case out rule in Illinois

1966While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single equitable cause of action, that fact is not sufficient to take this case out of the rule of the above case.” In Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 US 148 (1964), the court stated that the requirement of finality is to be given a “practical” rather than a “technical” construction.

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1926The fact that he was present when the statement was made, and the fact that he had previously made a statement in effect admitting the same thing, takes the case out of the rule announced in People v. Hotz, 261 Ill. 239 .

1919“The right to control the negligent servant is the test by which it is to be determined whether the relation of master and servant exists.” (Pioneer Fireproof Const. Co. v. Hansen, 176 Ill. 100 .) Or, as stated in Maredosia Levee & Drainage Dist. v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 68 , and Decatur Railway & Light Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 472 : “The principal test as to whether one is an employee or an independent contractor lies in the degree of control retained and exercised by the person for whom the work is being done.” We find nothing in the evidence that legitimately tends to sho

1919“The right to control the negligent servant is the test by which it is to be determined whether the relation of master and servant exists.” (Pioneer Fireproof Const. Co. v. Hansen, 176 Ill. 100 .) Or, as stated in Maredosia Levee & Drainage Dist. v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 68 , and Decatur Railway & Light Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 472 : “The principal test as to whether one is an employee or an independent contractor lies in the degree of control retained and exercised by the person for whom the work is being done.” We find nothing in the evidence that legitimately tends to sho

1919“The right to control the negligent servant is the test by which it is to be determined whether the relation of master and servant exists.” (Pioneer Fireproof Const. Co. v. Hansen, 176 Ill. 100 .) Or, as stated in Maredosia Levee & Drainage Dist. v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 68 , and Decatur Railway & Light Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 472 : “The principal test as to whether one is an employee or an independent contractor lies in the degree of control retained and exercised by the person for whom the work is being done.” We find nothing in the evidence that legitimately tends to sho

1908The fact that he happened also to be a master of this court does not seem to us to take the case out of the rule laid down in Bromley Carpet Co. v. Field, 88 Ill.

1907This state of the proof creates a conflict in the evidence and raises the question of the credibility of the witnesses, and in our opinion clearly takes the case out of the rule supported by Ency. of Plead. & Prac., Heinsen v. Lamb, and Anthony v. Wheeler, supra. All the facts and circumstances in evidence should have been submitted to the jury.

1907As we have indicated, the question is not without difficulty ; but without discussing generally the doctrine to which the defendant cites a Virginia case (Hayes v. Mutual Protection Association, 76 Va., 225 ), that “when matter to which estoppel applies is specially pleaded, then the estoppel must be specially replied or it cannot avail,” we will say that we do not think this case in any event a proper one for its application.

1896Horner et al. v. Starkey, Admx., 27 Ill. 13 .

1896In Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 Ill. 127 , the court says (p. 131): “The law as recognized by this court is, that to remove the bar of the Statute of Limitations it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove an express promise to pay the money, or a conditional promise with a performance of the condition, or an unqualified admission that the debt is due and unpaid, nothing being said or done at the time rebutting the presumption of a promise to pay.

1896App. 298 ; 153 Ill. 525 .

1896There was conflicting evidence as to whether the commissions were earned, upon which the finding of the judge, trying the case without a jury, is conclusive; also a question whether Winter was entitled to commissions'—he having no broker’s license, upon which the evidence was not sufficient to take the case out of the principle of O’Neil v. Sinclair, 54 Ill.

1888In Fix v. Quinn, 75 Ill. 232 , it is decided that complaint of irregularity in disposing of an appeal suit in the Circuit Court (though in that case it was held that the complaint was not well founded) comes too late at a subsequent term, and that the section of the statute last quoted has no application to the case.

1887We have most carefully examined the evidence contained in this record to ascertain if there was any fact or circumstance that would take this case out of the rule announced in the Cox case, 21 Ill. 23 , the Keefe case, 47 Ill. 108 , the Britz case, 72 Ill. 256 , and the Durkin case, 76 Ill. 395 , but are unable to distinguish this case from those cited in the principles there held applicable.

1887We have most carefully examined the evidence contained in this record to ascertain if there was any fact or circumstance that would take this case out of the rule announced in the Cox case, 21 Ill. 23 , the Keefe case, 47 Ill. 108 , the Britz case, 72 Ill. 256 , and the Durkin case, 76 Ill. 395 , but are unable to distinguish this case from those cited in the principles there held applicable.

1887We have most carefully examined the evidence contained in this record to ascertain if there was any fact or circumstance that would take this case out of the rule announced in the Cox case, 21 Ill. 23 , the Keefe case, 47 Ill. 108 , the Britz case, 72 Ill. 256 , and the Durkin case, 76 Ill. 395 , but are unable to distinguish this case from those cited in the principles there held applicable.