249 ; 333 NW2d 236 (1983), and Jalaba v Borovoy, 206 Mich App 17, 23 ; 520 NW2d 349 (1994). | 2 | 2 |
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.green2 sentences1982See Spence v Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc, 353 Mich 120, 134-135 ; 90 NW2d 873 (1958); Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85, 98 ; 133 NW2d 129 (1965).* * 3 He then makes three points. 1982See Spence v Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc, 353 Mich 120, 134-135 ; 90 NW2d 873 (1958); Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85, 98 ; 133 NW2d 129 (1965).* * 3 He then makes three points. | 2 | 2 |
Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc.red2 sentences2023Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Court scheduled and heard oral argument on the application, directing plaintiff to brief whether Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512 (2001), was consistent with Michigan’s comparative-negligence framework and, if not, what approach the Court should adopt for analyzing premises-liability cases under a comparative-negligence framework. 509 Mich 857 (2022). 2023Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Court scheduled and heard oral argument on the application, directing plaintiff to brief whether Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512 (2001), was consistent with Michigan’s comparative-negligence framework and, if not, what approach the Court should adopt for analyzing premises-liability cases under a comparative-negligence framework. 509 Mich 857 (2022). | 1 | 6 |
Riddle v. McLouth Steel Products Corp.green2 sentences2018The concurrence does not appear to disagree that premises possessors, such as defendants here, should have reasonably expected that a licensee, such as plaintiff, would turn on the light, but the concurrence proceeds to reason that the failure to turn on the light "may very well be relevant to apportioning damages under comparative negligence principles." I agree that plaintiff's failure to do so may well be relevant in a comparative-negligence analysis, but the concurrence does not explain why the presence of the light switch and defendants' reasonable expectations of plaintiff's conduct in r 2018The concurrence does not appear to disagree that premises possessors, such as defendants here, should have reasonably expected that a licensee, such as plaintiff, would turn on the light, but the concurrence proceeds to reason that the failure to turn on the light "may very well be relevant to apportioning damages under comparative negligence principles." I agree that plaintiff's failure to do so may well be relevant in a comparative-negligence analysis, but the concurrence does not explain why the presence of the light switch and defendants' reasonable expectations of plaintiff's conduct in r | 1 | 3 |
Jalaba v. Borovoygreen2 sentences2004See Pietrzyk v Detroit, 123 Mich App 244, 248-249 ; 333 NW2d 236 (1983), and Jalaba v Borovoy, 206 Mich App 17, 23 ; 520 NW2d 349 (1994). 2004See Pietrzyk v Detroit, 123 Mich App 244, 248-249 ; 333 NW2d 236 (1983), and Jalaba v Borovoy, 206 Mich App 17, 23 ; 520 NW2d 349 (1994). | 1 | 3 |
Grieb v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Incgreen2 sentences2006Id. at 520-522. 2000Moreover, we agree that, as stated in Grieb, supra, and Barr, supra, the statute, as amended, suggests a comparative negligence analysis in certain circumstances. | 1 | 2 |
Kaatz v. Stategreen2 sentences1994There is, therefore, no longer any reason for resort to the doctrine of last clear chance . . . .” [Callesen at 261 (quoting Kaatz v State, 540 P2d 1037, 1050 [Ala, 1975]).] It is clear from the case of Zeni v Anderson, 397 *132 Mich 117, 146-151; 243 NW2d 270 (1976), that Gibbard’s "gross negligence” is merely an alternative label used to describe the doctrine of last clear chance. 4 "Such gross negligence is also sometimes called . . . last clear chance doctrine . . . .” Gibbard at 319 . 1989The Alaska *261 Supreme Court in Kaatz, supra, while also abolishing the doctrine during the course of adopting a system of pure comparative negligence, gave the following explanation: We are, however, prepared to deal with one facet of the comparative negligence rule at this time: the status of the doctrine of "last clear chance”. | 1 | 2 |
Kirby v. Larsongreen2 sentences1992This Court initially accepted the doctrine of comparative negligence in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); see also Kirby v Larson, 400 Mich 585 ; 256 NW2d 400 (1977). 1992This Court initially accepted the doctrine of comparative negligence in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); see also Kirby v Larson, 400 Mich 585 ; 256 NW2d 400 (1977). | 1 | 2 |
Beckie Price v. High Pointe Oil Co Incgreen1 sentence2018The concurrence does not appear to disagree that premises possessors, such as defendants here, should have reasonably expected that a licensee, such as plaintiff, would turn on the light, but the concurrence proceeds to reason that the failure to turn on the light “may very well be relevant to apportioning damages under comparative negligence principles.” I agree that plaintiff’s failure to do so may well be relevant in a comparative- negligence analysis, but the concurrence does not explain why the presence of the light switch and defendants’ reasonable expectations of plaintiff’s conduct in | 1 | 1 |
