set out rule in Kansas

1965(Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 4th ed., § 202, p. 192.) In Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 424 , 21 Pac. 288 , this court set out the rule that no remainder will be construed to be contingent which may, consistently with the words used and the intention expressed, be deemed vested.

1965(Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 4th ed., § 202, p. 192.) In Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 424 , 21 Pac. 288 , this court set out the rule that no remainder will be construed to be contingent which may, consistently with the words used and the intention expressed, be deemed vested.

1999Ed. 2d 535 , 103 S. Ct. 673 ] (1983).” In State v. Harlin, 260 Kan. 881 , 925 P.2d 1149 (1996), this court set out the rule which applies to the present case.

1999Ed. 2d 535 , 103 S. Ct. 673 ] (1983).” In State v. Harlin, 260 Kan. 881 , 925 P.2d 1149 (1996), this court set out the rule which applies to the present case.

1999Ed. 2d 535 , 103 S. Ct. 673 ] (1983).” In State v. Harlin, 260 Kan. 881 , 925 P.2d 1149 (1996), this court set out the rule which applies to the present case.

1997In State v. Field, 252 Kan. 657, 664-65 , 847 P.2d 1280 (1993), the court set out the standard of review applicable to this issue: “[T]he determination of whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of law, or in some cases a mixed question of law and fact, for the appellate court to determine under die totality of the facts and circumstances.” Hadley cites K.S.A. 22-2402(1), which provides: ‘Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to

1997In State v. Field, 252 Kan. 657, 664-65 , 847 P.2d 1280 (1993), the court set out the standard of review applicable to this issue: “[T]he determination of whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of law, or in some cases a mixed question of law and fact, for the appellate court to determine under die totality of the facts and circumstances.” Hadley cites K.S.A. 22-2402(1), which provides: ‘Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to

1997Therefore, to stop a moving vehicle an officer must have articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion under K.S.A. 22-2402 and Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.

1997Therefore, to stop a moving vehicle an officer must have articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion under K.S.A. 22-2402 and Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.

1997In State v. Field, 252 Kan. 657, 664-65 , 847 P.2d 1280 (1993), the court set out the standard of review applicable to this issue: “[T]he determination of whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of law, or in some cases a mixed question of law and fact, for the appellate court to determine under die totality of the facts and circumstances.” Hadley cites K.S.A. 22-2402(1), which provides: ‘Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to

1997In State v. Field, 252 Kan. 657, 664-65 , 847 P.2d 1280 (1993), the court set out the standard of review applicable to this issue: “[T]he determination of whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of law, or in some cases a mixed question of law and fact, for the appellate court to determine under die totality of the facts and circumstances.” Hadley cites K.S.A. 22-2402(1), which provides: ‘Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to

1997In State v. Field, 252 Kan. 657, 664-65 , 847 P.2d 1280 (1993), the court set out the standard of review applicable to this issue: “[T]he determination of whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of law, or in some cases a mixed question of law and fact, for the appellate court to determine under die totality of the facts and circumstances.” Hadley cites K.S.A. 22-2402(1), which provides: ‘Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to

1997In State v. Field, 252 Kan. 657, 664-65 , 847 P.2d 1280 (1993), the court set out the standard of review applicable to this issue: “[T]he determination of whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of law, or in some cases a mixed question of law and fact, for the appellate court to determine under die totality of the facts and circumstances.” Hadley cites K.S.A. 22-2402(1), which provides: ‘Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to

1996Phoenix Orthopaedic Surgeons v. Peairs, 164 Ariz. 54, 59 , 790 P.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1989); Duffner v. Alberty, 19 Ark.

1996Phoenix Orthopaedic Surgeons v. Peairs, 164 Ariz. 54, 59 , 790 P.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1989); Duffner v. Alberty, 19 Ark.

1996Phoenix Orthopaedic Surgeons v. Peairs, 164 Ariz. 54, 59 , 790 P.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1989); Duffner v. Alberty, 19 Ark.

1996In H & R Block, 208 Kan. at 544 , this court set out factors which are considered in evaluating the reasonableness of noncompetition covenants contained in employment contracts, stating: “Although there is no rigid, absolute norm by which the reasonableness of a covenant against competition may be determined, rules evolving generally . . . are to the effect that the rights of the promisee, the promisor and the general public are to be taken into account; area and time limitations must be reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case [citations omitted].” Other jurisdictio

1987In Lee v. City of Fort Scott, 238 Kan. 421 , Syl. ¶ 1, 710 P.2d *293 689 (1985), this court set out the test for establishing gross and wanton negligence: “Proof of a willingness to injure is not necessary in establishing gross and wanton negligence.

1985K.S.A. 60-259(a) lists five grounds for a new trial, including, “newly discovered evidence material for the party applying, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.“ In Schraft v. Leis, 236 Kan. 28 , 686 P.2d 865 (1984), this court set out the rule for reviewing the trial court’s decision of refusing to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: “The granting or denial of a new trial on grounds of surprise or newly discovered evidence is discretionary on the part of the trial court, and will not be reversed unless a clear abuse of dis

1985K.S.A. 60-259(a) lists five grounds for a new trial, including, “newly discovered evidence material for the party applying, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.“ In Schraft v. Leis, 236 Kan. 28 , 686 P.2d 865 (1984), this court set out the rule for reviewing the trial court’s decision of refusing to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: “The granting or denial of a new trial on grounds of surprise or newly discovered evidence is discretionary on the part of the trial court, and will not be reversed unless a clear abuse of dis

1965Courts are inclined toward a construction favorable to the early vesting of an estate so as not to defeat the intent of the testator but there must necessarily be a vesting within the limits of the rule against perpetuities. ( Klingman v. Gilbert, 90 Kan. 545, 548, 549 , 135 Pac. 682 ; Tretbar v. Aged Ministers Home, 180 Kan. 18, 21 , 299 P.2d 58 .)" In ruling upon whether a future interest violates the rule against perpetuities, speculation concerning the probabilities of various subsequent developments is not indulged in by the courts.

1965Courts are inclined toward a construction favorable to the early vesting of an estate so as not to defeat the intent of the testator but there must necessarily be a vesting within the limits of the rule against perpetuities. ( Klingman v. Gilbert, 90 Kan. 545, 548, 549 , 135 Pac. 682 ; Tretbar v. Aged Ministers Home, 180 Kan. 18, 21 , 299 P.2d 58 .)" In ruling upon whether a future interest violates the rule against perpetuities, speculation concerning the probabilities of various subsequent developments is not indulged in by the courts.

1937(See Converse v. Wichita Gas Co., 132 Kan. 291 , 295 Pac. 635 .) In Fenn v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 118 Kan. 131 , 234 Pac. 77 , this court set out the rule to be followed as a test for setting aside inadequate or excessive verdicts.

1937(See Converse v. Wichita Gas Co., 132 Kan. 291 , 295 Pac. 635 .) In Fenn v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 118 Kan. 131 , 234 Pac. 77 , this court set out the rule to be followed as a test for setting aside inadequate or excessive verdicts.

1937(See Converse v. Wichita Gas Co., 132 Kan. 291 , 295 Pac. 635 .) In Fenn v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 118 Kan. 131 , 234 Pac. 77 , this court set out the rule to be followed as a test for setting aside inadequate or excessive verdicts.

1937(See Converse v. Wichita Gas Co., 132 Kan. 291 , 295 Pac. 635 .) In Fenn v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 118 Kan. 131 , 234 Pac. 77 , this court set out the rule to be followed as a test for setting aside inadequate or excessive verdicts.