case out rule in Georgia

1982Barraza v. State, 149 Ga. App. 738 (2) ( 256 SE2d 48 ) (1979).

1982Barraza v. State, 149 Ga. App. 738 (2) ( 256 SE2d 48 ) (1979).

1957The holding here is not in conflict with, but is in conformity with the holding in Florida Yellow Pine Co. v. Flint River Naval Stores Co., 140 Ga. 321 ( 78 S. E. 900 ).

1957The holding here is not in conflict with, but is in conformity with the holding in Florida Yellow Pine Co. v. Flint River Naval Stores Co., 140 Ga. 321 ( 78 S. E. 900 ).

1957In Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873 ( 189 S. E. 713 ) this court held: “Where an owner of personal property agrees to sell it to another person for cash, and on delivery of the property to the purchaser, accepts checks in payment, and thereafter such purchaser, having been placed in possession of the property by virtue of such agreement to sell, sells it for a valuable consideration to a third person who has no notice of the true owner’s title, the owner is thereafter estopped to set up his title as against such third person, although the checks so given, on due presentation to

1957In Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873 ( 189 S. E. 713 ) this court held: “Where an owner of personal property agrees to sell it to another person for cash, and on delivery of the property to the purchaser, accepts checks in payment, and thereafter such purchaser, having been placed in possession of the property by virtue of such agreement to sell, sells it for a valuable consideration to a third person who has no notice of the true owner’s title, the owner is thereafter estopped to set up his title as against such third person, although the checks so given, on due presentation to

1957In Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873 ( 189 S. E. 713 ) this court held: “Where an owner of personal property agrees to sell it to another person for cash, and on delivery of the property to the purchaser, accepts checks in payment, and thereafter such purchaser, having been placed in possession of the property by virtue of such agreement to sell, sells it for a valuable consideration to a third person who has no notice of the true owner’s title, the owner is thereafter estopped to set up his title as against such third person, although the checks so given, on due presentation to

1957In Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873 ( 189 S. E. 713 ) this court held: “Where an owner of personal property agrees to sell it to another person for cash, and on delivery of the property to the purchaser, accepts checks in payment, and thereafter such purchaser, having been placed in possession of the property by virtue of such agreement to sell, sells it for a valuable consideration to a third person who has no notice of the true owner’s title, the owner is thereafter estopped to set up his title as against such third person, although the checks so given, on due presentation to

1957In Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873 ( 189 S. E. 713 ) this court held: “Where an owner of personal property agrees to sell it to another person for cash, and on delivery of the property to the purchaser, accepts checks in payment, and thereafter such purchaser, having been placed in possession of the property by virtue of such agreement to sell, sells it for a valuable consideration to a third person who has no notice of the true owner’s title, the owner is thereafter estopped to set up his title as against such third person, although the checks so given, on due presentation to

1957In Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873 ( 189 S. E. 713 ) this court held: “Where an owner of personal property agrees to sell it to another person for cash, and on delivery of the property to the purchaser, accepts checks in payment, and thereafter such purchaser, having been placed in possession of the property by virtue of such agreement to sell, sells it for a valuable consideration to a third person who has no notice of the true owner’s title, the owner is thereafter estopped to set up his title as against such third person, although the checks so given, on due presentation to

1957Nations v. Lassiter, 94 Ga. App. 504 ( 95 S. E. 2d 25 ) does not take this case out of the rule of law protecting an innocent third party purchaser for value.

1957Nations v. Lassiter, 94 Ga. App. 504 ( 95 S. E. 2d 25 ) does not take this case out of the rule of law protecting an innocent third party purchaser for value.

1936Bestate ment of the Law, Agency, 629; Hodgson v. Hart, 165 Ga. 882 ( 142 S. E. 267 ).

1936Bestate ment of the Law, Agency, 629; Hodgson v. Hart, 165 Ga. 882 ( 142 S. E. 267 ).