Ferguson v. Delaware International Speedwaygreen2 sentences2016See Ferguson v Delaware Int’l Speedway, 164 Mich App 283, 293 ; 416 NW2d 415 (1987) (holding that any error as to a comparative negligence instruction was harmless because the jury concluded that the defendant was not negligent). 2016See Ferguson v Delaware Int’l Speedway, 164 Mich App 283, 293 ; 416 NW2d 415 (1987) (holding that any error as to a comparative negligence instruction was harmless because the jury concluded that the defendant was not negligent). | 1 | 1 |
Barr v. MT. BRIGHTON INC.green1 sentence2007In such a case, common-law negligence principles of “reasonable under the circumstances” and comparative negligence would be applicable. [Id. at 694-695 (emphasis added).] Likewise, in Kent , a case involving a skier injured while riding on a chair lift, this Court upheld the order granting the ski operator’s motion for summary disposition, but nevertheless noted that, as recognized in Barr , “the statute, as amended, suggests a comparative negligence analysis in certain circumstances.” Kent, supra at 743 ; accord Barr v Mt Brighton Inc, 454 Mich 910, 911 (1997) (BOYLE, J., concurring in the d | 1 | 1 |
Singerman v. Municipal Service Bureau, Inc.green2 sentences2003As noted in Singerman v Muni Service Bureau, Inc, 455 Mich 135, 145 (Weaver, J.), 146 (Mallett, C.J.); 565 NW2d 383 (1997), quoting 57A Am Jur 2d, Negligence, § 473, p 454, “ ‘An event may be one without which a particular injury would not have occurred, but if it merely provided the condition or occasion affording the opportunity for the other event to produce the injury, it is not the proximate cause thereof.’ ” It could be argued that pretreatment negligence “merely provide [s] the condition . . . affording the opportunity for the [medical malpractice] to produce the injury.” Id. 6 There is 2003As noted in Singerman v Muni Service Bureau, Inc, 455 Mich 135, 145 (Weaver, J.), 146 (Mallett, C.J.); 565 NW2d 383 (1997), quoting 57A Am Jur 2d, Negligence, § 473, p 454, “ ‘An event may be one without which a particular injury would not have occurred, but if it merely provided the condition or occasion affording the opportunity for the other event to produce the injury, it is not the proximate cause thereof.’ ” It could be argued that pretreatment negligence “merely provide [s] the condition . . . affording the opportunity for the [medical malpractice] to produce the injury.” Id. 6 There is | 1 | 1 |
| Mansfield v. Circle K. Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
Kellerman v. Zenogreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Kellerman v Zeno, 64 Ark App 79, 88-89; 983 SW2d 136 (1998) (intentional conduct); Mansfield v Circle K Corp, 877 P2d 1130, 1136, n 16 (Okla, 1994) (wilful, wanton, or intentional conduct); Krivijanski v Union R Co, 357 Pa Super 196, 203; 515 A2d 933 (1986) (wilful or wanton misconduct); Davies v Butler, 95 Nev 763, 772; 602 P2d 605 (1979) (wilful or wanton misconduct). 2002See, e.g., Kellerman v Zeno, 64 Ark App 79, 88-89; 983 SW2d 136 (1998) (intentional conduct); Mansfield v Circle K Corp, 877 P2d 1130, 1136, n 16 (Okla, 1994) (wilful, wanton, or intentional conduct); Krivijanski v Union R Co, 357 Pa Super 196, 203; 515 A2d 933 (1986) (wilful or wanton misconduct); Davies v Butler, 95 Nev 763, 772; 602 P2d 605 (1979) (wilful or wanton misconduct). | 1 | 1 |
| Wilkinson v. Leegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barr v. Mt. Brighton Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bowen v. Arnoldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Callesen v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILROAD CO.green | 1 | 1 |
| Howell Electric Light & Power Co. v. Village of Howellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bushland v. Corner Pocket Billiard Lounge of Moorhead, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dinger v. Department of Natural Resourcesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Melendres v. Soalesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Karcesky v. Lariagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Union Trust Co. v. Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Funk v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1982In this case we are required to determine the effect of the doctrine of comparative negligence 1 on our decisions in Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91 ; 220 NW2d 641 (1974), and Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Division of Avis Industries, Inc, 406 Mich 615 ; 281 NW2d 291 (1979). 2 Since the defense of comparative negligence serves not to undermine but to enhance safety in the workplace, we are of the view that comparative negligence is available as a defense in those cases where Funk and Tulkku formerly prohibited the application of the contributory negligence defense. 1982In this case we are required to determine the effect of the doctrine of comparative negligence 1 on our decisions in Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91 ; 220 NW2d 641 (1974), and Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Division of Avis Industries, Inc, 406 Mich 615 ; 281 NW2d 291 (1979). 2 Since the defense of comparative negligence serves not to undermine but to enhance safety in the workplace, we are of the view that comparative negligence is available as a defense in those cases where Funk and Tulkku formerly prohibited the application of the contributory negligence defense. | 4 | 1982–1987 |
Laier v. Kitchen
green
2 sentences2025See MCL 600.2959; Laier, 266 Mich App at 496 . 2023See MCL 600.2959; Laier v Kitchen, 266 Mich App 482, 496 ; 702 NW2d 199 (2005). | 3 | 2015–2025 |
Hardy v. Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc
green
