case out rule in New York

1914(Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome Co., 18 N. Y. 155 .) The fact of owning taxable property is not such a peculiarity as to take the case out of the rule, for all property, with very limited exceptions, is taxable, and everybody either has, or is capable of acquiring property.

1861As a resident citizen, and a person liable to be taxed, he has no other rights than such as are common to all the people of that community who own property; and we have decided upon full consideration that it requires some individual interest, distinct from that which belongs to every inhabitant of the town or county, to give the party complaining a standing in court, where it is an alleged delinquency in the administration of public affairs which is called in question. ( Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N.Y., 155 .) The fact of owning taxable property is not such a peculiarity as

2015Defendant possessed a “valued right” to have his first trial completed (Hall v Potoker, 49 NY2d 501, 505 [1980]), “and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal” (Matter of Cardin v Sedita, 53 AD2d 253, 259 [1976], quoting United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 484 [1971]), or dismissal (see People v Hong Wu, 81 AD3d 849 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 796 [2011]).

1983(Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 [2d Cir., Friendly, J.], cert. den. 377 U.S. 934 ; Graves v. Associated Transp., 344 F.2d 894, 900 [4th Cir.]; Teitelbaum Furs v. Dominion Ins.

1983It is Con Ed’s position that these factors take this case out of the rule laid down by the Court of Appeals in Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx ( 24 NY2d 65, 71 ): “Although we have not previously said so, it is now evident that New York has adopted the full and fair opportunity test in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

1962(Matter of Martin, supra; Matter of Levinsen, 29 Misc 2d 697 ; Matter of Garrett, 9 A D 2d 545, affd. 8 N Y 2d 725.) Does the use of the words by the testator “necessary or proper ’ ’ in his will, take the case out of the rule applied in Matter of Martin (supra) ?

1962(Matter of Martin, supra; Matter of Levinsen, 29 Misc 2d 697 ; Matter of Garrett, 9 A D 2d 545, affd. 8 N Y 2d 725.) Does the use of the words by the testator “necessary or proper ’ ’ in his will, take the case out of the rule applied in Matter of Martin (supra) ?

1962(Matter of Martin, supra; Matter of Levinsen, 29 Misc 2d 697 ; Matter of Garrett, 9 A D 2d 545, affd. 8 N Y 2d 725.) Does the use of the words by the testator “necessary or proper ’ ’ in his will, take the case out of the rule applied in Matter of Martin (supra) ?

1961Presmeyer v. Board of Comrs. of Police, 59 N. Y. 92 ).

1961Presumably, by that argument they seek to take the case out of the rule that licenses granted under the police power are not property in any constitutional sense and may be revoked without hearing by whatever method the statute establishing the licensing system provides (Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657, 667 ; People ex rel.

1956Nor is there a presumption that the testator intended to create a contingent remainder (Matter of Weaver, 253 App. Div. 24, 29 , affd. 278 N. Y. 605 ; Matter of Lurrie, supra), and a debatable ease of intent — one that can be argued reasonably both ways — does not bring the case out of the rule which favors a vesting on the death of the testator (Matter of Ross, 281 App. Div. 470, 475 , affd. 308 N. Y. 724 ).

1956Nor is there a presumption that the testator intended to create a contingent remainder (Matter of Weaver, 253 App. Div. 24, 29 , affd. 278 N. Y. 605 ; Matter of Lurrie, supra), and a debatable ease of intent — one that can be argued reasonably both ways — does not bring the case out of the rule which favors a vesting on the death of the testator (Matter of Ross, 281 App. Div. 470, 475 , affd. 308 N. Y. 724 ).

1956Nor is there a presumption that the testator intended to create a contingent remainder (Matter of Weaver, 253 App. Div. 24, 29 , affd. 278 N. Y. 605 ; Matter of Lurrie, supra), and a debatable ease of intent — one that can be argued reasonably both ways — does not bring the case out of the rule which favors a vesting on the death of the testator (Matter of Ross, 281 App. Div. 470, 475 , affd. 308 N. Y. 724 ).

1956Nor is there a presumption that the testator intended to create a contingent remainder (Matter of Weaver, 253 App. Div. 24, 29 , affd. 278 N. Y. 605 ; Matter of Lurrie, supra), and a debatable ease of intent — one that can be argued reasonably both ways — does not bring the case out of the rule which favors a vesting on the death of the testator (Matter of Ross, 281 App. Div. 470, 475 , affd. 308 N. Y. 724 ).

1956Nor is there a presumption that the testator intended to create a contingent remainder (Matter of Weaver, 253 App. Div. 24, 29 , affd. 278 N. Y. 605 ; Matter of Lurrie, supra), and a debatable ease of intent — one that can be argued reasonably both ways — does not bring the case out of the rule which favors a vesting on the death of the testator (Matter of Ross, 281 App. Div. 470, 475 , affd. 308 N. Y. 724 ).

1954A leading authority is Welsh v. Cornell ( 168 N. Y. 508 ).