1935There is nothing in the facts to take this case out of the rule stated in Johnson v. Thrower, 117 Ga. 1007 ( 44 S. E. 846 ), where it was said: “In a case where the undisputed evidence shows that the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, the execution of a warrant to dispossess the tenant will not be enjoined by a court of equity; the remedy of the tenant, if he has any defense, being to file the counter-affidavit provided for by the statute; and this is so though the tenant, on account of poverty, maj'' be unable to give the bond and security required as a condition prec

1935There is nothing in the facts to take this case out of the rule stated in Johnson v. Thrower, 117 Ga. 1007 ( 44 S. E. 846 ), where it was said: “In a case where the undisputed evidence shows that the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, the execution of a warrant to dispossess the tenant will not be enjoined by a court of equity; the remedy of the tenant, if he has any defense, being to file the counter-affidavit provided for by the statute; and this is so though the tenant, on account of poverty, maj'' be unable to give the bond and security required as a condition prec

1935There is nothing in the facts to take this case out of the rule stated in Johnson v. Thrower, 117 Ga. 1007 ( 44 S. E. 846 ), where it was said: “In a case where the undisputed evidence shows that the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, the execution of a warrant to dispossess the tenant will not be enjoined by a court of equity; the remedy of the tenant, if he has any defense, being to file the counter-affidavit provided for by the statute; and this is so though the tenant, on account of poverty, maj'' be unable to give the bond and security required as a condition prec

1935There is nothing in the facts to take this case out of the rule stated in Johnson v. Thrower, 117 Ga. 1007 ( 44 S. E. 846 ), where it was said: “In a case where the undisputed evidence shows that the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, the execution of a warrant to dispossess the tenant will not be enjoined by a court of equity; the remedy of the tenant, if he has any defense, being to file the counter-affidavit provided for by the statute; and this is so though the tenant, on account of poverty, maj'' be unable to give the bond and security required as a condition prec

1935There is nothing in the facts to take this case out of the rule stated in Johnson v. Thrower, 117 Ga. 1007 ( 44 S. E. 846 ), where it was said: “In a case where the undisputed evidence shows that the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, the execution of a warrant to dispossess the tenant will not be enjoined by a court of equity; the remedy of the tenant, if he has any defense, being to file the counter-affidavit provided for by the statute; and this is so though the tenant, on account of poverty, maj'' be unable to give the bond and security required as a condition prec

1935There is nothing in the facts to take this case out of the rule stated in Johnson v. Thrower, 117 Ga. 1007 ( 44 S. E. 846 ), where it was said: “In a case where the undisputed evidence shows that the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, the execution of a warrant to dispossess the tenant will not be enjoined by a court of equity; the remedy of the tenant, if he has any defense, being to file the counter-affidavit provided for by the statute; and this is so though the tenant, on account of poverty, maj'' be unable to give the bond and security required as a condition prec

1933Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271 ( 32 N. W. 223 , 60 Am.

1933Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271 ( 32 N. W. 223 , 60 Am.

1931Buchanan v. State, 118 Ga. 751 (9) ( 45 S. E. 607 ); Johnston-Crews Co. v. Smith, 33 Ga. App. 25 ( 125 S. E. 734 ), s. c. 161 Ga. 382 ( 131 S. E. 65 ); Walker v. State, 33 Ga. App. 598 (2) ( 127 S. E. 476 ).

1931Buchanan v. State, 118 Ga. 751 (9) ( 45 S. E. 607 ); Johnston-Crews Co. v. Smith, 33 Ga. App. 25 ( 125 S. E. 734 ), s. c. 161 Ga. 382 ( 131 S. E. 65 ); Walker v. State, 33 Ga. App. 598 (2) ( 127 S. E. 476 ).

1931Buchanan v. State, 118 Ga. 751 (9) ( 45 S. E. 607 ); Johnston-Crews Co. v. Smith, 33 Ga. App. 25 ( 125 S. E. 734 ), s. c. 161 Ga. 382 ( 131 S. E. 65 ); Walker v. State, 33 Ga. App. 598 (2) ( 127 S. E. 476 ).

1931Buchanan v. State, 118 Ga. 751 (9) ( 45 S. E. 607 ); Johnston-Crews Co. v. Smith, 33 Ga. App. 25 ( 125 S. E. 734 ), s. c. 161 Ga. 382 ( 131 S. E. 65 ); Walker v. State, 33 Ga. App. 598 (2) ( 127 S. E. 476 ).

1931Buchanan v. State, 118 Ga. 751 (9) ( 45 S. E. 607 ); Johnston-Crews Co. v. Smith, 33 Ga. App. 25 ( 125 S. E. 734 ), s. c. 161 Ga. 382 ( 131 S. E. 65 ); Walker v. State, 33 Ga. App. 598 (2) ( 127 S. E. 476 ).

1931Buchanan v. State, 118 Ga. 751 (9) ( 45 S. E. 607 ); Johnston-Crews Co. v. Smith, 33 Ga. App. 25 ( 125 S. E. 734 ), s. c. 161 Ga. 382 ( 131 S. E. 65 ); Walker v. State, 33 Ga. App. 598 (2) ( 127 S. E. 476 ).

