case out rule in North Carolina

1969State v. Tingen, 247 N.C. 384 , 100 S.E. 2d 874 .

1969State v. Tingen, 247 N.C. 384 , 100 S.E. 2d 874 .

1969Assuming, arguendo, that this inculpatory statement made by the defendant takes this case out of the rule set forth in State v. Reddish, 269 N.C. 246 , 152 S.E. 2d 89 , we do not think the evidence establishes that the intoxication of the defendant was the proximate cause of the death of Kemp Page.

1969Assuming, arguendo, that this inculpatory statement made by the defendant takes this case out of the rule set forth in State v. Reddish, 269 N.C. 246 , 152 S.E. 2d 89 , we do not think the evidence establishes that the intoxication of the defendant was the proximate cause of the death of Kemp Page.

1963Also, in the case of Ratley v. Oliver, 229 N.C. 120 , 47 S.E. 2d 703 , •the devise -was to W.

1963Also, in the case of Ratley v. Oliver, 229 N.C. 120 , 47 S.E. 2d 703 , •the devise -was to W.

1963Clark, C.J., ©peaking fioor the Court, ©aid: "The mile in Shelley’s ©ase wa© first stated, 1 Coke, 104, in 1581, .and is as follows: “When an ancestor, by 'any gift or 'conveyance, taketh an estate of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited, either 'mediately or immediately, ito his heirs in fee or in tail, the word heirs is a word of Imitation of the estate, and mot a word oif purchase.’ * * * “The worts, 'nearest heirs,’ mean ©imply ‘heirs,’ and do not take this case out of the rule.” Cox v. Heath, 198 N.C. 503 , 152 S.E. 388 .

1963Clark, C.J., ©peaking fioor the Court, ©aid: "The mile in Shelley’s ©ase wa© first stated, 1 Coke, 104, in 1581, .and is as follows: “When an ancestor, by 'any gift or 'conveyance, taketh an estate of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited, either 'mediately or immediately, ito his heirs in fee or in tail, the word heirs is a word of Imitation of the estate, and mot a word oif purchase.’ * * * “The worts, 'nearest heirs,’ mean ©imply ‘heirs,’ and do not take this case out of the rule.” Cox v. Heath, 198 N.C. 503 , 152 S.E. 388 .

1962In Moore v. Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424 , 199 S.E. 605 , this Court ap *429 proved the award of compensation by holding the evidence of injury by accident was sufficient to support the commission’s finding and to take the case out of the rule followed in Slade v. Hosiery Mills, supra, and Neely v. Statesville, 212 N.C. 365 , 193 S.E. 664 .

1962In Moore v. Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424 , 199 S.E. 605 , this Court ap *429 proved the award of compensation by holding the evidence of injury by accident was sufficient to support the commission’s finding and to take the case out of the rule followed in Slade v. Hosiery Mills, supra, and Neely v. Statesville, 212 N.C. 365 , 193 S.E. 664 .

1962In Moore v. Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424 , 199 S.E. 605 , this Court ap *429 proved the award of compensation by holding the evidence of injury by accident was sufficient to support the commission’s finding and to take the case out of the rule followed in Slade v. Hosiery Mills, supra, and Neely v. Statesville, 212 N.C. 365 , 193 S.E. 664 .

1962In Moore v. Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424 , 199 S.E. 605 , this Court ap *429 proved the award of compensation by holding the evidence of injury by accident was sufficient to support the commission’s finding and to take the case out of the rule followed in Slade v. Hosiery Mills, supra, and Neely v. Statesville, 212 N.C. 365 , 193 S.E. 664 .

1949In re Will of West, 227 N.C. 204 , 41 S.E. 2d 838 .

1949In re Will of West, 227 N.C. 204 , 41 S.E. 2d 838 .