1947(See, also, Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U. S. 171 ; Kohn v. Wilkes-Barre Dry Goods Co., 139 Misc. 116 ; Fickett v. Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 162 Misc. 18 ; Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Colonial Theatre, Inc., 165 Misc. 948 .) In the final analysis, it would indeed be farfetched to hold that a department store retailing merchandise exclusively within the State of Ohio was “ doing business ” within the State of New York, when it sold not a single dollar’s worth of merchandise in this State, when it solicited no orders in this State for the sale of its merchandi

1947(See, also, Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U. S. 171 ; Kohn v. Wilkes-Barre Dry Goods Co., 139 Misc. 116 ; Fickett v. Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 162 Misc. 18 ; Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Colonial Theatre, Inc., 165 Misc. 948 .) In the final analysis, it would indeed be farfetched to hold that a department store retailing merchandise exclusively within the State of Ohio was “ doing business ” within the State of New York, when it sold not a single dollar’s worth of merchandise in this State, when it solicited no orders in this State for the sale of its merchandi

1947(See, also, Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U. S. 171 ; Kohn v. Wilkes-Barre Dry Goods Co., 139 Misc. 116 ; Fickett v. Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 162 Misc. 18 ; Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Colonial Theatre, Inc., 165 Misc. 948 .) In the final analysis, it would indeed be farfetched to hold that a department store retailing merchandise exclusively within the State of Ohio was “ doing business ” within the State of New York, when it sold not a single dollar’s worth of merchandise in this State, when it solicited no orders in this State for the sale of its merchandi

1947(Rosenberg Bros, & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516 .) The additional element of interviewing personnel for employment outside of the State of New York does not pertain to1 ‘ doing business ” in this State and does not take the case out of the rule laid down in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co. (supra).

1947(Rosenberg Bros, & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516 .) The additional element of interviewing personnel for employment outside of the State of New York does not pertain to1 ‘ doing business ” in this State and does not take the case out of the rule laid down in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co. (supra).

1947(See, also, Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U. S. 171 ; Kohn v. Wilkes-Barre Dry Goods Co., 139 Misc. 116 ; Fickett v. Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 162 Misc. 18 ; Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Colonial Theatre, Inc., 165 Misc. 948 .) In the final analysis, it would indeed be farfetched to hold that a department store retailing merchandise exclusively within the State of Ohio was “ doing business ” within the State of New York, when it sold not a single dollar’s worth of merchandise in this State, when it solicited no orders in this State for the sale of its merchandi

1947(See, also, Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U. S. 171 ; Kohn v. Wilkes-Barre Dry Goods Co., 139 Misc. 116 ; Fickett v. Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 162 Misc. 18 ; Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Colonial Theatre, Inc., 165 Misc. 948 .) In the final analysis, it would indeed be farfetched to hold that a department store retailing merchandise exclusively within the State of Ohio was “ doing business ” within the State of New York, when it sold not a single dollar’s worth of merchandise in this State, when it solicited no orders in this State for the sale of its merchandi

1946The rule in cases of guaranteed mortgage certificates, wherein certificates held by the guarantor corporation have been subordinated, such as Ferris v. Prudence Realization Corp. ( 292 N. Y. 210 , affd. sub nom.

1930(Beltz v. City of Yonkers, 148 N. Y. 67 ; Hamilton v. City of Buffalo, 173 id. 72 ; Butler v. Village of Oxford, 186 id. 444; Gastel v. City of New York, 194 id. 15; Terry v. Village of Perry, 199 id. 79; Lalor v. City of New York, 208 id. 431; Smith v. City of New York, 223 id. 608; Eger v. City of New York, 239 id. 561; Kuhn v. Village of East Syracuse, 209 App. Div. 186 ; McCoy v. City of Utica, 143 id. 634; Vanderborg v. City of New York, 158 id. 297; Duffy v. City of New York, 149 id. 478; Henry v. City of New York, 119 id. 432; Scholl v. City of New York, 88 id. 64.) There was no unusual

1930(Beltz v. City of Yonkers, 148 N. Y. 67 ; Hamilton v. City of Buffalo, 173 id. 72 ; Butler v. Village of Oxford, 186 id. 444; Gastel v. City of New York, 194 id. 15; Terry v. Village of Perry, 199 id. 79; Lalor v. City of New York, 208 id. 431; Smith v. City of New York, 223 id. 608; Eger v. City of New York, 239 id. 561; Kuhn v. Village of East Syracuse, 209 App. Div. 186 ; McCoy v. City of Utica, 143 id. 634; Vanderborg v. City of New York, 158 id. 297; Duffy v. City of New York, 149 id. 478; Henry v. City of New York, 119 id. 432; Scholl v. City of New York, 88 id. 64.) There was no unusual

1930(Beltz v. City of Yonkers, 148 N. Y. 67 ; Hamilton v. City of Buffalo, 173 id. 72 ; Butler v. Village of Oxford, 186 id. 444; Gastel v. City of New York, 194 id. 15; Terry v. Village of Perry, 199 id. 79; Lalor v. City of New York, 208 id. 431; Smith v. City of New York, 223 id. 608; Eger v. City of New York, 239 id. 561; Kuhn v. Village of East Syracuse, 209 App. Div. 186 ; McCoy v. City of Utica, 143 id. 634; Vanderborg v. City of New York, 158 id. 297; Duffy v. City of New York, 149 id. 478; Henry v. City of New York, 119 id. 432; Scholl v. City of New York, 88 id. 64.) There was no unusual

1930It is not to be taken as a finding that the first felony ended with a suspension of the sentence and probation, for while the verdict is based on the indictment, in a larger sense it is based on the evidence, and as above pointed out, the testimony of defendant established that the suspended sentence later ripened into an executed judgment, thus taking the case out of the rule of People v. Schaller (supra).

1929L., H. & P. Co., 220 App. Div. 18 ; affd., 246 N. Y. 544 .) The Attorney-General urges in his brief that the holding in the Hall case “ should be limited to the facts, that is, where a certificate had been issued to the minor by the proper authorities under subd. 3 of § 14a.” It does not appear that such certificate had been issued in the instant case, but this fact does not take the case out of the rule there declared.