set out standard in Florida

2002In Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1958), a case preceding section 768.28, this Court set out the principle applicable to the earlier constitutional provision pertaining to sovereign immunity.

2002In Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 So.2d 421 (Fla.1958), a case preceding section 768.28, this Court set out the principle applicable to the earlier constitutional provision pertaining to sovereign immunity.

1996This Court set out the standard for a jury override in Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla.1975): In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.

1982In Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975), this Court set out the standard which must be met in order to affirm a trial court's sentence of death over a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment.

2019This Court set out the test for determining fundamental error in Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1960).

2019We held that, to overcome the timely objection rule and be deemed fundamental, “the error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.” Id. at 484 .

2018V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. In State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), this Court set out the test to be applied in determining whether an error is harmless: The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test.

2018V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. In State v. DiGuilio , 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), this Court set out the test to be applied in determining whether an error is harmless: The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly *1086 wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test.

2006San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 469 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071 , 119 S.Ct. 1468 , 143 L.Ed.2d 553 (1999); Warren v. State, 701 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

2006San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 469 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071 , 119 S.Ct. 1468 , 143 L.Ed.2d 553 (1999); Warren v. State, 701 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

2006San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 469 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071 , 119 S.Ct. 1468 , 143 L.Ed.2d 553 (1999); Warren v. State, 701 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

2006San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 469 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071 , 119 S.Ct. 1468 , 143 L.Ed.2d 553 (1999); Warren v. State, 701 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

2004In Fleming v. Fleming, 710 So.2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), this court set out factors to be considered in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for continuance.

1999In Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d 693 (Fla.1997), this Court set out our standard for reviewing aggravating circumstances: [I]t is not this Court's function to reweigh the evidence to determine whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—that is the trial court's job.

1997Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587 (Fla.1962), this Court set out the framework for determining whether specific activities constitute the practice of law, which bears repeating here.

1997This Court set out the standard for reviewing such claims following an evidentiary hearing in Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250 (Fla.1997): In reviewing a trial court's application of the [relevant] law to a rule 3.850 motion following an evidentiary hearing, this Court applies the following standard of review: As long as the trial court's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, "this Court will not `substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the tria

1997This Court set out the standard for reviewing such claims following an evidentiary hearing in Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250 (Fla.1997): In reviewing a trial court's application of the [relevant] law to a rule 3.850 motion following an evidentiary hearing, this Court applies the following standard of review: As long as the trial court's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, "this Court will not `substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the tria

1997In the present case, the trial court addressed this first claim at length and concluded: The Court has weighed all the above matters in light of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [ 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984).

1997In the present case, the trial court addressed this first claim at length and concluded: The Court has weighed all the above matters in light of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [ 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984).

1997This Court set out the standard for corpus delicti in Meyers v. State, 704 So.2d 1368 (Fla.1997): To admit a defendant's confession, the state must prove the corpus delicti either by direct or circumstantial evidence.

1996In State v. Kahles, 644 So.2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), approved, 657 So.2d 897 (Fla.1995), this court set out the analysis to be applied by a trial court when faced with a vagueness argument.

1996In State v. Kahles, 644 So.2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), approved, 657 So.2d 897 (Fla.1995), this court set out the analysis to be applied by a trial court when faced with a vagueness argument.

1983The court set out factors which should be considered in making this determination: [W]hether the maximum penalties of the statutes involved are greatly disparate, whether some reason exists why one jurisdiction cannot be entrusted to vindicate fully another jurisdiction's interests in securing a conviction, and whether the differences in the statutes are merely jurisdictional or are more substantive. 398 Mich. at 461 , 247 N.W.2d at 871 .

1983The court set out factors which should be considered in making this determination: [W]hether the maximum penalties of the statutes involved are greatly disparate, whether some reason exists why one jurisdiction cannot be entrusted to vindicate fully another jurisdiction's interests in securing a conviction, and whether the differences in the statutes are merely jurisdictional or are more substantive. 398 Mich. at 461 , 247 N.W.2d at 871 .