1931Buchanan v. State, 118 Ga. 751 (9) ( 45 S. E. 607 ); Johnston-Crews Co. v. Smith, 33 Ga. App. 25 ( 125 S. E. 734 ), s. c. 161 Ga. 382 ( 131 S. E. 65 ); Walker v. State, 33 Ga. App. 598 (2) ( 127 S. E. 476 ).

1931Buchanan v. State, 118 Ga. 751 (9) ( 45 S. E. 607 ); Johnston-Crews Co. v. Smith, 33 Ga. App. 25 ( 125 S. E. 734 ), s. c. 161 Ga. 382 ( 131 S. E. 65 ); Walker v. State, 33 Ga. App. 598 (2) ( 127 S. E. 476 ).

1930And inasmuch as time does not run against persons laboring under disability to contract on account of unsoundness of mind (Taylor v. Colley, 138 Ga. 41 , 74 S. E. 694 ; Brown v. Carmichael, supra; Fleming v. Collins, 27 Ga. 494 ; LaGrange Mills v. Kener, 121 Ga. 429 , 49 S. E. 300 ), the petition was not demurrable on the grounds (a) that it failed to allege why the grantor did not bring suit during her lifetime; (b) that, on account of the long lapse of time between execution of the deed in 1905 and institution of the suit in 1929, the plaintiff’s demand has become stale and is barred by the

1930And inasmuch as time does not run against persons laboring under disability to contract on account of unsoundness of mind (Taylor v. Colley, 138 Ga. 41 , 74 S. E. 694 ; Brown v. Carmichael, supra; Fleming v. Collins, 27 Ga. 494 ; LaGrange Mills v. Kener, 121 Ga. 429 , 49 S. E. 300 ), the petition was not demurrable on the grounds (a) that it failed to allege why the grantor did not bring suit during her lifetime; (b) that, on account of the long lapse of time between execution of the deed in 1905 and institution of the suit in 1929, the plaintiff’s demand has become stale and is barred by the

1930And inasmuch as time does not run against persons laboring under disability to contract on account of unsoundness of mind (Taylor v. Colley, 138 Ga. 41 , 74 S. E. 694 ; Brown v. Carmichael, supra; Fleming v. Collins, 27 Ga. 494 ; LaGrange Mills v. Kener, 121 Ga. 429 , 49 S. E. 300 ), the petition was not demurrable on the grounds (a) that it failed to allege why the grantor did not bring suit during her lifetime; (b) that, on account of the long lapse of time between execution of the deed in 1905 and institution of the suit in 1929, the plaintiff’s demand has become stale and is barred by the

1930And inasmuch as time does not run against persons laboring under disability to contract on account of unsoundness of mind (Taylor v. Colley, 138 Ga. 41 , 74 S. E. 694 ; Brown v. Carmichael, supra; Fleming v. Collins, 27 Ga. 494 ; LaGrange Mills v. Kener, 121 Ga. 429 , 49 S. E. 300 ), the petition was not demurrable on the grounds (a) that it failed to allege why the grantor did not bring suit during her lifetime; (b) that, on account of the long lapse of time between execution of the deed in 1905 and institution of the suit in 1929, the plaintiff’s demand has become stale and is barred by the

1930And inasmuch as time does not run against persons laboring under disability to contract on account of unsoundness of mind (Taylor v. Colley, 138 Ga. 41 , 74 S. E. 694 ; Brown v. Carmichael, supra; Fleming v. Collins, 27 Ga. 494 ; LaGrange Mills v. Kener, 121 Ga. 429 , 49 S. E. 300 ), the petition was not demurrable on the grounds (a) that it failed to allege why the grantor did not bring suit during her lifetime; (b) that, on account of the long lapse of time between execution of the deed in 1905 and institution of the suit in 1929, the plaintiff’s demand has become stale and is barred by the

1908In the case of Bartlett v. Columbus, 101 Ga. 300 ( 28 S. E. 599 , 44 L.

1908In the case of Bartlett v. Columbus, 101 Ga. 300 ( 28 S. E. 599 , 44 L.

1905Co. v. Amos, 98 Ga. 533 .

1896The effect of the agreement between the parties was to take this case out of the rule laid down in Duncan v. Clark, 96 Ga. 263 , and the cases upon which it rests.