set out standard in Arkansas

2022Martin v. Decker, 96 Ark.

2022Martin v. Decker, 96 Ark.

2014This court set out the standard to determine impossibility of performance in Frigillana v. Frigillana, 266 Ark. 296 , 584 S.W.2d 30 (1979), which states as follows: The burden of proving impossibility of performance, its nature and extent and causative effect rests upon the party alleging it.

2014This court set out the standard to determine impossibility of performance in Frigillana v. Frigillana, 266 Ark. 296 , 584 S.W.2d 30 (1979), which states as follows: The burden of proving impossibility of performance, its nature and extent and causative effect rests upon the party alleging it.

2004Custom Microsystems, Inc. v. Blake, 344 Ark. 536 , 42 S.W.3d 453 (2001).

2004Custom Microsystems, Inc. v. Blake, 344 Ark. 536 , 42 S.W.3d 453 (2001).

1999Nelson v. River Valley Bank & Trust, 334 Ark. 172 , 971 S.W.2d 777 (1998).

1999Nelson v. River Valley Bank & Trust, 334 Ark. 172 , 971 S.W.2d 777 (1998).

1986Co., 240 Ark. 76 , 398 S.W.2d 208 (1966), at page 83, the Court set out the standard to determine when such use ripens into a right as follows: Where there is usage of a passageway over land, whether it began by permission or otherwise, if that usage continues openly for seven years after the landowner has actual knowledge that the use is adverse to his interest or where the usage continues for seven years after the facts and circumstances of the prior usage are such that the landowner would be presumed to know the usage was adverse, then such usage ripens into an absolute right.

1986Co., 240 Ark. 76 , 398 S.W.2d 208 (1966), at page 83, the Court set out the standard to determine when such use ripens into a right as follows: Where there is usage of a passageway over land, whether it began by permission or otherwise, if that usage continues openly for seven years after the landowner has actual knowledge that the use is adverse to his interest or where the usage continues for seven years after the facts and circumstances of the prior usage are such that the landowner would be presumed to know the usage was adverse, then such usage ripens into an absolute right.

1976In Perez v. State, 249 Ark. 1111 , 463 S.W.2d 394 (1971), this court set out the rule for overturning a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial as follows: "We have uniformly held that, because of the wide latitude of discretion vested in the trial judge in granting or denying a motion for a mistrial, we will not reverse a judgment because of his action on such a motion in the absence of an abuse of that discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party.

1976In Perez v. State, 249 Ark. 1111 , 463 S.W.2d 394 (1971), this court set out the rule for overturning a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial as follows: "We have uniformly held that, because of the wide latitude of discretion vested in the trial judge in granting or denying a motion for a mistrial, we will not reverse a judgment because of his action on such a motion in the absence of an abuse of that discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party.

1976Shroeder v. Johnson, 234 Ark. 443 , 352 S.W.2d 570 ." The allegedly prejudicial testimony occurred upon cross-examination of appellant Bettis and appears in the record as follows: "Q.

1976Shroeder v. Johnson, 234 Ark. 443 , 352 S.W.2d 570 ." The allegedly prejudicial testimony occurred upon cross-examination of appellant Bettis and appears in the record as follows: "Q.