1948In Crisp v. Biggs, supra, it was held that “The words ‘nearest heirs’ means simply heirs and do not take the case out of the rule”; and in Cox v. Heath, supra, it was said, “The ‘nearest heirs’ are all those persons upon whom the law would cast the inheritance—Those who are heirs are therefore necessarily nearest heirs.” The cases cited by defendants wherein the words “nearest blood relative” (Miller v. Harding, 167 N. C., 53 , 83 S. E., 25 ), “nearest relatives” (Fields v. Rollins, 186 N. C., 221 , 119 S. E., 207 ), and “nearest blood kindred” (Brown v. Mitchell, 207 N. C., 132 , 176 S. E., 2

1948In Crisp v. Biggs, supra, it was held that “The words ‘nearest heirs’ means simply heirs and do not take the case out of the rule”; and in Cox v. Heath, supra, it was said, “The ‘nearest heirs’ are all those persons upon whom the law would cast the inheritance—Those who are heirs are therefore necessarily nearest heirs.” The cases cited by defendants wherein the words “nearest blood relative” (Miller v. Harding, 167 N. C., 53 , 83 S. E., 25 ), “nearest relatives” (Fields v. Rollins, 186 N. C., 221 , 119 S. E., 207 ), and “nearest blood kindred” (Brown v. Mitchell, 207 N. C., 132 , 176 S. E., 2

1948In Crisp v. Biggs, supra, it was held that “The words ‘nearest heirs’ means simply heirs and do not take the case out of the rule”; and in Cox v. Heath, supra, it was said, “The ‘nearest heirs’ are all those persons upon whom the law would cast the inheritance—Those who are heirs are therefore necessarily nearest heirs.” The cases cited by defendants wherein the words “nearest blood relative” (Miller v. Harding, 167 N. C., 53 , 83 S. E., 25 ), “nearest relatives” (Fields v. Rollins, 186 N. C., 221 , 119 S. E., 207 ), and “nearest blood kindred” (Brown v. Mitchell, 207 N. C., 132 , 176 S. E., 2

1948In Crisp v. Biggs, supra, it was held that “The words ‘nearest heirs’ means simply heirs and do not take the case out of the rule”; and in Cox v. Heath, supra, it was said, “The ‘nearest heirs’ are all those persons upon whom the law would cast the inheritance—Those who are heirs are therefore necessarily nearest heirs.” The cases cited by defendants wherein the words “nearest blood relative” (Miller v. Harding, 167 N. C., 53 , 83 S. E., 25 ), “nearest relatives” (Fields v. Rollins, 186 N. C., 221 , 119 S. E., 207 ), and “nearest blood kindred” (Brown v. Mitchell, 207 N. C., 132 , 176 S. E., 2

1948In Crisp v. Biggs, supra, it was held that “The words ‘nearest heirs’ means simply heirs and do not take the case out of the rule”; and in Cox v. Heath, supra, it was said, “The ‘nearest heirs’ are all those persons upon whom the law would cast the inheritance—Those who are heirs are therefore necessarily nearest heirs.” The cases cited by defendants wherein the words “nearest blood relative” (Miller v. Harding, 167 N. C., 53 , 83 S. E., 25 ), “nearest relatives” (Fields v. Rollins, 186 N. C., 221 , 119 S. E., 207 ), and “nearest blood kindred” (Brown v. Mitchell, 207 N. C., 132 , 176 S. E., 2

1948In Crisp v. Biggs, supra, it was held that “The words ‘nearest heirs’ means simply heirs and do not take the case out of the rule”; and in Cox v. Heath, supra, it was said, “The ‘nearest heirs’ are all those persons upon whom the law would cast the inheritance—Those who are heirs are therefore necessarily nearest heirs.” The cases cited by defendants wherein the words “nearest blood relative” (Miller v. Harding, 167 N. C., 53 , 83 S. E., 25 ), “nearest relatives” (Fields v. Rollins, 186 N. C., 221 , 119 S. E., 207 ), and “nearest blood kindred” (Brown v. Mitchell, 207 N. C., 132 , 176 S. E., 2

1938Freeman v. Freeman, 141 N. C., 97 , 53 S. E., 620 .

1938Freeman v. Freeman, 141 N. C., 97 , 53 S. E., 620 .

1937The cases cited by appellants in support of their position (Miller v. Hortman-Salem, Co., 145 Sou., 786 [La.], and Commercial Securities Co. v. Mast, 28 P. [2d], 635 ), were actions by mortgagees against, tort-feasors.

1937R., 190 N. C., 480 ), and there is nothing in the record here to take this case out of the rule there laid down.

1937The cases cited by appellants in support of their position (Miller v. Hortman-Salem, Co., 145 Sou., 786 [La.], and Commercial Securities Co. v. Mast, 28 P. [2d], 635 ), were actions by mortgagees against, tort-feasors.

