14 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1900–1980 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. Daygreen1 sentence1980There is no reason in law or logic for supposing that a debtor under an equitable mortgage must use some other form of conveyance to accomplish the same purpose (see Hooper v. Reid, 211 Ala. 451, 453 [1924]; Hill v. Day, 231 Ark. 550, 554 [I960]; Osborne, Mortgages § 247 [2d ed. 1970]) or for taking this case out of the rule that a quitclaim deed is sufficient to convey all the grantor’s right, title and interest in and to the property described in the deed. | 1 | 1 |
Hooper v. Reedgreen1 sentence1980There is no reason in law or logic for supposing that a debtor under an equitable mortgage must use some other form of conveyance to accomplish the same purpose (see Hooper v. Reid, 211 Ala. 451, 453 [1924]; Hill v. Day, 231 Ark. 550, 554 [I960]; Osborne, Mortgages § 247 [2d ed. 1970]) or for taking this case out of the rule that a quitclaim deed is sufficient to convey all the grantor’s right, title and interest in and to the property described in the deed. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kelleygreen1 sentence1975On those three indictments the judge submitted the question of fact to the jury to decide whether the property was “recently stolen.” There are few judicial precedents in this Commonwealth to help a judge or jury in deciding whether stolen property was “recently stolen.” In Commonwealth v. Kelley, 333 Mass. 191, 194 (1955), we said: “The defendant makes the contention that the lapse of fifty-four days between the robbery and the date of the defendant’s proved possession is enough to take the case out of the rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Perkins v. Lockwood
green
2 sentences1938Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249 , Curran v. Rummell, 118 Mass. 482 . 1936Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249 . | 2 | 1936–1938 |
Jennings v. Tompkins
green
1 sentence1943There is not sufficient evidence of a defective condition serious enough to take the case out of the rule of Jennings v. Tompkins, 180 Mass. 302 , and the cases which follow it. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Watriss v. First National Bank of Cambridge
neutral
1 sentence1939The fact that under our interpretation of the subsidiary findings of the master the alleys and racks became by estoppel ordinary chattels and not trade fixtures, takes the case out of the doctrine of Watriss v. First National Bank of Cambridge, 124 Mass. 571 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Commonwealth v. Hull
green
1 sentence1939The smallness of the sentence takes the case out of the rule applied in Commonwealth v. Hull, 296 Mass. 327, 337-338 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Curran v. Rummell
neutral
1 sentence1938Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249 , Curran v. Rummell, 118 Mass. 482 . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Geragosian v. Union Realty Co.
green
1 sentence1938The authorities are collected and fully discussed in the recent cases of Geragosian v. Union Realty Co. 289 Mass. 104, 108-110 , and Gray v. Howell, 292 Mass. 400, 403-404 . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Gray v. Howell
green
1 sentence1938The authorities are collected and fully discussed in the recent cases of Geragosian v. Union Realty Co. 289 Mass. 104, 108-110 , and Gray v. Howell, 292 Mass. 400, 403-404 . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Galvin v. Beals
green
1 sentence1937By his finding, however, that the ceiling was repaired before the occupancy of the plaintiff and her husband, and that the repairs then made were made negligently, he took, the case out of the rule he had in mind, because the liability for repairs negligently made exists only when there is a duty to repair, Galvin v. Beals, 187 Mass. 250, at 252 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Renwick v. Macomber
green
1 sentence1937That was in fact the situation in the case of Renwick v. Macomber, 233 Mass. 530 , but it must be noted that there the general notice by publication and mailing a copy of the citation to the persons interested was held sufficient in the absence of fraud to justify the entry of the decree allowing the will, even if the notice failed to reach the petitioners in that case. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
McLaughlin v. West End Street Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1929The conclusion is that the first petition did not fail for such a cause that the petitioner is entitled to “begin such proceedings anew.” The decisions to the effect that the court may permit a new defendant to be substituted by amendment after the statute of limitations has run (see McLaughlin v. West End Street Railway, 186 Mass. 150 ; Genga v. Director General of Railroads, 243 Mass. 101 ), are not controlling in this case. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Genga v. Director General of Railroads
green
1 sentence1929The conclusion is that the first petition did not fail for such a cause that the petitioner is entitled to “begin such proceedings anew.” The decisions to the effect that the court may permit a new defendant to be substituted by amendment after the statute of limitations has run (see McLaughlin v. West End Street Railway, 186 Mass. 150 ; Genga v. Director General of Railroads, 243 Mass. 101 ), are not controlling in this case. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Timms v. Old Colony Street Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1914There is nothing to the contrary in the statement made in Timms v. Old Colony Street Railway, 183 Mass. 193, 194 , relied on by the defendant. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
McElligott v. Randolph
green
1 sentence1902To prove the Connecticut law on this subject, the plaintiff put in evidence the cases of Wilson v. Willimantic Linen Co. 50 Conn. 433 , Darrigan v. New York & New England Railroad, 52 Conn. 285 , McElligott v. Randolph, 61 Conn. 157 , Gerrish v. New Haven Ice Co. 63 Conn. 9 , and the testimony of Mr. Waller, an attorney at law, practising in Connecticut. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Gerrish v. New Haven Ice Co.
neutral
1 sentence1902To prove the Connecticut law on this subject, the plaintiff put in evidence the cases of Wilson v. Willimantic Linen Co. 50 Conn. 433 , Darrigan v. New York & New England Railroad, 52 Conn. 285 , McElligott v. Randolph, 61 Conn. 157 , Gerrish v. New Haven Ice Co. 63 Conn. 9 , and the testimony of Mr. Waller, an attorney at law, practising in Connecticut. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Wilson v. Willimantic Linen Co.
green
1 sentence1902To prove the Connecticut law on this subject, the plaintiff put in evidence the cases of Wilson v. Willimantic Linen Co. 50 Conn. 433 , Darrigan v. New York & New England Railroad, 52 Conn. 285 , McElligott v. Randolph, 61 Conn. 157 , Gerrish v. New Haven Ice Co. 63 Conn. 9 , and the testimony of Mr. Waller, an attorney at law, practising in Connecticut. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Darrigan v. New York & New England Railroad
green
1 sentence1902To prove the Connecticut law on this subject, the plaintiff put in evidence the cases of Wilson v. Willimantic Linen Co. 50 Conn. 433 , Darrigan v. New York & New England Railroad, 52 Conn. 285 , McElligott v. Randolph, 61 Conn. 157 , Gerrish v. New Haven Ice Co. 63 Conn. 9 , and the testimony of Mr. Waller, an attorney at law, practising in Connecticut. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Messenger v. Dennie
green
1 sentence1900This instruction was deficient if, as the defendant contended, the rule of the road applied to the case ; it was deficient because it omitted from the case the question whether the defendant or the plaintiff was complying with the rule of the road; on this point the evidence was conflicting ; it was also deficient in not instructing the jury what consideration should be given by them to the speed at which the defendant was .driving, on which point, also, the evidence was conflicting; if the jury believed that the defendant was driving at the rate of ten or twelve miles an hour, the facts state | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Purtell v. Jordan
green
1 sentence1900This instruction was deficient if, as the defendant contended, the rule of the road applied to the case ; it was deficient because it omitted from the case the question whether the defendant or the plaintiff was complying with the rule of the road; on this point the evidence was conflicting ; it was also deficient in not instructing the jury what consideration should be given by them to the speed at which the defendant was .driving, on which point, also, the evidence was conflicting; if the jury believed that the defendant was driving at the rate of ten or twelve miles an hour, the facts state | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.