2 sentences2017Instead, Hardy adopted a comparative negligence rule on the grounds that such a rule retains a strong incentive for general contractors to maintain workplace safety. [Id. at 27, quoting Hardy, 414 Mich at 41 .] Similarly, if the relevant “danger” for the purpose of the “common work area” doctrine encompasses a plaintiff’s negligent conduct other than his or her failure to use available safety equipment, “we would effectively return to a contributory negligence regime.” Id. 2017Instead, Hardy adopted a comparative negligence rule on the grounds that such a rule retains a strong incentive for general contractors to maintain workplace safety. [Id. at 27, quoting Hardy, 414 Mich at 41 .] Similarly, if the relevant “danger” for the purpose of the “common work area” doctrine encompasses a plaintiff’s negligent conduct other than his or her failure to use available safety equipment, “we would effectively return to a contributory negligence regime.” Id. | 3 | 1987–2017 |
Weeks v. Feltner
green
2 sentences1982The rationale behind preserving the doctrine of joint and several liability for the negligent common action of joint tortfeasors even when comparative negligence is adopted was set forth in Caldwell v Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co, 111 Mich App 721, 725-726 ; 315 NW2d 186 (1981), quoting from Weeks v Feltner, 99 Mich App 392 ; 297 NW2d 678 (1980): "This argument ignores the fact that the comparative negligence doctrine also seeks to assure fair and adequate compensation for injured plaintiffs. 1982The rationale behind preserving the doctrine of joint and several liability for the negligent common action of joint tortfeasors even when comparative negligence is adopted was set forth in Caldwell v Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co, 111 Mich App 721, 725-726 ; 315 NW2d 186 (1981), quoting from Weeks v Feltner, 99 Mich App 392 ; 297 NW2d 678 (1980): "This argument ignores the fact that the comparative negligence doctrine also seeks to assure fair and adequate compensation for injured plaintiffs. | 3 | 1981–1982 |
Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing Corp.
green
2 sentences2000Similarly, in Schmitz, supra at 696 , where a skier hit a tree, this Court found that that danger was enumerated in the statute as one for which the skier accepted the risk of danger “as a matter of law.” Significantly, this Court agreed with the plaintiff that certain sections of the SASA, particularly MCL 408.342(1); MSA 18.483(22)(1), which requires a skier to “[m]aintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times,” and MCL 408.344; MSA 18.483(24), which states that a skier or operator who violates the act is hable for the portion of loss or damage resulting from that vi 2000Similarly, in Schmitz, supra at 696 , where a skier hit a tree, this Court found that that danger was enumerated in the statute as one for which the skier accepted the risk of danger “as a matter of law.” Significantly, this Court agreed with the plaintiff that certain sections of the SASA, particularly MCL 408.342(1); MSA 18.483(22)(1), which requires a skier to “[m]aintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times,” and MCL 408.344; MSA 18.483(24), which states that a skier or operator who violates the act is hable for the portion of loss or damage resulting from that vi | 2 | 1996–2000 |
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights
neutral
2 sentences1988This contention is supported by the language of MCL 408.342(1); MSA 18.483(22)(1) which states that a skier must "[m]aintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.” Plaintiffs contention is further supported by MCL 408.344; MSA 18.483(24), which states that a skier or ski area operator who violates the act is "liable for the portion of loss or damage resulting from that violation,” and which suggests a comparative negligence principle such as that articulated in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), reh den 406 Mich 1119 (1979). 1987In Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), reh den 406 Mich 1119 (1979), our Supreme Court replaced the doctrine of contributory negligence, as a total bar to recovery, with the doctrine of comparative negligence. | 2 | 1987–1988 |
Tulkku v. MacKworth Rees Division of Avis Industries, Inc
green
2 sentences1982In this case we are required to determine the effect of the doctrine of comparative negligence 1 on our decisions in Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91 ; 220 NW2d 641 (1974), and Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Division of Avis Industries, Inc, 406 Mich 615 ; 281 NW2d 291 (1979). 2 Since the defense of comparative negligence serves not to undermine but to enhance safety in the workplace, we are of the view that comparative negligence is available as a defense in those cases where Funk and Tulkku formerly prohibited the application of the contributory negligence defense. 1982In this case we are required to determine the effect of the doctrine of comparative negligence 1 on our decisions in Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91 ; 220 NW2d 641 (1974), and Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Division of Avis Industries, Inc, 406 Mich 615 ; 281 NW2d 291 (1979). 2 Since the defense of comparative negligence serves not to undermine but to enhance safety in the workplace, we are of the view that comparative negligence is available as a defense in those cases where Funk and Tulkku formerly prohibited the application of the contributory negligence defense. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.