1933It would seem, therefore, that these provisions inserted in the deed of trust, take the case out of the principle announced in Collins v. Bass, 198 N. C., 99 , 150 S. E., 706 , Bank v. Purvis, 201 N. C., 753 , 161 S. E., 386 , to the effect that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale under the power contained in a mortgage is entitled to possession as against the tenant of the mortgagor claiming under a lease made with knowledge of the mortgage and after its maturity and default. 19 R.

1933It would seem, therefore, that these provisions inserted in the deed of trust, take the case out of the principle announced in Collins v. Bass, 198 N. C., 99 , 150 S. E., 706 , Bank v. Purvis, 201 N. C., 753 , 161 S. E., 386 , to the effect that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale under the power contained in a mortgage is entitled to possession as against the tenant of the mortgagor claiming under a lease made with knowledge of the mortgage and after its maturity and default. 19 R.

1933It would seem, therefore, that these provisions inserted in the deed of trust, take the case out of the principle announced in Collins v. Bass, 198 N. C., 99 , 150 S. E., 706 , Bank v. Purvis, 201 N. C., 753 , 161 S. E., 386 , to the effect that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale under the power contained in a mortgage is entitled to possession as against the tenant of the mortgagor claiming under a lease made with knowledge of the mortgage and after its maturity and default. 19 R.

1933It would seem, therefore, that these provisions inserted in the deed of trust, take the case out of the principle announced in Collins v. Bass, 198 N. C., 99 , 150 S. E., 706 , Bank v. Purvis, 201 N. C., 753 , 161 S. E., 386 , to the effect that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale under the power contained in a mortgage is entitled to possession as against the tenant of the mortgagor claiming under a lease made with knowledge of the mortgage and after its maturity and default. 19 R.

1916The provisions in the contract between the city of Raleigh and Wake Water Company upon which the receiver relies to take this case out of the principle adopted in Gorrell v. Water Co. , 124 N.C. 328 , are in substance the same as those in the contracts considered in Jones v. Water Co. , 135 N.C. 553 , and Morton v. Water Co. , 168 N.C. 582 , and we therefore hold, following these authorities, that the News and Observer Publishing Company had a right of action against the defendants as receivers of the Wake Water Company upon the allegations of negligence contained in the petition.

1916The provisions in the contract between the city of Raleigh and Wake Water Company upon which the receiver relies to take this case out of the principle adopted in Gorrell v. Water Co. , 124 N.C. 328 , are in substance the same as those in the contracts considered in Jones v. Water Co. , 135 N.C. 553 , and Morton v. Water Co. , 168 N.C. 582 , and we therefore hold, following these authorities, that the News and Observer Publishing Company had a right of action against the defendants as receivers of the Wake Water Company upon the allegations of negligence contained in the petition.

1916The provisions in the contract between the city of Raleigh and Wake Water Company upon which the receiver relies to take this case out of the principle adopted in Gorrell v. Water Co. , 124 N.C. 328 , are in substance the same as those in the contracts considered in Jones v. Water Co. , 135 N.C. 553 , and Morton v. Water Co. , 168 N.C. 582 , and we therefore hold, following these authorities, that the News and Observer Publishing Company had a right of action against the defendants as receivers of the Wake Water Company upon the allegations of negligence contained in the petition.

1910R., 142 N. C., 557 : “In tailing passage on a freight train a passenger assumes the usual risks incident to traveling on such trains, when managed by prudent and competent men in a careful manner.” We see nothing that takes this case out of this rule.

1909This takes the case out of the principle laid down in Bailey’s case, 149 N. C., 169 . 2.

1906There must be something in the circumstances surrounding the case tó take the case out of this rule before “the facts can speak for themselves.” As is said in Toomey v. Steel Works: “This is founded in reason and common sense.” 89 Mich., 249 .

1904This rule was applied in the case of Anderson v. Felton, 36 N. C., 55 , to a gift which was to take effect at the time the testator’s daughter “arrived to the age of fifteen years,” but there was no preceding life estate as there is in this case, and, in Rives v. Frizzle, 43 N. C., 237 , this was said to take the case out of the rule as stated in Anderson v. Felton.

1904This rule was applied in the case of Anderson v. Felton, 36 N. C., 55 , to a gift which was to take effect at the time the testator’s daughter “arrived to the age of fifteen years,” but there was no preceding life estate as there is in this case, and, in Rives v. Frizzle, 43 N. C., 237 , this was said to take the case out of the rule as stated in Anderson v. Felton.