set out framework in Oregon

2009ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: “No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.” In State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402 , 649 P2d 569 (1982), this court set out a framework within which to analyze challenges to statutes under Article I, section 8, which the court later summarized in State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993): “First, the court

2009ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: “No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.” In State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402 , 649 P2d 569 (1982), this court set out a framework within which to analyze challenges to statutes under Article I, section 8, which the court later summarized in State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993): “First, the court

2009ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: “No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.” In State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402 , 649 P2d 569 (1982), this court set out a framework within which to analyze challenges to statutes under Article I, section 8, which the court later summarized in State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993): “First, the court

2009ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: “No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.” In State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402 , 649 P2d 569 (1982), this court set out a framework within which to analyze challenges to statutes under Article I, section 8, which the court later summarized in State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993): “First, the court

2025In Dearmitt II, this court set out the principle that “[a] sentencing court may not rely on aggravating facts that were not included either in the indictment or in written notice to the defendant to support an upward departure.” 321 Or App at 630 (citing ORS 136.765 and Davilla, 280 Or App at 62 ).

2025In Dearmitt II, this court set out the principle that “[a] sentencing court may not rely on aggravating facts that were not included either in the indictment or in written notice to the defendant to support an upward departure.” 321 Or App at 630 (citing ORS 136.765 and Davilla, 280 Or App at 62 ).

2009ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: “No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.” In State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402 , 649 P2d 569 (1982), this court set out a framework within which to analyze challenges to statutes under Article I, section 8, which the court later summarized in State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993): “First, the court

1991The court set out a test to determine whether separate convictions should be entered: “(1) Did defendant engage in acts that are ‘the same conduct or criminal episode,’ (2) did defendant’s acts violate two or more ‘statutory provisions,’ and (3) does each statutory ‘provision’ require ‘proof of an element that the others do not.’ ” 308 Or at 278 .

1987In State v. Warner, 284 Or. 147 , 585 P.2d 681 (1978), and Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485 , 443 P.2d 621 (1968), this court set out a rule for appellate review of the voluntariness of admissions and confessions.

1987In State v. Warner, 284 Or. 147 , 585 P.2d 681 (1978), and Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485 , 443 P.2d 621 (1968), this court set out a rule for appellate review of the voluntariness of admissions and confessions.

1987In State v. Warner, 284 Or. 147 , 585 P.2d 681 (1978), and Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485 , 443 P.2d 621 (1968), this court set out a rule for appellate review of the voluntariness of admissions and confessions.

1987In State v. Warner, 284 Or. 147 , 585 P.2d 681 (1978), and Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485 , 443 P.2d 621 (1968), this court set out a rule for appellate review of the voluntariness of admissions and confessions.

1985This, in turn, requires a finding that [the arsonist] was the dominant force in the affairs of [the corporation] and that the other parties in interest in the corporation so permitted him to control the affairs of the corporation that legally they may be held responsible for his acts and precluded from recovering for his wrongdoing.” Although the amount of stock owned by the arsonist was a factor in the court’s decision, it emphasized that recovery was properly denied only because the arsonist “largely dominated the affairs of the corporation” and because, in reality, the business was operated

1985This, in turn, requires a finding that [the arsonist] was the dominant force in the affairs of [the corporation] and that the other parties in interest in the corporation so permitted him to control the affairs of the corporation that legally they may be held responsible for his acts and precluded from recovering for his wrongdoing." Although the amount of stock owned by the arsonist was a factor in the court's decision, it emphasized that recovery was properly denied only because the arsonist "largely dominated the affairs of the corporation" and because, in reality, the business was operated

1982Gossett v. Simonson, 243 Or 16, 24 , 411 P2d 277 (1966), (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958)).

1982Gossett v. Simonson, 243 Or 16, 24 , 411 P2d 277 (1966), (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958)).

1982In Stanfield v. Laccoarce, 284 Or 651, 655 , 588 P2d 1271 (1978), the court set out the factors to be considered in determining whether an employe was acting within the scope of his employment: 1) whether the act in question is of a kind the employe was hired to perform; 2) whether the act occurred substantially within the authorized limits of time and space; and 3) whether the employe was motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.

1982In Stanfield v. Laccoarce, 284 Or 651, 655 , 588 P2d 1271 (1978), the court set out the factors to be considered in determining whether an employe was acting within the scope of his employment: 1) whether the act in question is of a kind the employe was hired to perform; 2) whether the act occurred substantially within the authorized limits of time and space; and 3) whether the employe was motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.