green
2 sentences1982See Spence v Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc, 353 Mich 120, 134-135 ; 90 NW2d 873 (1958); Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85, 98 ; 133 NW2d 129 (1965).* * 3 He then makes three points. 1982See Spence v Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc, 353 Mich 120, 134-135 ; 90 NW2d 873 (1958); Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85, 98 ; 133 NW2d 129 (1965).* * 3 He then makes three points. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Gibbard v. Cursan
red
2 sentences1968It is well settled in Michigan since Gibbard v. Cursan (1923), 225 Mich 311 , that this jurisdiction does not recognize different degrees of negligence nor the doctrine of comparative negligence. 1944Gibbard v. Cursan, 225 Mich. 311 ; Finkler v. Zimmer, 258 Mich. 336 . | 2 | 1944–1968 |
Zaremba Equipment, Inc. v. Harco National Insurance
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 35 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Holton v. A+ Insurance Associates, Inc
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Meridian Mutual Insurance v. Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Meridian Mut Ins Co v Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc (On Remand), 242 Mich App 645, 648 ; 620 NW2d 310 (2000). 2008Meridian Mut Ins Co v Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc (On Remand), 242 Mich App 645, 648 ; 620 NW2d 310 (2000). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Kent v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc
green
1 sentence2007In such a case, common-law negligence principles of “reasonable under the circumstances” and comparative negligence would be applicable. [Id. at 694-695 (emphasis added).] Likewise, in Kent , a case involving a skier injured while riding on a chair lift, this Court upheld the order granting the ski operator’s motion for summary disposition, but nevertheless noted that, as recognized in Barr , “the statute, as amended, suggests a comparative negligence analysis in certain circumstances.” Kent, supra at 743 ; accord Barr v Mt Brighton Inc, 454 Mich 910, 911 (1997) (BOYLE, J., concurring in the d | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Charleston v. Meijer, Inc
green
2 sentences2007The doctrine of contributory negligence has been abrogated since our Supreme Court’s decision in Jaworski , see Placek v Sterling Hts, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), and this Court has suggested that the reasoning of Jaworski — holding that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent for failing to observe and avoid the spilled cottage cheese — is no longer relevant under the doctrine of comparative negligence, Charleston, supra at 419 . 2007The Charleston Court observed that with the advent of comparative negligence in Michigan, “[t]he trend is towards allowing all issues [concerning the plaintiffs alleged negligence], when supported by the facts, to go to the jury....” Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Jones v. Enertel, Inc
green
1 sentence2003As the trial court noted, defendants’ argument poses the classic “but for” argument of causation, which in this context simply extends to further remote causes, i.e., but for someone building the home, plaintiffs would not have suffered a loss. “[T]he adoption of a comparative negligence doctrine does not act to create negligence where none existed before.” Jones, supra at 437 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ward v. K Mart Corp.
green
1 sentence2003It is fundamental tort law that before a defendant can be found to have been negligent, it must first be determined that the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff.” [Riddle, supra at 99 , quoting Ward v Kmart Corp, 136 Ill 2d 132, 145; 554 NE2d 223 (1990).] The Court in Riddle farther noted that the adoption of a comparative negligence doctrine does not act to create negligence where none existed before. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Krivijanski v. Union Railroad green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Davies v. Butler green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Bordeaux v. Celotex Corp. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| McCormick v. Go Forward Operating Ltd. Partnership green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hickey v. Zezulka green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Barrett v. Campbell green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Petrove v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Smith v. O'Harrow Construction Co. neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Zeni v. Anderson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Sharp Ex Rel. Sharp v. Fairbanks North Star Borough green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Duke v. American Olean Tile Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Reda Pump Co., a Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Finck green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Wilson v. Stilwill green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Larabell v. Schuknecht green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Moning v. Alfono green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Rittenhouse v. Erhart green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Landry v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In re PBB Litigation neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Ferdig v. Melitta, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Placek v. City of Sterling Heights green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| George v. Eaton Corp. neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Caldwell v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.